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A False Start?

The Impact of Federal Policy
on the Genotec hnology Industry
Michael

J. Malinowski and Maureen A. O'Rourket

Imponant scientific discoveries in the field of human genetics have been
reponed in the nation's major newspapers since the beginning of the decade,
and these discoveries have given rise to a multi-billion dollar industry.Mr.
Malinowski and Professor 0'Rourke explore the impact of federal policy on
the field and the resulting industry. They argue that federal policy in suppon
of genetics research and development has not been followed by the introduction
of regulatory and health policy necessary for the efficient and responsible
commercialization of the industry's products. As a consequence, Mr.
Malinowski and Professor 0'Rourke suggest, federal policy may have given
rise to a ''false stan "for the industry. The authors suggest that, in light of the
potential impact of genetics products on human health and the societal and
ethical implications of said technologies, ignoring the policy and regulatory
questions surrounding genetics products is, at best, i"esponsible. Mr.
Malinowski and Professor 0'Rourke identify many of the regulatory
shoncomings and offer a series of refonns and suggestions to foster the
responsible commercialization of the fonhcoming generation of genetics
products.
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Introduction
Genotechnology is the subset of biotechnology concerned with human
genetics and associated with the scientific efforts and advances of the Human
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Genome Project (HGP) . 1 The business of genotechnol ogy is big m oney,
applied medicine, and as American in origin as the automobile industry and
Micros oft. 2 Biotech-related products generated annual sales of m ore tha n $7
bi llion in 1993 , approximately $7.7 billion in 1994, and $8.
7 billion in 1995.3
The total market for deoxyrib onucleic acid (DNA) diagn ostics is expected to
exceed $700 million by 19984 and could be m uch greater in the near future.
5
A single s uccessful drug , like Amgen Inc. 's6 anemia-fighting protein, Epogen,
1. HGP is discussed infra Section II.A. The use of the term "genotechnology" is
necessitated by the extreme breadth of the term "biotechnology," which has been defined as "any
process in which organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, or isolated enzymes are used to convert
biological or other raw materials to products of greater values, as well as the design and use of
reactors, fermenters, downstream processing, analytical and control equipment associated with
biological manufacturing processes." Rochelle K. Seide & Frank A. S mith, Intellectual Property
Protection and Biotechnology, N.Y. ST. B.J., May-June 1995, at 53 (citation omitted). See also
Thomas E. Lovejoy, Bugs, Plants and Progress, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 4, at 11
(highlighting expansion of biotechnology, from environmental bioremediation to genetic
engineering of organisms). "Biotechnology" and "biotech" are used where necessary for accuracy.
The authors thank Pat Jones for suggesting this terminology.
2. The industry's national trade and lobbying association, the Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), has 520 members in 47 states. G. STEVEN BURILL & KENNETH B. LEE, JR.,
BIOTECH 94: LoNG-TERM vALUE SHORT-TERM HURDLES l ( 1993) [hereinafter BIOTECH 94] (Ernst
& Young's eighth annual report on biotech industry). In 1994, 1311 biotech companies were
located in the United States, while 485 were located in Europe. G.STEVEN BURILL & KENNETH
B. LEE, JR., BIOTECH 96: PuRSUING SUSTAINABILITY 1, 39 (1995) [hereinafter BIOTECH 96]. The
Japanese-expected to challenge the United States' accomplishments, outstrip the United States'
investment in genotech, and even buy out huge numbers of United States companies-have not
made major investments in the industry nor issued any major product approvals. G. STEVEN
BURRILL & KENNETH B. LEE, JR., BIOTECH 95: REFORM, REsTRUCTURE, RENEWAL 21 (1994)
[hereinafter BIOTECH 95]. See generally Robert A. Bohrer, Foreword: lWiat is Biotechnology and
Why Devote a Law Review Symposium to Biotechnology Law?, 55 U. PITT . L. REV. 607, 608
(1994) ("Outside the United States, .. . biotechnological research and development is being
performed largely by traditional pharmaceutical and chemical companies either directly or in
collaboration with United States [genotech companies].") (footnotes omitted). For discussion of
the possibility that the genotechnology industry might migrate offshore, see BIOTECH 96, supra
at 56. The biotech industry has more than 30 Food & Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs
on the market as well as 637 approved biotech diagnostics. BIOTECH 94, supra at 35. Just 10 of
these drugs generated world-wide revenues exceeding $4.5 billion in 1993.BIOTECH 94, supra
at 30-31. The top 10 money-making drugs for 1995 are identified in A Survey of Biotechnology
and Genetics, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25-Mar.3, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter Survey].
3. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 14; BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15, 50; BIOTECH 94,

supra note 2, at 5, 74; see also infra Appendix I (listing genotech drugs approved for market by
FDA as of March 1995). Product sales for public biotech companies grew by 20% in 1994 and
21% in 1995. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 9; BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 22.
4. Paul H. Silverman, Commerce and Genetic Diagnostics, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
May-June 1995, at S l 6 (Special Supplement).
5. The huge potential of the gene diagnostic market was demonstrated by a recent survey
in which 91 % of breast cancer patients' immediate female relatives reported that they would want
to be tested for genetic predisposition to the disease, were such a test to become availiable. C.
Lerman et al., Interest in genetic testing among first-degree relatives of breast cancer patients,
57 AM. J. MED. GEN.385-92 (1995).
6. Amgen, based in Thousand Oaks, California, is the largest and most successful biotech
company in the world. See, e.g. , BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 70. In December 1994, it was one
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may generate close to $1 b illion in reve nue per year.7
Advances in genotech nology have been m ade considerably faster than
antic ipated a decade ago. 8 The Human Genome Project, an international effort
to map and sequence the genes on all twenty-three pairs of chromosomes,9
is advancing m ore rapidly than originally predicted. 10 Innovations in computer
technology tha t enhance the speed and precis ion of research and decrease

of only six companies awarded a National Medal of Technology by the President and United States
Department of Commerce.

7. Terry McDermott, The Rarest Thing on &rth: The Story ofan Elusive Blood Hormone,
A Determined Group of Seattle Researchers and Biotechnology's Power and Promise, SEA TILE
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at A l . Epogen, a hormone responsible for stimulating red blood cell
production which was isolated almost one decade ago, has been on the market for five years. Id.
Although the total amount produced and sold could fit within a bucket, epogen has generated $5
billion in sales. Id. ; cf. Lawrence M. Fisher, Biotech Discovery Announced IJy Firms, DAILY NEWS

OF L.A., June 17 , 1994, at B3 (two genotech drugs, Erythropoietin and Granulocyte Colony
Stimulating Factor, which stimulate red and white blood cell production respectively, have each
generated more than $1 billion in sales worldwide, making them the most successful genotech
products to date).

8. The following is a time-line of major discoveries and advances:
1953 James Watson and Francis Crick discover DNA's structure;
1966

Scientists elucidate the functional structure of genes-that they consist of groups of
three molecules, located in strands of DNA, which provide the code for particular
amino acids, the building blocks of proteins (see infra Section 1.1);

1973
1975

Stanford researchers are the first to clone genes;
Harvard researchers are the first to isolate and clone a mammalian gene (a
component of hemoglobin in rabbits);

1977
1988

A human gene is cloned for the first time;
Congress funds Human Genome Project (HGP);
FDA enacts accelerated regulatory process for products combatting terminal disease;

1989

A cystic fibrosis gene is identif ied and identification of other genes immediately

1990

Work on the Human Genome Project, a commitment of $3 billion over 15 years,

follows;
commences;
Dr. Venter introduces a method

for

sequencing human genes and distinguishing

genes (just 3% of DNA) from junk DNA; First human gene therapy is introduced;

1992

Dr. Venter leaves NilI to set up The Institute for Genetic Research (TIGR);
Several thousand gene sequences are identified, and NIH files patent applications
for them-thereby igniting international controversy;

1994
1995

Merck supports a massive sequencing effort at Washington University;
An estimated 85-90% of human genes are partially sequenced.

BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 60; John Carey, The Gene Kings, Bus. WK., May 8, 1995, at

72,

73. For an excellent overview of the accomplishments and health care potential of
genotech, see Survey, supra note 2. Many of the incredible possibilities that may be realized in
the near future are di scuss �d in Gene Bylinsky, Genetics: The Money Rush is On, FORTUNE, May
_
mto the mechanisms behind human cancers, obtained in part through
30, 1994, at 94. Insights
genotech, are explained in Webster K. Cavenee & Raymond L. White, The Genetic Basis of

Cancer, SCI. AM., Mar. 1995, at 72.

9. JOS EPHLEVINE&DAVIDSUZUICI, THESECRETOFLIFE30-31 (1993); see infra Section
II.A.

10. See, e.g., Positional Cloning Approach Expedites Gene Hunts, HUM. GENOME NEWS,
Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1-2 ; U.S. Human Genome Project Updates Goals, HUM. GENOMENEWs, Nov.

1993, at 1.
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human error are accelerating the rate of progress. 11
The promise , possibilities, and challenges of the genotech industry are
many times greater than what i s readily visible.12 There are at least 5000
1
genetically-related diseases and conditions for which there are no cures. 3
Genotech-based advances in human health care will be as profound as those
associated with anesthesia and antibiotics;14 some may prove even more
profound. 15 Diagnostics that identify faulty genetic sequences associated with
cancers

and

other

common

diseases

and

therapeutics

that

counteract

predispositions for disease should be available by the end of this century or
early in the next, thereby injecting multiple billions of dollars into the
6
industry. 1
The business of genotechnology is built upon an idiosyncratic collection
of alliances between academics, venture capitalists, for-profit and not-for-profit
institutions , large federal agencies, multi-national pharmaceutical companies
(pharmas), and small, entrepreneurial firms. While the accomplishments of the
genotech industry are largely attributable to the private sector and academia ,
the federal government has deliberately and extensively fostered the industry's
growth in an effort to improve the nation's health care capability. As discussed
in detail in Section II, federal policy has played an important role in the
unprecedented advances in the science of genotech and the almost immediate
emergence of a genotech industry characterized by commercial alliances
between the public and private sectors.
Unfortunately , federal policy regarding genotech has been grossly short
sighted. Rapid advances in genotech research and product development have
not been accompanied by the legal and regulatory advancements necessary for
responsible commercialization of genotechnologies. For example, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have

1 1 . See, e.g., Ralph T. King Jr. , Gene Machines: An Eclectic Scientist Gives Biotechnology

a Fast Assembly Line, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1995, at Al, AS; Positional Cloning Approach
Expedites Gene Hunts, supra note 10, at 1-2.

12.

See generally

BIOTECH 96,

supra note 2 (phanna and genotech company contributions

THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP INC., THE
CONTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES: WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR AMERICA 65-67 (Sept.

to human

health

have

been profound);

,

1993) (" Biotechnology is a breakthrough in biological understanding that will eventually lead to
a revolution in available disease treatm ents . " ) .
1 3 . Ralph Oman, Biotech Patenting Issues Raise Ethical Concerns,
1995, at C42, C42.
14.

See Lissa Morgenthaler, Just What the Doctor Ordered,

NAT'L L.J., May 8,

BARRON'S, Sept. 20, 1993,

at 10 ("Some scientists have hailed gene therapy . . . as the fourth great advance in health care,
after sanitation, anesthesia and pharmaceuticals . " ) .
15.

See generally infra Section I. A. (addressing the status and importance of the industry).

16. See Carey, supra note 8, at 72, 78. But see Christine Gorman, Has Gene Therapy
Stalled?, TIME, Oct. 9, 1 995, at 62-63 (noting that while gene therapy holds extraordinary
promise, enthusiasm and financial pressures may have caused a premature push to market that
is sacrificing basic science and human safety for a quick return on investment).

167

The Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 13: 163, 1996

begun only recently to adapt their review processes in a meaningful way to
account for the unique risks and potentials for profit of genotechnologies.
Neither state nor federal policymakers have acted to ensure that genotech
commercialization proceeds responsibly within an appropriate regulatory and
ethical framework. This failure, among other things, has allowed some
commercial and academic laboratories to bypass regulatory and ethical quality
controls in their efforts to commercialize gene tests predicting future health
risks.17
The absence of a coherent and comprehensive federal policy has widened
the gap between genotech' s scientific and medical advances and the regulatory
and legal mechanisms needed to ensure that genotechnologies are made
available quickly and used responsibly and safely. The end result is an industry
built upon inflated short-term expectations and subject to extremely variable
investment cycles. As a result, financially vulnerable firms are rushing to
commercialize emerging HGP technologies. Critics allege that scientific
judgment is being sacrificed for quick profits.
The lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory infrastructure has created
a growing danger that public misunderstandings of the genotechnologies and
a few widely publicized failures could result in stop-gap policymaking rather
than policymaking based on a thoughtful assessment of the risks and potential
posed by genotech. This danger is increasing as more commercial applications
of genotech are introduced into the healthcare market.
This Article will first present an overview of the genotech industry and
how federal policy has shaped and continues to influence the science and
business of genotech. Section I provides a brief summary of the basic scientific
foundations and medical applications of genotech and discusses the nature of
the industry. Section II describes the federal government's past and present
involvement in the industry.
Section III proposes policy changes that would promote the government's
interests in genotech development, yet take into consideration the risks and
ethical issues presented by these novel technologies. 18 We suggest that the
federal government has been too hasty and short-sighted in its s upport of the

17. Such was the conclusion reached by an HGP task force in a report released at the
October 1995 annual meeting of the American Society of Human Genetics. Richard Saltus, Survey
of Labs, New Tests Concerns Genetics Specialists, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1995, at 14. In a
report issued in early 1995, the Institute of Medicine's Committee on Assessing Genetic Risks

!

conc uded that as gen�tic screening becomes more widespread, public policy needs may quite
possibly outrun the ethical and regulatory standards in place. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS 24782 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994).
18. Many of the serious implications of these technologies are identified and mentioned
briefly throughout this Article, but are not fully explored; one of the most obvious is who will
pay for patient use of the technologies. Such questions require comprehensive and careful
treatment, both by policymakers and scholars, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
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industry, thereby giving rise to a "false start" for the genotech industry. 19
While federal policy has facilitated the accelerating scientific accomplishments
of the industry, policymakers and drug regulators have begun only recently
to respond to the novelty of genotechnologies and the unique issues they raise.
The delay is underscored by the fact that the advancement of genotechnology
and many of these issues have been foreseeable for years.
Section III also addresses another aspect of this "false start." Ironically,
in the absence of the legal and regulatory infrastructure necessary to
commercialize genotechnologies, the scientific success of HGP is escalating
the potential for irresponsible applications of genotechnologies and reactionary
public policymaking. lnvestors in genotechnology have lofty expectations, but
are notoriously short-sighted

and jittery.

The absence of policymaking

addressing the social and ethical implications of genotech capabilities is
becoming more ominous as those capabilities continue to advance and expand,
and genotech-based products reach commerce. Without the appropriate legal
and regulatory infrastructure, the overall impact of federal policy on the
genotech industry may be to delay and impede the marketing of genotech
diagnostics and therapeutics, thereby defeating the central objective of HGP.
We do not propose that genotechnologies be made generally available before
adequate policy safeguards are in place and the efficacy of the technologies
is fully evaluated. We do, however, suggest that any regulatory policies that
slow the availability of these technologies should be carefully and deliberately
considered and implemented. A central premise of this Article is that delaying
the introduction of genotechnologies due to lack of reasoned policy decisions
is irresponsible.
Accordingly, Section III sets forth proposals to improve federal policy.
It focuses primarily on two

things:

(1)

creating

a more certain legal

environment to reduce investment volatility; and (2) adjusting federal processes
to encourage efficient yet prudent review of genotechnologies, with the hope
that these proposals will help to bring genotech products to market in a manner
that is both timely and responsible.
I.

The Accomplishments and Promise of Genotechnology
It is no coincidence that the great majority of the world's genotech

companies are located within

the United States.20 As discussed below,

although the industry's accomplishments are very much attributable to private
enterprise and academic excellence, the United States government has been

19.

Cf. Gorman,

supra

note 16, at 62-63 (suggesting that the rush to develop and

commercialize gene therapies may have misdirected efforts away from necessary, basic scientific
research).
20.

See

supra

note 2 and accompanying text.
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deliberately fostering the underlying science and growth of the genotech
industry. As a result, the industry, although perhaps still nascent in terms of
actual commercialization of diagnostics and therapeutics, has attained a
substantial domestic and international presence within a remarkably brief
period of time.21 For example, Genentech, Inc., one of the most successful
genotech companies to date, was founded in
In

1 976 with a $1000 investment.22

1994, the company generated $795 .4 million in revenue.23
The

genotech

industry

has

realized

the

vast

majority

of

its

accomplishments within just the last five years. Consider that five years ago,
less than five percent of all human genes had been identified. Now, DNA
sequences representing parts of eighty-five to ninety percent of all genes have
been identified,

and the scientific community is rapidly matching these

sequences to gene functions.24 The following is a discussion of the present
importance of the industry and the federal policy that has contributed to the
industry's accomplishments.
A.

The Science and Medicine of Genotech
Medical science is moving from a century dominated by physical science

into one dominated by biological science.25 Health care and drug development
are undergoing a fundamental change in methodology. In the past, medical care
was generally directed towards immunizing against disease and suppressing
the symptoms of those diseases that could not be prevented. Now, however,
medical researchers are attempting to u nderstand the biochemical intricacies
which cause health conditions.26 As they come to understand the biochemical
functions of genes, scientists will be able to identify and correct the specific
defects that cause illnesses.27 Thus, rather than just treating or supressing
21. Id.
22. McDermott, supra note 7, at Al.
23. Steve Ginsberg, Genentech Buys Chevron Umd for Expansion, SAN. FRAN. Bus.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at 6. In the third quarter of 1995, Genentech generated $40.2 million in
profit, compared to $33.6 million in the third quarter of 1994. Third-Quarter 1995 Profits/or 711
Companies, WA LL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at AS.
24. Carey, supra note 8, at 73. However, less than 5% of the genetic code has been
sequenced fully, meaning that the precise nucleotide composition of more than 95 % of the human
genome is yet to be determined. Mariette DiChristina, Unraveling the Mystery of Life, BoSTONIA,
Fall 1995, at 16.
25. See generally BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note 12, at 65.
26. This emphasis on fully understanding and influencing the impact of biochemistry on
human health has been coined "Dar winian" or "evolutionary" medicine. See Terry McDermott,
Darwinian Medicine: It's a War Out There and Margie Poifet, a Leading Theorist in a New
Science, Thinks the Human Body Does Some Pretty Weird Things, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31, 1994,
at 10.

27. See Craig W. Johnson, Recent Developments in Venture Capital Financing for
Biotechnology Companies, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: Bus., L. AND
REG., Nov. 18, 1993 , available in WEST LAW, C886 ALl-ABA l , 4. ("[A]s the collective
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symptoms, the genotech industry aims to identify and attack the root causes
of disease.
Medical applications of genotech are already moving rapidly towards the
healthcare marketplace. Biotech-related investigative new drug applications
(INDs) now represent

forty-five percent of all INDs.28 Approximately 2000

biologically-derived drugs are in developmental stages and over

494 products

are in human clinical trials, the last prerequisite for seeking full marketing
approval from the FDA.29 Approximately 120 of these drugs are in Phase III
advanced clinical trials, a stage reached by fewer than twenty percent of all
drugs entering human trials.30 Genotech products are likely to reach market
quickly over the next several years because multinational pharmaceuticals have
recently

begun

investing

money

and

other

resources

into

genotech

companies,31 which i n turn has helped renew investor confidence in the
industry. 32

1.

The Science of Genotech

The human body consists of an estimated 60 to

100 trillion cells, each

of which, with a few exceptions, has a full complement of twenty-three pairs
of chromosomes containing 60,000 to 100,000 genes.33 In terms of scale, if
the human cell is equated to the earth, then the cell's nucleus is the equivalent
of a continent, each chromosome the equivalent of a state, individual molecules
of chromosomal DNA the equivalents of cities, genes the equivalents of

understanding of the body's chemical mechanisms becomes clearer (the human genome project
is an example), new approaches to drug development to promote or retard these mechanisms for
therapeutic purposes becomes more obvious. ") The accomplishments of the genotech industry also
have redirected the course of the research and development efforts of pharmaceutical companies.

See Carey, supra note 8, at 76-77 (noting that, whereas drugmakers have had to test thousands
of chemicals to find one that alleviates a particular medical symptom, they now have begun to
understand the underlying biology and as a result narrow their research to find proteins or other
molecules that block or activate particular biochemical pathways).
28.
29.

BIOTECH 94, supra note 2, at 38.

BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 23 (relying upon Goldman Sachs data); Swiss Betting
Big On Biotechnology, ORLA N DO SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 1995, at Bl.
30. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 23-24. The drug-approval process is discussed infra at

Section II.D. l .
31. Bylinsky, supra note 8 , at 95, 108; Lawrence M. Fisher, Gene Project is Already Big
Business Pro.fit Potential Heavily Based on Public Research, SAN JosE MERCURY NEWS Jan. 30,
,

1994, at 9A (expecting products to be in the marketplace by 1998-99).
32. Ellie McCormack, Biotech Stocks Regain Health: Share Prices are Rising Amid Flood

ofSecondary Offerings, BOSTON Bus. J. , Aug. 18-24, 1995, at 1, 28; see also BIOTECH 96, supra

note 2, at 9-10.
33. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 67; Michael Kirby, The Human Genome
Project-Promise and Problems, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y I, 8 (Fall 1994); Carey,
supra note 8 , at 74. But see LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 67 ("[T]he of�-quoted es�im tes

�

of 100,000 genes are relatively arbitrary, and may well understate our geneuc complexity. ).
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specific streets, and the nucleotides of which the genes are comprised the
equivalents of houses on those streets. 34

•
Each gene is a unique sequence of DNA that, when active, encodes a

�6 uniq�e

protein or protein fragment. 35• Each protein, in tu�n, consists ?f
.
combination of the twenty ammo acids
that comprise all protems.

While

each cell contains the entire complement of an individual's chromosomes,
different genes are active in different cell types and at different times, so cells
differ in protein content and perform different functions. 37 This great variety
of composition and distribution allows proteins to perform the extraordinary
assortment of tasks that together give living organisms their structural forms
and capacities for action.

A person's visible characteristics (his or her "phenotype") are thus
controlled by his or her genetic makeup ("genotype") and environmental
factors. 38 By instructing cells how and when to make proteins, genes help
determine, for example, whether we are tall or short, good at hitting home
runs, predisposed to developing colon or breast cancer, likely to produce
healthy children, 39 or destined to be stricken with Huntington's disease. 40
Scientists can map the chromosomes-that is, identify where genes are situated
precisely within the universe of the human genome-because each gene
occupies a particular spot on a particular chromosome.41 Recently and for the
first time,

scientists deciphered

the entire

1,830,121 DNA bases-of a living organism,

DNA sequence-a chain of

Hemophilus influenza.42

The

long-term objective of HGP is to do the same for the human body. 43 Scientists
have already sequenced fragments of eighty-five to ninety percent of the

34. This analogy, although slightly altered, is borrowed from Bylinsky, supra note 8, at
%.
35. The DNA of the 23 pairs of chromosomes is made up of about 3 billion nucleotide
pairs, of which only about 3% are thought to comprise genes. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9,
at 18, 28; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100; Carey, supra note 8, at 74-75. Each nucleotide contains
one of four elements (or "bases") that comprise the fundamental four-letter molecular code.
LEVINE& SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 18-19. Even a small gene contains 3,000 base pairs, and genes
can be much larger. Id. at 18.
36. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 19; Christopher A. Michaels, Biotechnology and
the Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y
247 , 250
(1994).
37. LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 11, 64-66.
38. See, e.g., id. at 220-251.
39. For a discussion of prenatal genetic screening and related ethical
issues see Michael
J Malinowski, Coming Into Being: Law, Ethics, and the Practice
of Prenatal Gene c Screening'
45 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1994).

rl

·

Seide & Smith, supra note I, at 53-54; Carey, supra note 8,
at 72.
41. O�an supra note 13, at C42; see also LEVINE & SUZUKI,
supra note 9, at 28-29.
:
42. Scientists Decode a DNA Sequence, BosTON GLOBE,
May 26, 1995, at 10.
43. L�VINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 30-31; see also
Carey, supra note 8, at 77
"
( Experf:8 believe a database of all human genes must be
laden with clues to previously unknow n
.
b1ochem1cal pathways that could be manipulated to treat or
prevent the disease.").
40.
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estimated 100,000 genes.44 It is virtually certain that researchers will have
sequenced all human genes and know the amino acid composition of all human
proteins by the year 2010. 45
Mapping and sequencing genes is frequently only the beginning of a
researcher's task, as is underscored by the fact that the human and chimpanzee
genomes differ in DNA content by only about 1.5 percent.46 The real
challenge is identifying what genes do and how they contribute to phenotypic
characteristics, especially those associated with disease.47 Generally, scientists
must determine what protein(s) a gene sequence (or combination of sequences)
encodes and then identify and trace the gene's role in cellular processes.48
The task is even more difficult when the subject of research is a condition, like
asthma or diabetes, that may result from multiple gene defects on more than
one chromosome.49
Nonetheless, scientists have already identified genetic defects associated
with approximately 200 conditions, including Huntington's disease, cystic
fibrosis, several cancers, and Alzheimer's disease.50 In just the last six
months, scientists have isolated and confirmed genetic links to obesity in
mice, 51 found an inherited genetic mutation in humans that appears to cause
44. Carey, supra note 8, at 74.

45.

See Survey, supra note 2, at S4 ("It is entirely conceivable that, by the end of the

century, scientists will know the true names [sequences] of all the proteins the human body uses;
it is inconceivable that the names should not be known by 2010 . ... Once all the genes have been
cloned, the raw stuff of all human inheritance will be laid bare. The implications of
that go far beyond the fortunes of a bunch of biotechnology companies.").

46. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 96. Even fruit flies make proteins that are identical or
similar to those made by human

genes. Id.

The genetic simililarities between humans,

chimpanzees, and fruit flies suggest just how subtle, complex, and difficult to uncover are the
connections between genotype and phenotype. Yet interspecies genetic similarities are essential
to the study of human genetics. See generally LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 2 1-33. The vast
majority of the techniques used in genotech research were developed for research on bacteria and
viruses. Id.
47.

For examples of how such puzzles have been solved by researchers, see, for example,

Survey, supra note 2, at S6; McDermott, supra note 7, at Al.
48.

See, e.g., Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 99-101.

49.

Such conditions are termed "polygenic" or "multifactorial." Id. at 100; Malinowski,

supra note 39, at 1440.

50. Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 1 1; Richard Saltus, Early Alzheimer's: Do You Want
to Know?, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1995, at 39, 43 [hereinafter Saltus, Do You Want to Know?].

Researchers have identified a gene that causes a form of early-onset, familial Alzheimer's thought
to afflict approximately 200,000 of the four million who have Alzheimer's. Richard Saltus, Gene
that Causes Early Alzheimer's is Reported Found, BoSTON GLOBE, June 29, 1995, at 1, 17. The

most common form of Alzheimer's, which accounts for about 85% of all cases, is believed to
result from a combination of genetic predispositions and environmental factors. Id.; Saltus, Do
You Want to Know?, supra.
51.

Richard Saltus, Weight Loss Hormone Reported, BoSTON GLOBE, July 27, 1995, at

I, 10. Scientists isolated a hormone, called "Ieptin" and produced by an "obesity" gene identified

last year, that controls obesity in both "obesity"-mutant and normal mice. Id. Researchers also
identified a second gene, "tub," associated with obesity in mice. Id. Some scientists are skeptical,
however, that the discovery of these genes in mice will result in products for people any time
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a propensity for adult-onset diabetes and obesity ,52 and shown that a gene
thought to be involved in Alzheimer's disease may serve as a marker for life
expectancy. 53 Furthermore, discoveries from research targeting specific
diseases and conditions are elucidating entirely different diseases and
conditions. The search for a vaccine against HIV, for example , may benefit
cancer and tuberculosis patients;54 deadly microbes like the Ebola virus may
eventually be defeated by means of discoveries made in work on other viral
systems.55
2.

Transforming Science into Diagnostics and Therapeutics

The genotech industry has come a long way since the introduction of the
first medical genotech product, a version of insulin. 56 The most important
contribution from the patient perspective is the advent of gene therapy . 57 Gene
therapy, 58 albeit still in nascent form , is a reality which has been in existence
since 1990.59 In fact, as of 1993, well over 100 gene therapy procedures had
soon.
at 3.

See Richard Saltus, Some Scientists Skeptical of a Cure, BOSTON GLOBE, July 28, 1995,

52. Alison Bass, Genetic Mutation, Obesity: A New Link Area ls Relaled to Inadequate
Calorie Burning, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. IO, 1995, at 4.
53. Jerry E. Bishop, A Gene Gives a Hint Of How Long a Person Might Hope to Live,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1995, at 1, 14.
54. Many therapeutic vaccines are being tested in people with AIDS and, if successful,
could lead to treatments for other viral infections, cancer, and a variety of immune deficiencies.
See Aids Vaccine Effort Offers Unseen Benefits, O RLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.21, 1993, at G7.
However, several clinical studies of vaccines have had very dissappointing results. See, e.g., John
Crewdson, Hope Fades for AIDS Vaccine Soon: Results of Tests Dissappointing, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov.12, 1995, at 1 (prospects for AIDS vaccine by turn of century dimmed further after
failure of gpl20 vaccine to protect high-risk volunteers from contracting IIlV; researchers'
estimates of when a successful vaccine will be found range from five to 25 years). There is also
concern that the experimental vaccine will be ineffective against other strains of IIlV which have
slightly altered surface proteins. Carey, supra note 8, at 77.
55. An outbreak of the Ebola virus killed over 200 people in Zaire earlier this year.

Science Briefs: Army Joins Hunt for Ebola 's Source, BosTON GLOBE, June 12, 1995, at 29; see
generally RICHARD PREsTON, THE HOT ZoNE (1994).
56. Survey, supra note 8, at S5; see generally Appendix I .
57. See Lawrence M . Fisher, Bottling the Stuff of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1995,
at DI (stating that companies developing these technologies are "edging closer to unlocking the
therapy's vast potential to correct genetic defects and, in theory at least, treat almost every disease
known to man").

But see Gorman, supra note 16 (contending that safe and effective gene therapy

is a Jong way off and quoting the NIH's Dr. Harold Varmus, who is concerned that government
is not getting its money's worth from its gene therapy investment: "My intuition tells me that we
need to emphasize more basic aspects of gene therapy research.").
58. "Gene therapy involves inserting genes into a cell of an individual to compensate for
a deficiency or to give the cell a new characteristic." Daniel Sutherland, New Area Company 10
Work on Gene Therapy, WASH. PosT., Mar. 4, 1993, at D12.
59. Oman, supra note 13, at C42 ("On September 14, 1990, 4-year-old Ashanti

DeSilva-who had been born without a working immune system resulting from a rare disorder
called SCID, or sever combined immune deficiency-was given new genes to correct the defect.
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been approved for and were in clinical trials in the United States and
Europe. 60 One of the newest products to reach the market, administered
through inhalers , is a treatment for cystic fibrosis, a disease afflicting 30,000
Americans . 6 1
The general premise of gene therapy is that genes contain the recipes for
proteins, and defective genes make defective proteins . 62 Among the various
approaches to and technologies associated with gene therapy,63 one
methodology (in vivo) is to isolate, purify, and introduce the desired gene into
the body, and then into cells' genomes , by means of a vector, such as an
inactive virus with a prowess for penetrating cells ; another approach (ex vivo)
involves introducing the gene into cells that have been removed from the

. . . This was the first time gene therapy had been administered to a human in an attempt to cure
disease. Ashanti, now eight years old, is able to attend school and lead a normal childhood. ")
(footnote omitted) . In October 1995, scientists declared this first gene therapy a success. See
Dolores Kong, Study: First Gene Therapy a Success, BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3.
60. Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 10.
6 1 . Natalie Angier, Gene Therapy Begins for Fatal Lung Disease, N . Y. TIMES, Apr . 20,
1993 , at CS (reporting on the therapy) ; Marilyn Chase, Genentech 's Cystic Fibrosis Treatment
is Unanimously Cleared by the FDA Panel, WALL ST. J . , Aug. 10, 1993, at B6. The search for
the cystic fibrosis gene cost $150 million and took three years. John Carey, Gene Hunters Go/or
Big Score, Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 1993, at 98. Analysts estimate that Genentech's treatment,
Fyurmean DNase, will generate $300 million in annual revenues by 1996 and up to $500 million
worldwide; however, Genentech's window ofopportunity to recoup its investment may not remain
open for long: gene therapy has "potential to cure CF, thereby making DNase obsolete." Joan
Hamilton, A Star Drug is Born, Bus. WK . , Aug. 23, 1993, at 66. But see Jerry E. Bishop,
Biotechnology: . . . but Trials Deflate Hope for Therapies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at B l
(reporting failure of attempt to use genetically engineered common cold virus to insert normal gene
into CF patients).
62. See LEVINE & SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 192-93, 195 (gene therapy is human genetic
engineering aimed at correcting or replacing defective genes); Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 108
(objective of gene therapy is to introduce new genes into cells to restore production of proteins
that, when missing or mutated, cause disease); Morgenthaler, supra note 14, at 10 (objective of
gene therapy is to get the necessary protein to the appropriate sites within cells without the
problems associated with conventional drugs).
63 . Carey, supra note 8, at 75. HGS and its affiliates are sequencing DNA fragments
(called cDNA) from almost all human genes with the objective of establishing a database resource
for the research and development of therapies. Id. at 76. The data base allows researchers to
identify human analogs of genes identified in yeast, bacteria, or other research organisms, and
vice versa. See, e.g. , id. (In December, 1993 , two Johns Hopkins University oncologists "were
racing to catch up with rivals at Harvard and the University of Vermont in a hunt for the gene
that, when flawed, causes inherited colon cancer. They suspected that the gene normally fixes
errors made when cells copy DNA during cell division and had in hand such a gene from yeast.
So, in what many see as a vindication of the cDNA approach, they agreed to cede product rights
[to HGS] in return for access to HGS's database. In minutes, they found the human version.").
Other companies are taking a more focused approach. For example, Myriad Genetics, Sequana,
Mercator and Millennium are studying families with high incidences of diseases such as diabetes
and cancer to identify the underlying genetic mechanisms. Id. at 78. Sequana Therapeutics is
searching family histories and HMO data for genes associated with hypertension, obesity, and
asthma . Id. at 76.
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patient and then putting the cells back into the body. 64 Genes may also be
used, as is now most common, to manufacture proteins in bulk as
pharmaceutical drugs or other useful compounds to cure human disease. 65 A
major objective of the industry is to develop an approach to deliver corrective
genes to the nuclei of cells that is administered, packaged and sold like other
drugs. 66 The industry 's products have been grouped as diagnostics; gene
therapeutics based upon the introduction of new genes; gene regulators which
function by replacing command sequences; protein therapeutics which are
medicinal proteins produced in laboratories ; and small molecule drugs ("bio
molecules ") administered by injecting proteins directly into the blood or in pill
form, possible because these small molecules are able to pass through the
stomach lining . 67
Much of the genotech industry's efforts and the investment of pharmas
are concentrated on cancer-related drugs. 68 The resulting drugs and diagnostic

64. See, e. g. , LEVIN E & SUZUKI, supra note 9 , at 20 8-1 5; Fisher, supra note 57 , at D I ;
cf. Bishop supra note 61 (noting failure of cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy gene therapy
experiments); Robert Langreth, Gene-Based Vaccines Ride Directly to Cells on Backs of Bacteria,
Delivery System Has Promise/or Bringing "Naked DNA " to Hard-to-Reach Organs, W A LL ST.

J., Oct. 13, 1995, at B3 ("Researchers cautioned that the approach has been tried only

in animal

experiments and it will likely be several years before its potential for use in humans is known. ").
This virus-delivery approach does, however, carry some risk-both of infecting the patient with
the virus and of rejection, since viruses tend to trigger the cell's immunity mechanisms. See

Michael Waldholz, To Fight Disease, Researcher Reforms Cold Virus 's Evil Ways, W A LL ST. J. ,
Jan. 1 8, 1994, at B l. For a discussion of another approach to gene therapy delivery, which makes

use of liposomes, see J udy Foreman, Gene Therapy System Aims to Restore Youtliful Hair, BoSTON
GLOB E, J une 30, 1995, at 1 , 4. Liposomes, applied to skin, are able to slip easily through cell
membranes, and this approach is being used in research on gene therapy to restore youthful hair.

Id.
65. Fisher, supra note 57 , at D J ; Oman, supra note 13 , at C42.

66. See Fisher, supra note 57, at DI (stating that at present most genetic therapies are
administered ex vivo and the major obstacle is developing the means to administer them in vivo,
meaning to introduce them into and have them become a lasting part of the cell function). But see
Bishop, supra note 61.
67. All of these technologies are discussed in Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 107 -0 8. The
technologies are often grouped by the industry into the following areas of concentration: bio
molecules; drug delivery; drug design; drug development; disease-specific drug discovery ;
immunotherapy; living cell therapy; monoclonal antibodies ; and proteins. BIO TECH 9 5 , supra note
2, at 1 8.

68. See generally Webster K. Cavenee & Raymond L. White, The Genetic Basis of
Cancer, SCI. AM., Mar. 199 5, at 72-81; James Flanigan, What Ails the Drug Industry Has Little
to Do With Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1994, at 72-81. For example, Matritech has sought FDA

approval for a protein- based bladder cancer test and is developing similar tests for breast, cervical,
colorectal, and prostate cancers. Maritech Asks FDA to Approve Bladder Cancer Test, NEWS
RELEASE (Maritrech Corporation), Nov. 9, 1994 . Genentech Inc. and Zymogenetics Corporation
have announced the discovery of a hormone, thrombopoietin, that stimulates the production of
blood- clottU:g platelet cells, which are destroyed by chemotherapy and radiation cancer treatments;
the world- wtde market for the hormone is estimated at $1 billion. Fisher, supra note 7 , at B3.
Immunex Corporation and Genetics Institute Inc. have other platelet-stimulating drugs in clinical
trials. Id.
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capabilities are likely to be at the forefront of the forthcoming generation of
genotech products .69 For example, researchers claim to have found a genetic
marker for colon cancer, the second leading cause of cancer-related deaths in
the United States .70 An individual in whom the marker is detected may have
an astonishing ninety-five percent chance of developing the cancer. 71
The diagnostic prospects associated with "genotyping " offer perhaps the
most immediate and significant possibilities. In its simplest form, genotyping
technology is diagnostic capability. Eventually , it will enable health care
providers, pharmas , and genotech companies to determine which drugs and
therapies will work on individual patients-thereby eliminating wasteful drug
consumption, lost treatment time, unnecessary side effects , and some costs .72
In an era of reductions in health care financing, pharmas and genotech
companies will be better able to assess their markets and, therefore, enhance
their efficiency. 73 The direct implication of this technology for individuals
is that one's genetic profile "will become an indispensable part of the
medication [he or she] might be prescribed. " 74 Once this genotyping
technology is fully advanced , health care providers may be able to design drugs
on demand that are fitted to target each person's biochemical needs.75

3.

The Drug-Development Time Lag

Considering the youth of the genotech industry and the fact that the time
frame required for an idea to evolve into a marketable drug or other product
is generally ten or more years , it is extraordinary that an entire generation of
69. Investors are also seeking out products close to reaching market. See Lisa Eckelbecker,
Biotech 's Long, Hot Summer, WORC. TEL. & GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 1990, at El, E2 (stating that
"biotech investors want products close to market").
70. Kirby, supra note 33, at 12.
71. Id. Recently, scientists determined that tomerase, an enzyme which repairs the ends
of chromosomes, is active in many cancers, thereby making it a prime R&D target for developers
of both diagnostics and therapeutics. Scientists Report uimmortality " Enzyme in Many Cancers,
BoSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1994, at 3.

72. See Survey, supra note 2, at 1 4. "Pharmocogenetics" is the name given this emerging

field that seeks to dissect diseases genetically in order to match diagnoses and treatments more
effectively. Id.
73. See id. at 1 4-1 5; cf Michael Schrage, Drug Merger Frenzy Dampening Confidence
in Future, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1 995, at 32 (arguing that the industry offers investment
opportunities which are being missed).
74. Schrage, supra note 73 .
75. Leslie Helm, "Grind and Find " Robots, VDTs May Be the RX for New
Pharmaceuticals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1 994, at D 1. The methodology is that, " [f]irst, the objective
is to find a protein, or 'recepto r,' that plays a key role in a disease. Once a receptor is found,
the task is then to find a compound that will attach itself to the receptor and either disable the
receptor if it has harmful functions or activate it if it has a positive role. Think of the receptor
as the lock that must be opened or closed for treatment and the drug as the key that must be
found. " Id.
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novel drugs is already visible. Nonetheless, while the underlying science has
proceeded more quickly than expected, the commercialization o f genotech has
been much slower and more expensive than anticipated due i n part to the
regulatory challenge of obtaining approval from the FDA. 76 Many genotech
firms and investors may have assumed, incorrectly in retrospect, that the FDA
would be quicker to approve technologies

based on more

"natural,"

biologically-derived molecules.77 Firms overlooked the fact that genotech
products are different than the products that FDA is accustomed to reviewing.
In other words, what sets genotechnologies apart from traditional technologies
and gives rise to their potential has held them back during some steps of the
FDA process. The companies that arrive first at the FDA with proposed
therapeutics and diagnostics in hand have found that the FDA process, while
time-consuming, uncertain, and expensive under the best of circumstances,
may be prohibitively so when applied to truly novel technologies.

As

"firstcomers," these companies bear the burden of designing and proposing
adequate testing protocols and convincing regulators that both the protocols
and the resulting data are a dequate.
Since genotech companies lack established product lines, they must live
off their capital while attempting to develop products� conduct trials, and get
products to market. 78 The

"burn rate"

(the extent to which capital is

exhausted on research and development (R&D) before profits from products
are generated) in the genotech industry has been much higher than was
anticipated in the 1 980s.79 Ernst & Young has estimated that, a s of late 1 994,
one-half of the 1 3 2 publicly held biotech companies did not have enough
capital to survive two more years.80 During 1 995, the overall survival index
for the industry dropped from twenty-five months in 1 994 to just sixteen
months. 81 Such financial pressure has resulted in a race to push products
through the FDA approval process before bank accounts are depleted, credit
is tapped, and potential investors have lost interest.
Although the investment appeal of genotech has returned recently, 82 the
investment cycles for the industry have been relatively brief and unquestionably
extreme.83 Moreover, federal grants for scientific research and d evelopment,
traditionally a major source of funding for genotech efforts, appear to be at

76. BIOTECH 96 , supra note 2 , at 1 1 ; see also infra notes 2 39-241 and accompanying text.
77.

BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 1 1 .

78.

BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 , at 54.

79. Id. at 30-3 l .
80. Id. at 54 .
81.

BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 15.

8 2 . See supra note 32 .
83.

1 78

See supra note 78.
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the top of Congress' budget-cutting agenda. 84 Although it appears that a
federal trust fund will be established to finance scientific research and NIH
funding is being spared , there is no guarantee that these funds will escape
congressional budget cuts in the future. 85
In part, the problem the genotech industry is facing is familiar, as most
new industries are confronted with some version of it. But the problem and
its consequences have been exaggerated and intensified in the context of the
genotech industry. The virtually unconditional support for genotech research,
accompanied by international cooperation and competition, have resulted in
a surge in technological advancement and given rise to
international

industry

in record time .

Early

a

multi-billion-dollar ,

success built tremendous

expectations , 86 and the result is a hyper-sensitive market especially responsive
to disappointments. 87

84. See Troy Goodman, Should the Labs Get Hit?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 6,
1995, at 83 ("Some of the most sweeping budget cuts considered this year have focused on
science. "); Charles Petit, Huge Cuts on Horizon For Science: U. S. Spending Could Drop One-

1hird by the Year 2000, S.F. CHRON . , Aug . 29, 1995, at A5 (while cuts in science spending
planned for many other agencies, the budget proposal would increase spending for medical

research at Nlli); infra Section J.B.
85. See Petit, supra note 84, at AS.
86. "In the past, some biotech companies, eager to obtain financing, often made broad
claims regarding their product's futures-heralding cures for cancer or AIDS, for example. These
companies often rushed products with large market indications through early clinical development

and into Phase m in order to reap Wall Street's rewards-too often running into clinical
disappointments . " BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 38-39. The impact of such disappointments on
the value of stock is direct and substantial : "Stocks like Synergyn, that once traded for as much
as 60, have sunk to below 5 . . . . Furthermore, of about 300 biotech companies, only 14 have

operating earnings. " Herb Greenberg, Biotech Babble-Is the Worst Finally Over?, S.F. CHRO N . ,

July 25, 1 994, at D I . At least one commentator has attributed these inflated expectations to
genotech CEOs: "That the CEOs of these major biotechnology/pharmaceutical firms have little
or no relevant scientific training in the technologies that drive their companies may in part account
for the industry 's exaggerated claims and failure to show leadership in research and development. "
Silverman, supra note 4, at Sl6. An alternative explanation is that "the capital markets were
operating under the fallacious assumption that, because biotechnology dealt with molecules that
were natural, biotech's products would be safer than traditional pharmaceuticals and would get
through the FDA regulatory process faster . " BIOTECH %, supra note 2, at 1 1 .
87. See Gorman , supra note 1 6 , at 63; infra Section LB. Consider the investment market's
reaction to the announcement of Biogen, Inc . , one of the first genotech companies to realize
operating earnings , that it was abandoning development of hirulog, an experimental anticlotting
drug. (The drug was effective, but cost seventeen times as much as the existing anticlotting drug;
see also Ronald Rosenberg, Biogen Lost a Drug, Kept its Health, Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE,

Nov. 20, 1994, at A l -2 . ) The company's stock price dropped 25%

within a few days of the

announcement and a flurry of class-action shareholder suits soon followed . See, e.g. , Lazar v .
Biogen, Inc . , et al. , No. 94- 121 77PBS (D. Mass., filed Nov. 2 , 1994) (representative of more
than ten such complaints) ; Tom Schmitz, High-Tech Heart Drug Gets Tiny Edge in Study, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May l , 1993, at l A (reporting Genentech's experience with TPA, an anti
clotting enzyme that is somewhat more effective than an already-commercialized counterpart but
costs five times as much); cf Ronald Rosenberg, More Woes Aheadfor Biotech, BoSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 3 , 1 995, at 61 [hereinafter Rosenberg, More Woes] ("In the short history of commercial
biotechnology, 1 994 will be remembered as one of the bleakest years. Only one new biotechnology
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When evaluating the industry, the inevitable drug-development time lag
should not detract from the extraordinary technological accomplishments .
Within the next year or two , some of the industry's most promising
technologies will go into production.
B.

88

The Genotechnology Industry: Shifting Alliances and the Impact of
Federal Policy on Industry Stru.cture
The remarkable advancement of genotechnology during the last five years

is attributable to both scientific advances and aggressive entrepreneurialism.

89

While the genotech industry began as pure science, concentrated in academia
and aided by federal research grants and technology transfers, a myriad of
discoveries with commercial potential enabled the industry to attract venture
capital financing and, more recently, pharma funding. Pharma involvement has
renewed general investment confidence in the industry, and small, speculative,
independent genotech firms have largely been replaced by consolidated
entities . 90

drug earned Federal Food and Drug Administration approval. "); Daniel Sutherland, Amgen to
Buy Faltering Synergen for $240 Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1994, at DI ("The biotech
industry . . . was a favorite for venture capital in the 1980s. But many of the promised products

have proven far more difficult to make than expected, or have failed tests run by the Food and

Drug Administration.").
88. See Tina Cassidy, Biotech the Real Estate Decision, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995,

at Al3; supra note 3 1 .

89. See Michael Malinowski, Bringing Human Genome-Related Biotechnology to Market:
A Matter of Survival, THE HEALTH LAWYER, Early Spring 1995, at 8, 8.

90. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 22; irifra note 254 (addressing CRO model).
Organizational strategy has shifted from the original models-fully integrated pharmaceutical

company (FIPCO) and royalty-based pharmaceutical company (RIPCO)-to fully integrated

discovery and development organization (FIDDO) model, which means genotech companies
focusing on drug development and del�gating manufacturing, sales, distribution, and marketing.

BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 40; Kathleen Day, Experimental Journey, WASH. PoST, Mar. 27,

1995, at 1 , 18-19 ("Most companies don't have the illusion anymore that they'll become fully

integrated, stand-alone pharmaceutical companies that can do everything. . . . Money is scarce
out there . ") . Lawrence M. Fisher, With New Genentech Chief, Science Takes Center Stage,
N.Y.TIMES, July 12, 1995, at D2 (stating that the ousting of G. Kirk Raab and naming of Arthur
D . Levinson as president and chief executive "is a clear signal that first and foremost Roche
[Holding Ltd.] intends Genentech to be a research and development center, with sales and
marketing largely handled by the parent company . ") . The FIDDO model is built upon an alliance
philosophy, in which the biotech company "could partner with academia for discovery; partner
with CROs for clinical and preclinical development; partner with pharma companies for marketing,
distribution, and sales; and even partner with others for manufacturing . " BIOTECH 95, supra note
2, at 40. Making genotech companies members of alliances around a shared technology and

objective (developing and marketing that technology) cuts risks to genotech investors and enhances
genotech company's attractiveness to investors, though it also restricts their potential for profit.

See James Flanigan, What Ails the Drug Industry Has Little to Do With Politics, L.A. TIMES, May
25, 1994, at D l . ("Drug stocks are declining because market forces are driving the air out of drug
prices, forcing the pharmaceutical industry into a historic restructuring. Powerful trends in the
business show that drug companies will continue to merge and consolidate and important drug
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There has thus been a rapid shift i n involvement and contributions from

the gov �rnm � nt to the private sector. The private sector is now assuming the
economic

nsks

and

cost'i

of

developing

practical

applications

of

genotechnolog y . Nevertheless, the accomplish ments of the industry rest upon
.
.
a regulatory mfrastructure supportive of R&D and the direct contributions of
the federal government, as discussed below i n Section II. The end result is an
industry built upon a conglomeration of complex alliances between the private

and public sectors-all iances among members of industry, academia, and
government arranged i n a staggering number of ways .91
This entanglement between the public and private sectors has been a
source of controversy as rights allocation issues at least as complex as the
underlying all iances are already arising.92 These are the latest i n a series of
ethical and legal issues which have emerged over the course of the industry's
development. Despite the industry' s growing significance , many of these issues
remain largely unaddressed. 93
1.

The Exodus From Government and Academia to the
Genotechnology Industry

From its inception , the genotech industry has been tied closely to
academia, a traditional source of pure scientific research heavily funded by the
federal government. 94 What distinguishes genotech from analogous fields is
the willingness of academics either to enter into joint development agreements
with genotech firms,

or to leave their academic and government posts

altogether to join existing genotech companies or start their own. Academic
institutions and teaching hospitals-unwilling to give up affiliations with these
leaders in the field of genotechnology and miss out o n the prestige and
potential financial gain associated with the genotech industry-also are getting
directly invol ved in the researc h , development and commercialization of

research will increasingly be done by smaller biotechnology companies." ). Some in the genotech
industry, such as ImmuLogic, redefined their objectives before the down-tum in investment. S�e
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genotech-based advances .

The exodus of genotech researchers from government and academia to
private industry predates the modern genotech industry. I n 1 973 , Herbert
Boyer and Stanley Cohen were the first to clone genes, accomplishing this
while working at Stanford University .95 Shortly thereafter, Boyer left and,
with venture capital provided by Robert Swanson, founded Genentech. 96 This
pattern-university researchers moving into the private sector or forming
alliances with genotech firms-was repeated and, with each repetition, the web
of connections among government, academia and industry became increasingly
entangled.97
The trend undoubtedly has been furthered by the federal government's
fostering of a genotech industry through HGP and its technology transfer
policy.98 For example, Dr. Craig Venter, working on the government-funded
HGP at NIH, invented a method fo r identifying gene sequences , thereby
igniting the patent controversy discussed below. 99 With this method and $70
million from venture capitalists in hand, Venter left the NIH in 1 992 and
founded a not-for-profit research institution,

The Institute for Genomic

Research (TIGR), and a for-profit counterpart, Human Genom e Sciences , Inc.
(HGS), to commercialize TIGR's findings . '00 TIGR and HGS have been busy
carrying on the work identifying gene sequences which Venter began at the
NIH, filing thousands of patent applications to protect their findings , and
developing ways to commercialize them .1 01 They have compiled an extensive
database of identified gene sequences and, in September 1995 , opened certain
parts of this database to academic and government researchers who previously
had been allowed accesss only if they were willing to give HGS licensing

95. Carey, supra note 8, at 77.
96. Joan O'C. Hamilton, Biotech 's First Superstar-Genentech is Becoming a Major
Leaguer-and Wall Street Loves It, Bus. WK. , Apr . 14, 1986, at 68.
97. Cf. Johnson, supra note 27, at 6 ("The search for capital has spurred extraordinary
creativity among biotech companies and their investors in structuring alternative financing

).
98. See infra Sections II.A, H.B. I .

techniques . . . .

"

99. Carey, supra note 8 , at 74; see also infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
100. Carey, supra note 8, at 76.
IOI. Id. at 74, 77. The controversy surrounding Venter's career has been summarized as
follows :
Depending on one's perspective, Venter and his company typify the ideal link
between government-supported basic science and the entrepreneurial verve necessary
for seeing that the fruits of [the] Human Genome Project make their way into the
medical

marketplace.

But

some

scientists

are

uneasy-ethically

and

professionally-with the idea of their colleagues profiting from the research for
which the government has paid . . . . All the work [Venter] produced at the National
Institutes of Health was published in scientific journals that were available to the
public, [Venter] . . . said, and he has had little to do with the financing he has
Fisher,
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received since leaving the government.
supra note 3 1 , at 9A . See generally Carey, supra note 8.
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rights to their discoveries .102
Revolving doors among academia, government and industry are now
characteristic of the genotech industry . 1 03 Examples are plentiful. Millennium
Pharmaceuticals,

co-founded

by

an

MIT

professor,

employs

former

academics104 and lists the director of the federally funded Whitehead/MIT
Center for Genomic Research and professors at Rockefeller University and
Albert

Einstein

College

of

Medicine

among

its

founding

scientific

105
Chiron Corp. , one of the few remaining integrated genotech
advisors .
0
firms, 1 6 was founded by three scientists from the University of California at

Berkeley. 107 Myriad Genetics was co-founded by Walter Gilbert, a Harvard
University academic, and Darwin Molecular was co-founded by Dr. Leroy
Hood of the University of Washington. 108 Richard

Myers and Dennis

Drayna, affiliated with the federally funded Genome Center in Palo Alto ,
California, formed Mercator Genetics. 109 Mark Pearson, a member of the
federally funded

HGP's national

advisory board,

is CEO

of Darwin

Molecular.11° Dr. Ronald G. Crystal, once extensively involved in in vivo
gene therapy as a chief scientist at the NIH, is now a founder of and Chief
Scientific Advisor at GenVee. 1 1 1
This exodus to the private sector and rush to commercialize emerging
science has generated resentment within the genotech field:

102. Elyse Tanouye, Biotechnology: Gene Pioneer Opens His Databank . . , WALL ST.
J . , Sept. 28, 1995, at B l , Bl6; see also supra note 63 (discussing use of database by Johns
Hopkins researchers to identify gene associated with colon cancer) ; infra note 336 (discussing
HGS 's practice of licensing its database and Merck's efforts to make similar information freely
accessible).
103. The revolving door also exists within the genotech industry itself as executives move
between companies. See, e.g. , Don Clark, Raab Is Named Chairma.n of Shaman, Two Months
After Genentech Ouster, WALL ST. J . , Sept. 14, 1995, at BIO (Former Genentech CEO who
resigned after Board probe revealed his secret request for $ 1 million personal loan
guarantee from Roche Holding, Genentech's majority stockholder, resurfaced as chairman of
Shaman Pharmaceuticals, a small biotech firm developing drugs from tropical plants .).
104. Thomas M . Burton, Eli Lilly Plans Gene-Research Venture With Millennium in Bid
for New Drugs, WALL ST.J., Oct.24, 1 995, at B6 (Millennium co-founded by Eric Lander,
professor at MIT's genome center).
.

105. Ronald Rosenberg, Biotech Thrives on the Hot Idea, BoSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1994,
at A77.
106. See infra Section ill.A (few remaining genotech firms are capable of moving drugs
from R&D to market without assistance from pharma partner(s)).
107. Chiron Stock Jumps Amid Merger Talk Rumors: Biotech Firm Confirms It 's Discussing
Alliance with a Company, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 12, 1 994, at 12D.
108.
109.
1 1 0.
111.

Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 95.
Fisher, supra note 10 1 , at 9A.

Id.
GenVec Acquires Promising New Gene Therapy Cancer Technology: Exclusive Patents
Offer Promise for Precise Therapy at Tumor Sites, GEN VEC PREss RELEASE (GenVec
Corporation) , Nov. 29, 1 993.
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The commercial recruitment of leading scientists from publicly
supported universities and federally backed genome centers has
stirred professional resentment among some geneticists , who argue
that the rush to commercialize or patent pieces of the genome
project will hinder the greater discover_ies that can come when the
s cientific community freely shares its discoveries. 1 12
This resentment has been displayed in allegations of conflicts of interest
and professional impropriety . For example, the PTO has a number of
examiners who formerly worked at the NIH. Those examiners are reviewing
patent applications from firms with executives and employees who are also
former NIH employees. This has resulted in allegations of PTO favoritism. 1 1 3

Such allegations are likely to increase as more technologies reach commerce
and individuals begin to realize substantial profits from genotechnologies that
originated through government research and funding.
Despite this controversy , the trend shows no s igns of stopping, or even
slowing .

In fact,

final FDA-approval of technologies, recent scientific

successes with immensely lucrative commercial potential, 1 14 the return of
market appeal to investors and pharma investment, and the impact of potential
congressional budget-cutting on publicly-funded research and development are
likely to cause the exodus to continue and expand.
2.

The Prevalence of Alliances

As discussed below, progressing from genetic discovery to marketable
drug is a capital-intensive project, often c osting as much as $300-400 million
and taking ten to twelve years . 1 15 The federal government, through the HGP,
NIH, and Federal Technology Transfer policy, has been involved in much of
the basic genotech

research . 1 16 Accordingly,

alliances between private

genotech companies and the government, i n the form of cooperative research
and development agreements (CRADAs) , 1 1 7 are long-standing. Also, direct
involvement from the researchers and scientists whose work has formed the
basis of the industry is, as a practical matter, often needed b y companies
seeking to build commercial entities around such work . These researchers are
commonly affiliated with academic institutions, making alliances between

1 12. Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A.
1 1 3. See infra note 428.
1 1 4. E.g . , Amgen's discovery of leptin , a hormone found to significantly control obesity
in mice. See supra note 5 1 and accompanying text.
1 15. See infra Table I accompanying note 25 1 . See generally i'!fra Sections 11.D and III . A .
1 16.
1 17.
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See infra Section 11. B . l for discussion of CRADAs .
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genotech companies and academia a natural and necessary development. 1 1 8
Depending upon the outcome of present and future budget cuts, the most
prestigious academic institutions and teaching hospitals, which have benefitted
from federal government largesse and were once too uncomfortable with these
alliances to engage in them, may pursue genotech companies aggressively on
behalf of their faculty, staff and patients. 1 19 The commercial success of
genotech may have the same effect. In fact, beyond shifting some of the cost
of their faculty's research to genotech companies and investors in those
companies,

royalties

from the forthcoming genotech therapeutics

and

diagnostics may be a means for such institutions to offset expected cuts in
government subsidies.
Outright alliances between academia and industry are pervasive and
recently have taken o n a more commercial flavor than is customary for
academics. For example, Harvard University and Genica are working together
on a potential eye test for Alzheimer 's disease. Pursuant to their agreement,
Genica receives exclusive rights to market the test while Harvard receives
royalties on future sales. 120 In 1994, HGS announced a collaboration with
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine to research genes identified by
TIGR and HGS that may play a role in colon cancer. 121 Johns Hopkins
granted HGS an exclusive license to the results of the project in return for
access to HGS's gene sequence database. 122 HGS also has over thirty
agreements with nineteen different research institutions , most of which are
university affiliated. 123 To compete with HGS in the identification of gene
sequences, Merck & Co. paid Washington University to sequence 200,000
gene fragments . 124 Additionally, Amgen is paying MIT $3 million per year

1 1 8.

Note also that, since academia has traditionally received research funding from the

federal government, alliances with academia have allowed firms to leverage that government
funding-an indirect means for firms to obtain government subsidization as opposed to the
direct funding received by firms under CRADAs.
1 19.

See Travis E. Polling, Financing the Studies: Faced with Stagnant Federal Funding,

Institutions Seek More Private Contracts, SAN ANTONIO Bus. J . , July 2 1 , 1995, at 15 ("The focus
of academia tends to be squarely on federal sources when it comes to funding, but locally and
nationally academic research institutions are having to look beyond Washington, D . C . , to keep
their projects funded and researchers busy. "); supra note 1 12 and accompanying text.
120.
at

1.

Dolores King, Harvard, Biotech Firm Strike Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1 1 , 1 994

,

12 1 . HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC. , HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES TO COLLABORATE
WITH JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL SCHOOL ON COLON CANCER RESEARCH (Feb. 28,

1994).

122. Id. ,· see also supra note 63 (describing Johns Hopkins' efforts to identify cancer
gene) .
123.

HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC . , HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES ANNOUNCES NEW

l (July 2 1 , 1994).
8, at 76; cf. Robert Rosenberg, Genzyme 's Plans to Beal
()_bsolescence, BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8 , 1995, at 57 (Genzyme working with University of

AGREEMENTS WITH REsEARCH INSTITUTIONS
124.

Carey, supra note

Pittsburgh researchers and Dutch genotech firm to develop gene therapy technique).
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Vol. 1 3 : 163, 1 996

The Yale Journal on Regulation

for ten years for rights to some of the school's biological research. 125
Many of these academia-industry collaborations have taken on the
appearance of commercial joint ventures. For example, Genetics Institute, Inc.
(GD and Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine combined to form
MetaMorphix, Inc . , a company focusing on treatments to repair the nervous
system . 126 GI invested $3 .6 million for a fifty-eight percent share of the
company, while Johns Hopkins contributed nineteen genes for the remaining
forty-two percent. 127 Johns Hopkins will receive royalties based upon its
contribution to a particular product when that product is sold either by GI or
MetaMorphix. 128 GI has the right to commercialize any discoveries by
MetaMorphix which MetaMorphix decides not to develop and market
itself. 129 As observed by one commentator, " [t]raditionally[ , ] what happens
with academic centers that have licensing agreements with c ompanies is that
scientists get small royalties . . . . In this situation, though, it seems that the
scientists get more control . It is an expanded collaboration that goes one step
beyond the traditional agreement. " 130
Johns Hopkins also has filed jointly with Integrated Genetics , a division
of Genzyme Corp. , for a patent to commercialize decoded genetic information
involved in kidney disease . 131 This alliance was reported in the popular press
as :
an example of a trend in biotechnology research, in which
university scientists team with small biotech companies. Such
relationships offer long-term financial incentives to universities ,
which stand to make money if products result from the efforts , and
immediate gain to struggling start-up companies , which are often
strapped for cash and need additional brainpower . 132
However, the alliance between Johns Hopkins and Integrated Genetics
also provides an example of the potential for controversies such as arguments
over intellectual property rights and questions of divided loyalties , which often
surround many such agreements . Johns Hopkins and Integrated Genetics relied

125.

Ronald Rosenberg, A mgen to Get Synergen for

$240 Million, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.

19, 1994, at 25.
126. Cathryn J. Prince, Genetics Institute,
BoSTON Bus. J. , May 26-June 1 , 1995, at 1 1 .

University Form Baltimore Research Finn,

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
1 3 1 . Mass. Firm, Johns Hopkins Announce Kidney Disease Find, BoSTON GWBE, Apr.
2, 1 995, at 13.
132. Id.
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on assistance from a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory to help them
understand how the gene's proteins cause adult polycystic kidney disease, yet
there is no mention of the government scientist's being named on the
patent. 1 33 The BRCAl dispute, discussed in Section III . B , also dramatizes
the problem of allocating rights when government, academia and industry
combine to form a product with commercial value. 134
Additionally , the ethical implications of these collaborations have not
been explored . Some scientists have expressed concerns that the expectations
of investors financing genome companies have created and will continue to
create pressures that scientists are hard-pressed to resist-perhaps resulting in
overly-optimistic reports on research, if not outright scientific fraud. 135
Moreover, this investor pressure to generate profits may have skewed the
course of basic science in the genotechnology field, thereby contributing to a
"false start " for the industry . Some commentators fear that financial pressures
are replacing "scientific rigor in determining how and when to use gene
therapy" and sacrificing basic scientific research and human safety for a quick
profit as " [c]ommercial pressure has . . . pushed scientists to test gene
treatments on human subjects as early as possible. " 1 36
Nevertheless, existing alliances are only the beginning. As the genotech
industry continues to consolidate, 137 genotech firms are investing in other
genotech firms . 138 The most significant example is the Amgen takeover of

133.
1 34.

Id.
See, e.g. , King, supra note 120, at 1 (reporting that Genica Pharmaceuticals

Corporation began marketing a test for a gene that may indicate the risk of Alzheimer's disease,
even though it had no agreement with Duke University , which conducted the original research);

infra text accompanying note 341 .
1 35. Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A (noting that roles must be clearly defined to avoid
inherent conflict of interest).
136.

Gorman,

137.

Rosenberg,

supra note 16.
More Woes, supra note 87, at 61 (noting that 1994 was a bad year for

biotech with only one drug receiving FDA approval, and that, "[i]n the year ahead, analysts are
expecting tougher times for weaker biotech firms, including more fire sales of assets and
technology sales to stronger biotech firms and to large pharmaceutical firms"); Steve Kaufman,

Bio-Roulette Failures Have Cut the Flow of Funds to Biotech, But Big Rewards Tempt Some
Investors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 28, 1 994, at ID (" A big shakeout is imminent among
the industry 's 1 , 3 1 1 companies, and it will probably hit venture capital-backed players hardest
because they are the furthest from introducing products . The best guess among many industry
insiders is that about half of all companies will be gone within about five years . "). Although this
trend has not been as extensive thus far as was anticipated, it is expected to continue.

See BIOTECH
supra note 2, at 5 (statement of Dr. Arthur D . Levinson, President and CEO of Genentech,
Inc.) . As this Article goes to print, the market appeal of genotechnology has largely returned. See
supra note 32.
138. Johnson, supra note 27, at 6 ("Corporate investments have . . . become popular as
96,

a way for profitable public biotech companies interested in preserving earnings to fund new
technical opportunities on an 'off balance sheet' basis while retaining marketing rights to the
developed products . ");

see also Clark, supra note 103 (Raab planning to assemble fund to buy

small biotech firms and consolidate them into a larger company) .
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Synergen for $240 million in 1994. 139 Genentech invested $17 million in
GenVec140 which, in turn, later merged with Theragen. 141 Other
companies, including HGS , have a portfolio of deals with other genotech
firms. 142
In their efforts to form alliances , genotech companies ' attentions have
shifted to pharmas . 143 Especially during times of low m arket appeal to
investors , this match seems ideal, enabling genotech firms to leverage existing
pharma expertise in manufacturing, marketing, and dealing with the FDA and
other regulatory bodies , both domestic and foreign . 144 Multinational pharmas
are better positioned than small genotech firms to be aware of and exploit
comparative m arket advantages such as clinical trials conducted abroad.
Additionally, pharmas , with their portfolio of products, are more capable of
absorbing losses when particular products fail, thereby perhaps stabilizing the
market for genotech companies ' stocks . 145 Finally, pharmas are in need of
new products as patent expiration dates on many of their major drug products
are approaching . 146
Pharmas are investing in the genotech industry in a myriad of ways . 147
139. Sutherland, supra note 87, at D 1 . According to a Paine Webber analyst, this takeover
may have marked the "beginning of the end for the biotech industry as an assortment of small,
speculative independent companies trying to play David to the drug industry ' s Goliath . . . . " Id.

140. See GENVEC CORP., GENVEC ACQUIRES PROMISING NEW GENE THERAPY CANCER
1 (Nov. 29, 1993).
141. GENVEC CORP . Two GENE THERAPY COMPANIES FINALIZE MERGER (Sept. 6,

"ECHNOLOGY

,

994).
142. See, e. g. , HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC. , HGS AND GENETIC THERAPY FORGE
14, 1994); HUMAN GENOME SCIENCES, INC., HGS AND
GENENTECH TO COLLABORATE (Apr. 20, 1994) .
143. See generally, BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 49-50 (describing IO most influential
deals in the industry). Ronald Rosenberg, From Foes to Financiers; BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24,
1995 at 89, 92.
144. See e. g. , Rosenberg, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. Johnson, supra note 27, at 4 (Nov. 1 8 , 1993) ("Many large pharmaceutical companies
I

]ENE THERAPY COLLABORATION (Sept.

have recognized that they need to increase their rate of development of new products and that
biotechnology is the most promising method to do so. Companies with major products which are
soon coming off patent (such as Glaxo with Zantac, SmithKline with Tagament and Syntex with
Naprosyn) are particularly vulnerable and motivated. Their willingness to enter into creative
collaborative relationships with younger biotech companies has taken a substantial part of the load
off venture investors in financing young biotech companies from inception to profitability . ").

147. See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 49-50 (listing 10 most influential deals).
SmithKline Beecham invested $125 million in HGS for a 7% equity position and rights to
promising genes. Carey, supra note 8, at 73. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. has invested $5 million
for an equity position in Darwin Molecular. DARWIN MOLECULAR, CORP . , DARWIN SIGNS
AGREEMENT WITH RHONE-POULENC RORER; COMPLETES FINANCING ROUND (Oct.

4, 1994).

Hoffman-LaRoche owns 60-percent of Genentech and has invested $70 million in Millennium
Pharmaceuticals. Survey, supra note 2, at S6; Rosenberg, supra note 105. Eli Lilly paid almost

$3 million to Myriad Genetics for rights to the BRCAl gene. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 95. Other
pharmas are paying genotech firms just for the opportunity to look into their databases. Carey,

supra note 8, at 76; see also Burton, supra note 104 (Eli Lilly and Millennium Pharmaceuticals
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The fully-integrated entrepreneurial genotech companies that could both
discover and produce genotech products are becoming R&D centers dependent
upon pharmas for drug approval, manufacturing, and international and
domestic marketing.148 In fact, of the nation's dozen or so major biotech
companies, only Amgen has been able to remain independent-and rumors
persist that Amgen is up for sale.149
It is too soon to tell whether these alliances will bode well for the
industry . 150 With the return of investment appeal, the genotech industry may
be less dependent upon pharmas, except to the extent that the return of this

entering into $50 million joint venture); Lawrence Fisher, Therapy with Genes Gains in
Credibility, ORANGE Cl'Y . REG., June 4, 1995, at D6 (big drug firms such as Bayer, Rhone
Poulenc Rorer and Sandoz are investing big money in joint development deals with new
companies, including Applied Immune Sciences, Somatix Therapy , and Systemix) ; Gorman, supra
note 16, at 63 ("The list of recent mergers . . . reads like a Who's Who of biotechnology: 'Sandoz
buys Genetics Institute . Chiron buys Viagene. Bristol Myers makes a big investment in Somatrix
. . . Rhone-Poulenc invests in Applied Immune Sciences and several other gene-therapy
companies . " ') ; Robert Langreth, New Technique for Discovering Medicines Takes Hold, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1 1 , 1995, at B3 (discussing combinatorial chemistry, a new drug discovery technique
that allows chemists to speed up development of new substances and is driving pharmas' "new
round of gobbling up small biotechnology companies, " citing Glaxo Wellcome's acquisition of
Affymax NV, Marion Merrell Dow's purchase of Selectide, Inc . , and Eli Lilly 's purchase of
Sphinx Pharmaceuticals as examples). But see Repligen Says Lilly Is Out O f Drug-Development
Pact, WALL ST. J . , Sept. 1 3 , 1995, at B9 (Eli Lilly backing out of agreement to fund Repligen' s
development of monoclonal antibodies for inflammatory diseases, after string of setbacks for
Repligen); Thomas M. Burton and Rhonda L. Rundle, Lilly Gets Out of Biotechnology and
Medical Diagnostics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at B4 (Eli Lilly selling off biotech assets to
Beckman Instruments, Inc . at fraction of price it originally paid) .
148. Rosenberg, More Woes, supra note 87, at 6 1 ; cf. Day, supra note 90, at 1 8 (blaming
investors' flight from the industry for driving some biotech companies out of business and forcing
others to acquiesce to giant pharmaceutical take-overs); Ronald Rosenberg, Repligen Cuts Nearly
Half its Staff, BoSTON GLOBE, Feb . 15, 1995, at 41-42 (company cut work force by nearly 50%
and postponed or discontinued promising drug development in desperate attempt to conserve cash) .
Genotech companies working on the same technologies are merging to eliminate duplication and
rechannel resources to diversify-"like two people sharing two lottery tickets rather than each
holding one with perhaps the same numbers. " Day, supra note 90, at 1 , 1 8- 19 (citing the sale of
Crop Genetics International Corp. of Columbia to Biosys Inc . of Palo Alto, California and a
merger between Oncologix Inc. of Gaithersburg and two Texas firms, Argus Pharmaceuticals Inc .
and Triplex Pharmaceutical Corp .). See supra note 90; (addressing FIPCO, RIPCO, and FIDDO
organizational models).
149. However, Amgen also has a number of deals with pharmas. See BIOTECH %, supra
note 2, at 49-50 (Amgen partnering with drug firms such as J & J and Roche); cf. Kathleen Day,
Biotech Company Fills Prescription for Success, WASH. PosT, Aug. 2 1 , 1995, at 9 ("As health
care insurers and providers push to contain rising medicinal costs even large drug companies have
found it hard to remain independent. ") . Most of the biotech companies' deals have been large and
narrowly targeted around specific technologies, such as SmithKline Beecham's $125 million deal
with HGS and Hoffman LaRoche's $70 million deal with Millennium. See Lawrence Fisher, RMne
Unit Focuses on Gene Drugs, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994, atD5 (discussing how Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer has created a new division concentrating on R&D and commercialization of drugs based
on gene and cell therapies) .
150. See Gorman, supra note 16, at 63 (noting that pharma investment, while probably
unavoidable, may premsturely push science out of basic research and into a rush to market).
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appeal is attributable to pharrna involvement. The genotech industry's alliances
are a direct result of supportive federal policy. Now, policymaking regarding
the commercialization of genotechnology must be as direct, responsive, and
comprehensive as the federal policy promoting genotech R&D . Section II sets
forth an overview of federal policy generally, while Section III assesses that
policy and makes proposals for change.
II.

Federal Financial Support and the Regulation of Genotechnology

Just as the United States engaged in the Manhattan Project to develop the
atomic bomb and end World War II, the Apollo Project to beat the Soviets to
the moon, and the Cold War to deter the use of nuclear weapons, the United
States has made a deliberate and substantial effort to advance genotech R&D.
Smith and Kettelberger claim, "Not since the dawn of the atomic age have
scientists from all over the world sought the same prize . " 151 Although the
primary objective of federal policy presumably has been to improve human
health, there have been economic returns on the federal government's
support-as evident from the fact that the genotech industry exists almost
entirely within the United States' borders . 152
HGP is the United States' most direct and perhaps most publicized
statement of support for advancement within the field of genotechnology. In
fact, the federal government-through the NIH, FDA, and PTO-has had an
impact on the past and current state of the genotech industry and will also
shape the industry's future . The following is a discussion of how the United
States , through these agencies and relevant statutes and regulations, has
supported the industry .
A.

The Human Genome Project

HGP is an effort, initiated by Congress in 1 988-89 and commenced in
1 990, to map all twenty-three pairs of human chromosomes. The three primary
technical goals of the project are to produce ( 1) genetic linkage maps to trace
inheritance of chromosome regions through pedigrees ; (2) physical maps of
large chromosome regions to enable direct study of DNA structure in search
of genes; and (3) substantial DNA sequence information, enabling the
correlation of DNA changes with alterations in biological function . 153 Some
151 . G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M . Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome
Project, 22 A.l.P.L.A. Q.J. 27, 39 (1994) (addressing support of various governments for
protecting and fostering genotech) .
152. See supra note 2 .
153. Robert M . Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH,
SAFErY & ENVIRONMENT 97, 100 (1994). The fact that the overall objective of HGP is to map
the human genome has generated extensive criticism within the scientific community. "Some
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350 laboratories throughout the world now are engaged in HGP.154 Despite
the elimination of federal programs to fulfill the Republican Congress'
"Contract with America ," the Project is targeted to receive more than $100
million in federal funds per year through its completion in 2005, unless it is
completed sooner.155
HGP intentionally seeks to join the commercial and academic sectors to
exploit the rapidly growing body of knowledge about DNA structure in order

to generate practical benefits for human health . As discussed above, the result
has been alliances among academic, not-for-profit, and private individuals and
entities around specific technologies. Public funds designated for academic
research and private funds have been commingled-feeding the impression that
public money is being used for private gain. 156 Critics charge that academic
industrial alliances will slow or halt the transfer o f gene mapping and
sequencing research, adding needless time and money to complete the genome
sequencing. 157 These are just some of the serious policy and economic isues
associated with the HGP. 158 Nevertheless, HGP clearly satisfies a cost-benefit
analysis based on the real dollar investment associated with it. Public funds
reaching private industry through HGP are trivial in comparison with the
investment of private industry-$ 1 . 5 to $2 billion in

before

1 987, some three years

HGP even commenced. 159 The practical effect of HGP cannot be

overestimated. HGP is responsible for generating world-wide scientific,
political, and financial commitment to the field of genotechnology. It has
spurred scientific advances in the field in record time and thereby created a
multiplication effect o n private-sector investment, first from venture capitalists
and now from pharmas.

160

critics assess that it would be pr eferabl e to sp end the limited funds availabl e to det ermin e th e
compl ete structure and function of individual genes of m edical importanc e. " Kirby, supra not e
33, at 8.

154. Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100.
155. Although the monies appropriated to HGP are revi ewed annually and subj ect to cuts,
this sum has increased over the past s e v eral y ears from $ 106 million in 1993, to $108 million in
1994, to $ 1 14 million in 1995. Tel ephon e Intervi ew with Sharon Durham, Public Affairs
Specialist, Nat'! Ctr. for Hum. Genom e R es earch (Aug. 1 , 1995). Current fed eral budget-cutting
efforts are expected to result in a reduction of only $1 million for 1996. Id. ; see also Victor A.
McKusick, The Human Genome Project: Plo.ns, Status, and Applications in Biology and Medicine,
in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 18, 22-26 ( G eorge J. Annas & Sh erman
Elias eds., 1992); Jam es D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future, 248
SCIENCE 44, 46-47 (1990). For an exampl e of how fed eral grants from DOE and NIH are funding
the res earch of Genom e Th erap eutics, Inc. of Waltham, Massachus etts, see Ronald Ros enb erg,
Taking Gene Therapy to the Market, BoSTON GLOBE, J an. 22, 1995, at 80.
156. See supra Section LB ; Smith & Kettelberg er, supra note 151, at 50.
157. Smith & Kettelb erg er, supra note 151, at 50.
158. See infra Section ill .
159. Rebecca S. Eis enberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 , 737-38

(1990).

160. See generally supra not e 99 and accompanying text.
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HGP has inspired the European Union and some individual countries to
finance parallel efforts . 16 1 For example, the United Kingdom committed £15
million from 1989 to 1 992. Several other European countries likewise have
devoted specific government funds to the project, and Canada has allocated
$ 1 8 million over the next five years . 162 These government funds have been
supplemented by money from charities, such as the Howard Hughes
Foundation in the United States and the Welcome Trust in the United
Kingdom. In addition, the Human Genome Mapping Project administered by
the Medical Research Council in the United Kingdom , the Science and
Technology Agency of Japan, and the combination of the French Muscular
Dystrophy Association, Genethon and le Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme
Httmain of France have made direct contributions to the field. 163 HGP also
has inspired the creation of the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP),
a collaborative effort among anthropologists , geneticists, doctors , linguists, and
scholars throughout the world to document genetic variation within the human
species. 164
World-wide efforts in the field of genotech nology are coordinated, albeit
loosely at times, through two international organizations-HUGO and the
United Nations Educational, Social , and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
HUGO, established in 1 989 in Geneva, Switzerland, is comprised of an
international group of scientists and operates by coordination among
people-rather than nations-in the Proj ect. It claims to be an "enabler"
instead of a "provider" or rule creator. 165 Although HUGO has no formal
1 6 1 . Survey, supra note 2, at S9. The efforts of other nations are discussed country-by
country in Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 15 1 , at 50. In order to encourage industry expansion,
the Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB), which is composed of Europe's biotech
company leaders, has petitioned the European Union for a change in its regulatory policies.
BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15. SAGB has also recommended the creation of a task force with
a defined mission to confront current obstacles to biotechnology industry growth. The plan would
include, inter alia, revision of regulatory guidelines; changes in investment policies so as foster
entrepeneuralism; and greater education funding. Id. But see infra note 213 (describing European
Parliament's action in vetoing legislation to clarify conditions under which genes may be patented
in EU).
162. Kirby, supra note 33, at 9.
163. Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 151 , at 32-33.
164. Since January 1994, HGDP has been carried out under the auspices of the Human
Genome Organization (HUGO) . UNESCO is, at the outset of HGDP, taking care to address ethical
implications of the collection of DNA samples. See generally, Bartha Maria Knoppers et al .,

Ethical Issues in International Collaborative Research on the Human Genome: The HGP and the
HGDP (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). According to Professor Knoppers and her
colleagues, who are highly regarded for their international perspective, a "macro-ethical"
framework focu sing on both communities and individuals must be established for both HGDP and
HGP. Id. at 4. Like HGP, HGDP has generated criticism, including a 1 993 commmunique from
Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) and a 1993 Declaration on Cultural and
Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples by MATAATUA. Id. at 6.
165. Kirby, supra note 33, at 9-10.
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decision-making powers, its recommendations carry "moral weight. " 166
UNESCO, located in Paris, France, has not been as active as HUGO ' but it
has succeeded in encouraging regional and national discussions of the ethical
and legal issues associated with research and advancements in the field of
genotechnology. 167
B.

Property Rights and Other Market Protections

The federal government has encouraged investment in genotechnology
both by directly funding research and by granting property rights and other
market protections to research results . The government is ( 1) giving
government-funded R&D to the private sector; (2) granting patent protection
to the private sector's genotech advances; and (3) protecting specific markets
for genotech products .
1.

Federal Transfer of Technology Policy

The United States is making scientific contributions and g1vmg
them-along with the tremendous financial risks accompanying their
development-to the private sector. The underlying hope is that the private
sector will commercialize these contributions and, consequently, benefit public
health . The exercise of existing statutory authority to transfer technology as
well as provisions in proposed legislation directly tailored to the business of
genotechnology demonstrate the federal commitment to the industry . 1 68
Under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act169 and the
Bayh-Dole Act, 170 the United States has given small businesses and nonprofit
organizations a statutory right to retain title to technology and innovations
realized through federally-assisted R&D , so long as they are interested in
patenting and attempting to commercialize this technology . 1 71 The Bayh-Dole
Act was expanded in 1984 to apply to not-for-profit government-owned,
contractor-operated facilities (GOCOs) . 172 Under the Federal Technology
Transfer Act (FfTA) , enacted i n 1 986, those employed by agencies may patent

166. Id.
167. Id. at 10.
168. Note that, unless otherwise indicated, federal technology transfer law applies to the
transfer of all technology, not just that associated with genotech.
169. Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 23 1 1 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 (1980))
(technology innovation/transfer) .

170. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3020 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 202 (1980));
see also 35 U.S.C. § 203 ( 1980) (patent rights in inventions made with federal assistance) .
1 7 1 . See generally Lawrence Rudolph , Overview ofFederal Technology Transfer, 5 RISK:
HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 133, 134 ( 1 994).
1 72. Id.
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inventions if their agency employer does not intend to do so. The FTTA also
(1) authorizes cooperative R&D agreements between federal laboratories and
nonfederal entities; (2) requires royalty sharing with federal employees
whenever an agency retains ownership of its inventions; and (3) authorizes
award programs for such employees . The American Technology Preeminence
Act of 199 1 173 extended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to agencies within the
legislative branch .
On a practical level, the FTTA has created incentives for high tech
companies to join with the NIH and other government agencies to work
together on the research and development of new technologies . These
incentives encourage the creation of biotech firms concentrating on the
development of new pharmaceuticals . 174 For example, Human Genome
Sciences, Inc . (HGS) , a company formed largely to identify genetic sequences
and find commercial applications for them, uses a technique developed at the
NIH to catalogue the chemical sequence of human genes . 175 Likewise, the
Bayh-Dole Act has permitted universities to retain title to their federally funded
inventions and to grant licenses for patents arising from inventions . 176
These policies benefit the genotech industry most obviously through the
prevalence of cooperative research and development agreements
(CRADAs)-contractual agreements that create actual privity between federal
laboratories and private ent1t1es for the development of specific
technologies .177 Executive Order 1259 1 , issued in 1987, directed federal
agencies to encourage cooperative research and technology transfers through
their laboratories . 178 In 1 989, the National Competitiveness Technology
Transfer Act authorized Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories to enter into
CRADAs on the same basis as GOCOs. To foster such agreements , the Act
created a Freedom of Information Act exemption for certain categories of

173. Pub. L. No. 1 02-245 , 106 Stat. 7 (1992) (also known as the Technology
Administration Act) .
174. Day, supra note 90, at 19.
175. Id. ; see also supra note 102 and infra notes 336 and 382 (discussing HGS and its
sequencing efforts in more detail).
176. See also David Warsh, Lab-to-Market Miracle at MIT, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3 1 ,
1995, at 41 (reporting that universities have been able to supplement federal funds through royalty
revenues from patent licenses).
177. See, e. g. , Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,939 (1994) (solicitation by DHH for genotech
or pharma participant in CRADA for the biomedical use of novel approaches for lentivirus vaccine
development, with the aims of rapid publication of research results and timely commercialization) ;
Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,938 (1994) (solicitation by DHHS and the National Cancer Institutes for
genotech or phanna participant i n CRADA for the biomedical use of novel approaches for IIlV-1
Vaccine Development) ; see also 37 C.F.R. § 40 1 . 1-. 16 ( 1987) (recognizing rights to inventions
made by not-for-profit organizations and small business firms under government grants and
cooperative agreements) .
178. Special assessments and intellectual property protection must be considered when
negotiating with foreign individuals and governments .
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information derived during the resulting cooperative research. Moreover, all
federal agencies are "taxed " to support the Federal Laboratory Consortium ,
an interagency group which helps to resolve technology transfer issues raised
between government agencies , as well as CRADAs . 179
The NIH180 and DOE, 181 two of the three major institutions funding
the HGP182 have made extensive use of their authority to enter into CRADAs
with the private sector, thereby advancing genotechnology in the field of
human genetics . 183 DOE laboratories have entered into over 300 CRADAs
while the NIH Office of Technology Transfer encourages and licenses the
development of technology at its GOCO laboratories . 1 84 Moreover, DOE and
NIH foster technology transfers by actively seeking applicants for Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants .185
CRADAs have been criticized for, among other things, allegedly creating
an unfair advantage for former government researchers both directly and
through added responsiveness at the regulatory (PTO, NIH and FDA)
levels . 186 Private firms also have alleged that they have less influence than

179. Day, supra note 90, at 19. Currently, there is a revived proposal to establish a
cabinet-level Science Department to coordinate R&D programs among federal agencies . See
Graeme Browning, Tense Days Down in the Lab, NAT L L.J . , Apr. 22, 1995 , at 1005; irifra notes
231 and accompanying text.
1 80. NIH is the principle biomedical and behavioral research agency within the federal
government, and its mission is to improve human health by increasing scientific knowledge related
to health and disease through biomedical and behavioral research.
1 8 1 . HGP actually was initiated by Dr. Charles DeLisi, the former director of DOE's
health and environment research programs . DiChristina, supra note 24, at 16.
1 82. The other major contributor to the HGP is the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.
183. See DAN BERGLUND & CHRISTOPHER COBURN, PARTNERSHIPS: A COMPENDIUM OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 219, 486-91, 5 1 3-19, 52 1 -22, 52324, 548-53 (1995); Rudolph, supra note 1 7 1 ; Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Grants,
HUM. GENOME NEWS, May-June 1995, at 15; see also NIH Should Rethink Pricing Clause, 372
NATURE 488 (1994) . The federal transfer policy was at the center of a major pricing clause
controversy. The clause at issue allowed NIH to set "reasonable prices" for products developed
jointly with industry . This clause was introduced out of anger over the cost of AZT, an AIDS
drug, which was furthered by work done in NIH laboratories. Because the clause was reputed to
discourage investment by venture capitalists in companies that enter into CRADAs, NIH was urged
by various members of its advisory councils to drop it, and did so. Id.
1 84. Rudolph, supra note 1 7 1 , at 142. The policy implications of CRADAs are addressed
fully supra Section II and infra Section III . The NIH recently announced that it will monitor
recipients that conduct studies for private industry more closely and hold agencies back from
imposing entanglements . See David E. Bartlett, NIH Regulations Now Guide Sponsored Research ,
NAT'L L.J . , Oct. 23, 1995, at C46 .
1 85. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Grants, supra note 183, at 15.
186. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Biotech Patent Derided: Critics Say It 's Overbroad and Will
Hinder the Search /or Treatment of AIDS, NAT . L L. J . , Apr. 10, 1995, at A6; see irifra notes
348 and accompanying text (addressing patent granted on Mar. 2 1 , 1995, to Dr. W. French
Anderson and his colleagues at the NIB, which "covers any method of introducing genetically
altered human cells into a patient to combat disease"). This controversy is likely to continue, for
career shifts from government servic e to genotechnology by top researchers are common. For
example, David J. Galas, Darwin Molecular's president and chief scientific officer, previously
'

'
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they desire in setting the research agenda and must abide by complicated rules
about conflicts of interest and property rights of research results . 187
Nevertheless , the popularity of using federally-owned technology to foster
human health benefits while promoting economic competitiveness and growth
is evident in the hundreds of measures introduced in Congress in each of the
last few sessions which would affect technology transfer. 1 88 These measures
include proposals to coordinate all federal transfers of technology and federal
9
investment in the area of genotechnology . 18
ran HGP. See Rosenberg, supra note 155, at 80-8 1 ; see generally, supra Section II.
187. Rudolph, supra note 171, at 142.
188. Giving away federally-owned technology to promote economic competitiveness and
growth is a popular notion within Congress. "Congress is constantly tinkering with the laws
governing technology transfer. In the last Congress, 80 bills were introduced that referenced or
amended the Stevenson-Wydler Act, among 243 measures introduced that somehow affected
technology transfer. " Rudolph, supra note 1 7 1 , at 133 (completely addresses all federally
supported R&D) (discusses H.R. 820, H.R. 1432, and H.R. 523, which are identified as
"noteworthy"). H . R. 820 contains the National Competitiveness Act of 1993, the Manufacturing
Technology and Extension Act of 1 993, and the Civilian Technology Development Act of 1993.
"These proposals seek to boost the nation's international competitiveness by strengthening our
technology base and fostering the development of advanced products, particularly in
manufacturing. " Id.
189. See Rudolph, supra note 171; see also Browning, supra note 1 79, at 1005; Eliot
Marshall, Data Sharing: A Declining Ethic, 248 SCIENCE 952 (1990) . Among these proposals are
the following:
Federal Technology Commercialization and Credit Enhancement Act of 1995,
H.R. 80, 104th Cong. , 1 st Sess. (1995) : A bill "[t]o foster economic growth, create
new employment opportunities, and strengthen the industrial base of the United
States by providing credit for businesses and by facilitating the transfer and
commercialization of government-owned patents, licenses, processes, and
technologies, and for other purposes . " The stated objectives are to: provide
financing to private sector to commercialize the technologies; develop centralized
database; plan to finance by taxing foreign corporations; and establish an
independent corporation to administer some $3,000, 000 , 000.
·

Developing Sponsored Research Agreements, 59 Fed. Reg. 55673 ( 1 994): A draft
agreement, introduced by NIH for use by recipients of NIH funding. The main
concern expressed by the NIH in this proposal is that recipients of NIH funds
comply with the funding agreement requirements so that information produced under
the CRADA is disseminated to industry as per the requirements of the Act and
implementing regulations.
·

,

Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12771 (1995) :
Proposal sponsored by the Department of Health and Human Services and NIH for
a Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBTMA) This agreement was
designed for use when material is transferred between not-for-profit organizations
for research . It does not address transfer between universities and industry, because
such transfers essentially are license agreements for which universities have
standard-form agreements. Under this proposal, (1) such material may be used only
for teaching or academic purposes; (2) the recipients of the transferred material have
unchecked rights to distribute the substances created only if such a substance is not
a progeny, modification, or unmodified derivative; and (3) the material must be
·
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2.

Patents and Genotechnology

Another fundamental example of the federal government's desire to
advance genotechnology is its willingness to recognize and protect intellectual
property rights190 in technological advancements .191 Although United States
provided at no cost. The predecessors of this proposal are the "Policy Relating to
Distribution of Unique Research Resources Produced with PHS Funding" issued by
the PHS in 1988 and PHS's adoption in 1989 of a standard Material Transfer
Agreement form for use by PHS scientists.
37 C .F.R. Ch. IV, §§ 404. 1 - . 14: Department of Commerce policy to use the
patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
·

supported research or development.
H.R. 632, 104th Cong . , 1 st Sess. ( 1995): A proposal to increase fairness in the
compensation of patent owners whose patented inventions are used by the United
·

States government.

See also Bill Mandating Transfer of Patient 's Rights from Federal Labs is Reintroduced, 50 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 369 (Aug. 10, 1995) {summarizing provisions of H.R. 2196
which would amend Stevenson-Wydler Act by, inter alia, directing federal labs to assign any
intellectual property rights resulting from work done under CRADA to the private sector partner
and government to retain paid-up irrevocable license and "march-in" rights i f holder of intellectual
property rights fails to commercialize technology).
190. This section concentrates on United States patent policy . Copyright may apply to
certain outputs of the genotech companies' work, including written documentation, computer
program s and databases. However, the scope of protection afforded under copyright law may vary
depending on the nature of the output. In particular, copyright is unlikely to afford meaningful
protection to gene sequences for three reasons. First, for a work to be eligible for copyright
protection, it must be "original . " 17 U . S . C . § 102(a) ( 1 988 & Supp. V 1993). The Supreme Court
has interpreted originality to require some modicum of creativity. Mere mechanical listings of gene
sequences, whether in hard-copy form or stored in a computer database, are unlikely to meet the
originality requirement . See Oman, Biotech Patenting Issues, supra note 13, at C43-44. Second,
it is a long-standing doctrine of copyright law that copyright protects only expressions of ideas,
not the ideas themselves: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work . " 17 U.S. C . § 102(b) ( 1 988). Genetic code may be regarded as an idea or discovery
which, if protectable at all, must meet the rigorous requirements of the Patent Act. Third, closely
related to the textual language of § 102(b) is the judicial gloss of "merger . " According to the
merger doctrine, where there is only one or a very limited number of ways to express an idea,
the expression merges with the idea and no copyright protection is available. See, e. g. , Computer
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc . , 982 F.2d 693, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1992). Even if genetic code can
be copyrighted, its expression may merge with the idea and therefore be unprotectable if it can
be precisely described in only one way. See Oman, supra note 13, at C43; Seide & Smith, supra
note 1 , at 58 (footnote o mitted) (Copyright Office indicating it will not register copyrights in DNA
sequences).
Note, however, that state trade secret law may provide an avenue of protection for genotech
firm s. In contrast to the patent system, which requires disclosure of a discovery prior to an
inventor receiving a patent, trade secret protection inheres in data only so long as that data is kept
secret. The congressional willingness to grant patent s in genotech-related inventions, as well as
to consider lowering the traditional patent threshold requirements for protection, may be motivated
in part by a desire to provide an incentive for inventors to seek patent protection through
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law historically has accorded patent protection to inventions meeting statutory
standards, 192 United States patent practice in the genotech area has created
domestic and international controversy. The policy has been opposed
vigorously by other countries 193 and by groups within the United States as
disparate as the scientific and religious communities. 194 Although it is
premature to assess with certainty the extent to which genotec h-related United
States patents will be upheld by the courts , patent practice is affecting the
shape of the industry. Moreover, there is an obvious need for reforms to
minimize investor uncertainty and to optimize innovation in the field of
genotechnology.
The opposition to patenting genotech-related inventions has been
grounded in economics , law and ethics . The willingness of the United States
to encourage patent applications 195 and issue patents has generated concern
on the part of other nations. Many fear that the United States will "corner the
market" on genotech, thereby increasing industry entrance costs to foreign
firms due to the necessity of their licensing technology from American firms
or seeking funding from their own governments . 1 96 American patent practice
also has engendered global uneasiness about the propriety of (1) patenting
human life forms and (2) competition among countries , rather than
cooperation, for information which has the potential to save and improve
countless lives . 197
The controversy over patenting genotech inventions exploded in 1991
when the NIH attempted to patent certain identified gene sequences discovered
by Dr. Craig Venter, then an NIH researcher. The NIH claimed 351 partial
cDNA fragments in its initial application and later filed claims to over 2750

concomitant disclosure rather than relying on trade secret . Thus, patent protection may make more
information available to the public and other researchers than would reliance on trade secret law.

See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
191 . See infra note 349 (Genetic Therapy Inc. obtained a broad patent in April 1995 for
one form of gene therapy.).
192.

The first United States patent statute was enacted in 1790. Major revisions were

enacted in 1836 and 1952. Recently, major changes have been enacted and proposed to bring the
United States into compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . For
an excellent overview of the history of patent law, see ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW
AND Poucy 1-9

(1992). See also infra notes

3 64-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of

the statutory standards.
193.

See, e.g. , Kirby, supra note 33, at 1 1 (conflict over recognizing property interests

in genome discoveries); infra text accompanying notes 212- 1 3 .
194. See infra text accompanying notes 214 and 4 1 4 .
e United States leads the world i n genotech patent applications and thus,
195
.
potentially, m issued patents. Kirby, supra note 3 3 , at 17 (over 35,000 patent applications for
biological materials filed in United States compared to about 13,000 in Europe) .
_

.

�

196. See supra note 2 (noting that outside the United States, genotech R&D often is
con u�ted in collaboration with United States genotech firms) . However, note that government
.
.
subs1dizat1on has charactenzed the genotech industry within the United States as well as abroad.

�

197.
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partial cDNA sequences . 198 These patent applications were filed despite the
fact that researchers had not identified the genes' structures or functions. 199
The NIH's stated intentions were: (1) to encourage commercial applications
of its research by licensing the data to private commercial entities at a nominal
fee, thereby giving them an incentive to develop new drugs and (2) to avoid
situations where several companies own a segment of a complete gene, thus
requiring complex cross-licensing in the event that any of these companies
wished to commercialize the entire gene or its particular product. 200
Regardless of the NIH's intentions, the filings outraged members of both
the scientific and international communities . Renowned scientist James Watson,
co-discoverer of the DNA double helix and then director of the NIH's HGP
project, argued that patenting the "secrets of life" would hinder research. 201
He also emphasized that gene sequences , like the double helix, should be
available for all humanity. 202 Many members of the international community
consider the NIH's filings to be shortsighted and contradictory to HGP:
Ironically, the very country that founded the HGP and recognized
its essential international character sponsored patent applications
that inflamed those whose cooperation was essential to completion
of the project . . . . Many countries have specific provisions
barring the grant of patents for innovations whose publication or
exploitation would be contrary to morality . 203

Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 , at 46.
Id.
200. Id. at 46-47 (noting that another force encouraging NIH to file was fear that prior
publication would destroy potential foreign patent rights). But see Christopher A. Michaels,
Biotechnology and the Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
198.
199.

Soc'y 247 , 248 (1994) (noting that, within government itself, patenting gene sequences is

controversial: "The National Research Council Committee on Mapping and Sequencing the Human
Genome concluded in its 1988 study that 'human genome sequences should be a public trust' not
subject to the intellectual property laws, while the Office of Technology Assessment's 1988 report
on the Genome Project suggested that federal agencies and Congress should instead promote early

data").
supra note 1 5 1 , at 47; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100. Watson

filing of patent applications followed by prompt release of
201 .

Smith & Kettelberger,

resigned from the NIH shortly after the patent controversy erupted . The reasons for his resignation
are unclear.

See The Genome Project: Will It Be Allowed to Survive?, NEWSDAY, May 19, 1992,

at 61 (Watson left after Dr. Bernadine Healy, then director of the NIH, "raised questions about
Watson' s ownership of biotechnology company stocks . . . [Healy] did deny in the journal,

Science, that she had used conflict of interest allegations to force Watson's resignation. Watson's
friends are convinced she wanted him out because of bitter disagreement over the NIH's new
policy of seeking patents . ").
202.

Kirby ,

203 .

Kirby,

supra note 33, at 17; Bylinsky, supra note 8, at 100.
supra note 33, at 1 1 , 17 (noting also that patent applications undermined the

principle of international cooperation, and the subject led to "many an angry clash" among
participants at the May 1993 conference in Balboa, Spain) .
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Individual nations have also spoken out against the NIH's actions . France
accused the United States of placing HGP at risk by penalizing low-budget
research efforts and increasing the overall cost of the Project. 204 France also
raised ethical objections, contending that patents should not be issued on
something that is "part of our universal heritage. " 205 Similarly, Italy opined
that the NIH decision would undermine the HGP by encouraging competition
for patents . 206 Italy also objected on substantive legal grounds, contending
that an invention setting forth partial gene sequences of unknown function fails
to meet standard threshold requirements for patentable inventions. 207 On the
other hand, countries such as Great Britain reacted by rushing to file their own
patents. 208
The NIH patent applications were rejected by the PT0209 and later
withdrawn by the NIH. 2 10 The most widely voiced legal objection to the NIH
patents was that the NIH did not know what functions the gene sequences
performed and that, therefore, the inventions lacked utility as required under
the Patent Act. 211
The NIH filing controversy highlighted the differences between the patent
policies of the United States and European nations that are visible in Article
53(a) of the European Patent Convention . Article 53(a) prohibits granting
patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be contrary to
public policy or morality. 212 Moreover, the European Parliament recently
vetoed European Union (EU) legislation aimed at making the EU genotech
industry more competitive with that in the United States and Japan. The
legislation would have clarified the conditions under which genes could be
patented. 21 3 There is no doctrine under United States law that is comparable
204.

Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 , at 47.
Id.
206. Id. at 48 .
207. Id.
208 . Id.
209. Id. at 57 (rejection based on failure of claims to meet statutory standards : partial
gene sequences not new, useful or nonobvious, and no enabling disclosure provided); see also
infra Section III. B.2.
210. Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bidfor Gene Patients, 263 SCIENCE 909 (1994).
2 1 1 . 35 U . S . C . § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also infra text accompanying notes
205 .

364-67 (discussion of utility requirement) . In its applications, NIH cited the following utilities for
the gene sequ�nces: to (1) �ap c omosomes; (2) identify tissue types . . . ; and (3) identify
gene
.
regions associated with a disease. MERGES, supra note 192, at 159; cf infra notes 377-78
and
accompanying text (arguing that strongest legal objection should be that gene
sequences are
"phenomena of nature" and a non-patentable discovery rather than a patentable
invention) .

�

212. John Richards,

ti:

International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP . MEDIA & ENT. L . J . 433, 443 ( 1 993).
2 1 3 . Specifically, the European Parliament:
invoked new powers on March l to veto European Union legislation on gene
patents.
Supporters of the proposals by the executive European Commission claimed that the
veto
. . . could harm the competitiveness of Europe's biotechnology industry. They
argued that
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to Article 53(a), although religious leaders have raised strong public policy
objections to patenting human life forms .214
Despite objections to United States patent policy from abroad and at
home, the United States government has remained committed to advancing
genotechnology through the recognition of intellectual property rights . For
example, Congress has enacted legislation to bring the United States into
compliance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . The
legislation seeks to assist in maintaining the viability of genotech patents .215
Furthermore, the United States was reluctant to sign the Convention on
Biological Diversity without an interpretive statement, 216 and the President
recently signed legislation making it easier for genotech firms to obtain process

absence of EU legislation laying down conditions under which genes could be patented
would play into the hands of rival researchers in the United States and Japan . . . .
Parliamentary officials said it was the first time the assembly had used the rights granted
it in the Maastricht Treaty to reject a legislative proposal in its entirety under new "co
decision" procedures

European Parliament Blocks EU Rules On Patentsfor Biotechnology Products, 9 WORLD INTELL.
PROP REP. 96, 96-97 (1 995). National patents and European patents through the European Patent

Id. at 97.
See irifra note 414 (describing objections raised by religious leaders); cf. Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial
Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 105 1 , 1067 (1988) (arguing that new technologies should not be

Office may, however, still be available.
214.

denied patent protection merely on speculation about consequences and that the patent system is
not where technology evaluation should occur) . Nevertheless, American courts historically have
been willing to withhold patents on inventions considered immoral, such as gambling machines

Id. at 1062.
Legislation: GATT Bill Clears House with Major Intellectual Property Law Reforms,

and inventions used to defraud.
215.

49 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J . (BNA) 95 (1994) . Under prior United States law, the term
of a patent was 17 years from the date of issuance.
of filing.

Id. Under GATT, it is 20 years from the date
Id. Because many applications, including those associated with genotech, often take in

excess of three years to find their way through the PTO, a number of firms, including genotech
firms, were concerned that compliance with GATT would effectively shorten their patent
protection.

Id. To address this concern over lag time between application and patent issuance, a

provision was inserted into the implementing legislation to extend a patent term if the patent's
issuance is delayed by interference proceedings, a government secrecy order, or by appeals to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences or the Federal Circuit.
may be up to five years .

Id. at 95. Such extensions

Id. at 96.

216. Karen Anne Goldman, Note, Compensation for Use of Biological Resources Under
the Convention on Biological Diversity: Compatibility of Conservation Measures and
Competitiveness ofthe Biotechnology Industry, 25 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 695 (1994) (United
States refused to sign Biodiversity Convention for one year because of economic provisions
requiring direct financing or exchange of resources and technology, including compensation to
developing countries for use of biological resources.); cf Ralph T. King, Jr . , Grace 's Patent on
a Pesticide &rages Indians, WALL ST. J . , Sept. 1 3 , 1995, at B l , B9 (coalition of 200
organizations from 35 countries challenging a W. R. Grace & Co. process patent for pesticide
development based on a formulation from seeds of the Indian neem tree, claiming, "intellectual
and biological piracy. " At the same time, however, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, Inc. seems to have
adopted a policy of compensating those countries which it prospects for materials for gene therapy
through up-front payments and contributions of future profits to a foundation for rain-forest
preservation.).
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3.

The Orphan Drug Act

Another source of market protection available for many of the
forthcoming genotech-based drugs-many of which are c haracterized as
"biologics" (drugs premised on altering or influencing genes)21 8-is the
Orphan Drug Act. This legislation gives companies working o n drugs for "rare
diseases and conditions" control over their target markets , making the
development of such drugs more economically worthwhile. 219 The first
applicant to obtain such designation and approval of a marketing application
for a drug is entitled to market exclusivity for a period of seven years . 220
Moreover, the developers of such drugs receive a fifty percent tax credit and
may request federal grants to offset testing expenses incurred in drug
development. 22 1
Although the Orphan Drug Act protects markets to encourage drug
development, it has been criticized by members of the genotech community
and others as helping individual companies at the expense of the overall
industry. Critics argue that the actual markets for such drugs are much larger
than anticipated because the drugs' initial potentials are often underestimated,
and that markets may continue to grow through subsequently discovered
uses. 222 Another criticism is that it is possible for a drug developer
intentionally to define its "target" market narrowly enough to obtain the
designation, with full knowledge that the actual market is much larger and that
physicians will prescribe the drug for other known uses. Raising this and
related market concerns, some activists for AIDS sufferers claim that this
217. President Clinton Signs Bills on Biotech Patents, Performance Rights, 5 1 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 45 ( 1995) (legislation amends 35 u.s.c. § 103 by
"prohibiting obviousness rejections of process patent applications for biotechnological processes
'using or resulting' in a composition of matter which is novel and non-obvious if: (1) the product
and process claims are in the same application and have the same filing date; and (2) the product
and process claims were owned by the same person when they were invented. ") .
218. See infra notes 234, 243-44 and accompanying text.
219. Orphan Drug Amendment of 1988, Pub . L . No. 100-290, § 3 , 102 Stat. 90 (1988)
(codified at 2 1 U.S.C. §§ 301 , 360aa, 360bb, 360ee ( 1988)); 42 U.S . C . § 236 (1988). See
generally Veronica Henry, Problems With Plw.rmaceutical Regulation in the United States, 1 4 J.
LEGAL MED . 6 1 7 (1993); Malinowski, supra note 89, at 8, n. 13.
220. In other words, no other company can market a molecularly identical orphan drug
for FDA-approved use for seven years after that approval i s granted.
221. The applicability of this credit is, however, limited by three factors: (1) the tax credit
applies only to expenses incurred in clinical trials on humans, not preclinical testing expense; (2)
the credit cannot be reaquired, and the company only benefits if it can afford to take advantage
of the credit; and (3) the company must be continually "carrying on business. " The third limitation
makes it difficult for biotechnology companies, making very little profit and accordingly not
marketing products until many years after start up. Henry, supra note 2 1 9 , at 636.
222. Id. at 632.

202

A False Start?
market exclusivity has led to monopoly pricing. 223
" Orphan drug" designation is granted by the FDA for rare diseases,
which include numerous genetic diseases . Many of the products being
developed by the genotech industry may qualify as orphan drugs . Designating
them as such will b enefit their individual developers and may indirectly help
the entire industry by bringing about market successes that lure i nvestors .
Despite such purported benefits , since 1 993 , BIO, the biotechnology industry' s
trade association, has been seeking to limit the market protection allotted under
the Act. The organization drafted a proposal to limit the market exclusivity
of such drugs to fiv e years with a provision allowing the sponsors of products
with "limited commercial potential " to apply for five-year extensions . 224
Also, while the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association wants to keep the
Orphan Drug Act as it is, the National Organization for Rare Disorders
(NORD) has supported a bill that would protect markets either for seven years
or until $200 million in cumulative sales has been realized, whichever comes
first. 22s
Recent developments suggest that amendments to the Orphan Drug Act
are likely . In 1 994, Congress proposed amending the orphan drug rules to
reduce the period of market exclusivity from seven to four years , with an
opportunity to extend exclusivity for an additional three years for drugs that
are of limited commercial potential.226 This proposed legislation also would
allow companies to share exclusivity if they develop a drug independently but
simultaneously . 227
C.

National Institutes of Health Funding

As stated by one commentator, " [i]n a very real sense, NIH is the father
of the biotechnology industry in the United States. " 228 Beyond its
involvement in administering HGP, the NIH conducts its own research229 and
sponsors billions of dollars worth of research annually at universities and other
public and private institutions . 230 In other words , the NIH is to the genotech
223 . Note, however, that the kinds of drugs which the Orphan Drug Act applies to carried
prices higher than average even prior to the passage of the Act. Id. at 635-36.
224. Id. at 636.
225.
226.
227.
228.
Sciences, 9
229.

Id.
See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 14.
Id.
Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and
HIGH TECH . L.J. I , 7 ( 1 995) .
Id. NIH transfers many of the resulting discoveries to private industry for
commercialization. See supra Section II.B. l .
230. McGarity, supra note 228, a t 7-8. "Americans have been generous to their biomedical
researchers. For more than 30 years, large fees for hospital treatment have supported the
development of many new techniques. At the same time, the budget of the National Institutes of
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industry what NASA has been to the space mission. However; unlike NASA's,
NIH's funding is secure-at least for the time being. 23 1 With an annual
budget of almost $7 billion, NIH supports "more than 25,000 separate awards
in health and environmental sciences . "232
The NIH oversees human clinical trials , including those involving
genotech-based therapeutics and diagnostics. Although the FDA is directly
responsible for review of genotechnology applications ,233 it is collaborating
with the NIH to combine and accelerate review of gene therapy protocols. 234
The NIH ' s involvement in the genotech industry also has caused immense
controversy as evidenced by the patent dispute discussed above. 235 The NIH
also became involved in a pricing controversy triggered by the marketing of
AZT. 236 These controversies demonstrate that the NIH's actions can
profoundly affect the genotech industry-negatively and positively-and,
therefore, its decisions and policies must be crafted with both foresight and
caution. 237

Health, which supports 70% of American academic medical research, has climbed steadily . "

Managing to Care,

THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2 3 , 1995, at 75.
23 1 . In 1 994, the NIH budget included an 1 8 % increase (to $152 million) for the National
Center for Human Genome Research. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15. Although recently there
was a proposal to cut NIH's budget by $7.9 billion, the Senate quickly restored $7 billion, thereby
essentially singling out the NIH and sparing it from the wide blade of Congressional budget cuts.

BosroN GLOBE, May 25, 1995, at
1 1 (NIH spared from present budget cuts, at least relative to most other agencies). HGP's budget
for 1996 presently is expected to be reduced only by $1 million. Supra note 85. But see Anthony
Flint, Universities Face New Era in Research Funding, BoSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1 , 6

See Richard Saltus, NIH Wins Support on Funding in Senate,

(addressing "slashing" of federal funds designated for research, addressing the question "why not
have Dow or Merck pay for the work instead of Uncle Sam?" and considering the possibility that
teaching institutions will be transformed into corporate R&D centers); Lovejoy,

supra

note l

(highlighting the expansive potential of genotechnology and stating that "(t]his potential could be
jeopardized, however, by . . . [b]udget cuts that could slow advances in biotechnology, where
the U.S. leads all other nations"); Browning,

supra note 179,

at 1005 (noting that the federal

government funds 36% of research and development in United States; and that new Congress may
reduce funding for projects with reasonable expectation of private sector financing).

232. See McGarity, supra note 228 , at 7.
233. See infra Section II.D.
234. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub . L. No. 102-571 , 106 Stat. 449 1 ;
BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 , a t 14-15. Biologics were regulated before other drugs, and that
responsibility originally rested with NIH. Now the FDA and Nill work together on biologics
through the Center for Biological Evaluation and Research (CBER) , which is under the jurisdiction

infra Section 11.D. 1 .
235. See supra notes 198-2 1 1 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 1 83 and accompanying text (addressing the CRADA "reasonable

of the FDA, as discussed

price" clause controversy) .

237. There is some evidence that the NIH is reassessing its policies, particularly with
See Gorman, supra note 16, at 63. The head of NIH "appointed an

respect to gene therapy.

independent committee of scientists to look into how the NIH spends its gene-therapy research
dollars (some $200 million

Id.
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D.

Food and Drug Administration Regulation

The United States has "the most demanding prescription drug approval
regimens in the world. " 238 The time from discovery and cloning of a new
molecule to market entry for a resulting drug-the aforementioned "drug
lag " -is seven to twelve years , and the process of getting to market often costs
as much as $400 million. 239 Beyond institutional sluggishness within the
proces s , " [t]he reasons for delay include errors in pharmaceutical industry
practice, lack of cooperation between the pharmaceutical industry and the
FDA, misdirected research , poor investigative data, and excessive bureaucratic
procedure. " 240 Moreover, " [f]or every 10,000 drug candidates created in the
lab , only 1 ,000 compounds will be tested i n animals " and, of those, only one
will reach the market. Human testing itself is a two to four year process, and
only twenty percent of the compounds tested in humans will reach the
market. 241
All new drugs, including biologics, are subject to regulation under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) . 242 Biologics and their
developers and manufacturers are also subject to further requirements under
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). 243 The primary objective of the
FDCA is to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the final product, with
controlling the manufacturing process a secondary concern. In contrast,
biologics regulation under the PHSA is focused on "rigid control of the

238 : Henry, supra note 2 1 9, at 617.
239. See Fisher, supra note 7 , a t B3; Eric D. Randall, Genetics Research Carries Risks,
U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 22, 1994, at 3B (stating that the development of drugs based upon identified
genes takes four to six years). "Researchers at large pharmaceutical companies screen thousands
of compounds in trial-and-error 'grind and find' tests before finally hitting on a promising

$400 million and 12 years in the process . " Helm, supra note 75, at D l .
240. Henry, supra note 219, at 623 .
24 1 . Id. at 6 1 7 .
242. See JAMES T . O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION §§ 13-15 (2nd ed.

drug-typically spending

1993).

243. Public Health and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 58 Stat. 682, 702-03 (1944)
(codified at 42 U . S . C . § 262 (1988)). The added burdens for biologics have included requirements
that ( 1 ) the product used in the Phase ill trials generally must be produced in the intended
commercial-scale manufacturing facility; (2) only the company that manufacturers the biologic
may obtain and hold the marketing licenses; and (3) each significant participant in the
manufacturing process must hold establishment and product licenses for the new technology .
According to some commentators, the divergent regulatory emphasis of the PHSA (manufacturing
process) and the FDCA (safety of final process) reflects the assumptions of a time "when biologics
were crude mixtures or biological extracts . " Gary E. Gamerman,

Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise, 49

FOOD & DRUG L.J.

Regulation of Biologics

2 13, 213 (1994) . As stated by

one commentator, "[t]he establishment licensure requirement, in particular, creates for biologics
manufacturers significant and costly commercial and legal problems that drain financial resources
and competitiveness, and impedes the useofimproved manufacturing technologies and strategies . "

Id.

at 2 1 4. This distinction between biologics and other drugs i s discussed i n more detail

infra

Section ill . A.
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manufacturing process , " which reflects the particular scientific and historical
characteristics of biopharmaceuticals . 244
1.

The Drug-Approval Process

As stated above, both the FDCA and the PHSA, and their implementing
regulations, govern the testing (for efficacy and safety), manufacturing, and
marketing of biologics and new drugs . 245 Within the FDA, the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) regulates new drugs, while new
biologics are regulated by the Center for Biological Evaluation and Research
(CBER) . 246 Genetic therapeutics are subject to added regulatory clearance
requirements prior to clinical trials and commercialization, and the novelty of
these technologies requires the FDA to review each protocol on a case-by-case
basis. 247
Diagnostics are regulated separately as " medical devices " and "testing
kits . " 248 Because of their complexity , genetics-based diagnostics generally
are labelled Class III devices . A Class Ill device requires pre-m arket approval
unless its manufacturer can demonstrate that the device is the substantial
equivalent of an existing Class I or II device, 249 or a pre-1976 device not yet
classified.250 Accordingly, the burden on the developers and manufacturers
of genetics-based diagnostics is comparable to that for developers of new
drugs . They must perform clinical studies , obtain an investigational device
exemption to conduct clinical tests , file a pre-market approval application, and
ultimately obtain FDA approval.
The approval process traditionally consists of a preclinical phase,
followed by three phases of trials on human subjects and a review phase. The
process is summarized in Table I:

244. Gamerman, supra note 243, at 2 1 3 .
245. See generally O'REil..LY, supra note 242, a t § 13-15.
246. See generally id.

247. See supra

note 243 (addressing added requirements) . The FDA has published a

"Points to Consider" guidance document to help develop gene therapy protocols.
248. O'REil..L Y, supra note 242, at § 1 8 . 02.

249. Establishing substantial equivalence to a Class I device requires adherence to general
controls associated with that device, and substantial equivalence to a Class II device mandates

adherence to general and special controls. Manufacturers of new devices also may have to conduct

clinical tests to demonstrate that differences between the new and existing devices do not affect
safety or effectiveness.
250.

See O'REil..LY, supra

the longevity of their use.
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note 242, at § 18.04.

Pre- 1976 devices not yet classified are viewed as having proven efficacy because of
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TABLE 1:251
FDA Review Process for Biotech Products

PHASE

TEST

PURPOSE

TIME

SUCCESS

FRAME

RATE

(YEARS)
PRECLINICAL

Laboratory

Assess Safety

and Animal

and Biological

Studies

Activity

20 to 80

Evaluate Safety

healthy

and Dosage

1.8

10%

.5

30%

2

67%

IND

APPLICATIONS
I

volunteers
II

ill

100 to 300

Evaluate

patient

Effectiveness

volunteers

and Safety

1000 patient

Verify

volunteers

Effectiveness,

(approximate)

3

Continue Safety
Evaluation

IV

Review All

(FDA REVIEW)

Submitted Data

1.7

Concerning
Safety and
Efficacy for
Proposed
Product

25 1 . Table I i s compiled in part from data provided by Kendall Strategies Inc. of
Cambridge, Massachusetts; additional data was obtained from numerous interviews with
representatives from industry and government during the fall of 1995-many resulting from the
circulation of earlier drafts of this Article. IND
Investigational New Drug. PLA
Product
License Application. ELA Establi shment License Applicator. NDA New Drug Application.
=

=

=

=
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PLAS and ELAS OR

2.5

75 %

NDAS

(average;

approval

APPLICATIONS

overlap

(pre-

AND REVIEW

with FDA

review)

review)

9.8 (min.)

TOTAL

1 out of

10,000
drug
candidates

The preclinical phase consists of laboratory work and studies of two or
more animal species in order to establish an impact on the target disease and
assess side effects and safe dosage ranges. 252 The results of the preclinical
phase studies, if promising , become the basis for an Investigational New Drug
Application (IND) filed with the FDA. An IND must be granted for drugs to
be tested on humans, that is , for Phase I clinical trials to begin and for
developers to charge patients for those drugs where the requisite level of
efficacy is established. 253 The FDA reviews INDs to assess the design of the
proposed studies and to determine whether they will be conducted with
safeguards to protect patients . 254
Phase I clinical trials, which take generally six months to one year,
consist of introducing the drug into twenty to eighty healthy human volunteers
to determine toxicity, preferred route of administration, and safe dosage
range. 255 Of drugs submitted for human clinical trials, seventy percent fail
252. Consider that, because penicillin produces harmful effects in some animals, it might
never have reached the market under current FDA regulations.

253 . INDs generally consist of (1) a brief introductory statement (identification of the name
of the drug, its active ingredients, its pharmacological class, the structural formula, the route of
administration, and the drug's broad treatment objectives) ; (2) an investigational brochure
(comprised generally of a summary of the pharmacological and toxicological effects of the drug,
its pharmacokinetics, and the resulting biologic disposition in animals); and (3) a clinical trial

See O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 1 3 . 12.
254. To obtain various objectives (IND approval, clinical trial success, limits on liability,

protocol .

minimization ofexpense from repeating clinical trials, enhancement of overall negotiation position
with FDA) drug developers must select qualified clinical investigators (preferably prestigious
teaching hospitals) to supervi se administration of the products and ensure investigations are
conducted and monitored in accordance with FDA regulations as well as the general investigational

plan and protocols contained in the IND. O'REILLY,

supra note 242,

at § 13 . 1 1- . 12. The present

trend among genotech companies is to delegate drug development to contract research
organizations (CROs) for clinical process.

See supra

parts II.A, 11 . B . l . CROs offer economies

of scale based upon the expertise in development, clinical trials planning and implementation,
feasibility testing, database management, and application procedures realized by CROs. BIOTECH

95, supra note 2, at 27.
255 . The clinical trial process is discussed fully in O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 1 3 . 1 1 . 12.
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in Phase I . Phase II trials are conducted on a limited number of human
subjects, usually 100 to 300, who have the specific disease or symptoms that
the drug is intended to treat. The objective of these Phase I and Phase II
trials-which last approximately two years and consist of placebo-controlled,
double-blind studies-is to develop dosage and toxicity data and obtain
preliminary evidence of effectiveness . They also may address short-term side
effects and risks in people whose health is ' impaired . Of the thirty percent of
drugs which reach Phase II, thirty-three percent fail. Thus , there is a total
failure rate of approximately eighty percent in Phases I and II.
The remaining twenty percent then undergo Phase III trials which last
approximately three years and involve 1000 to 3000 patients . Their objective
is to assess the overall risks and benefits of the drug, establish safe and
effective dosages , and provide an adequate basis for physician labelling.
Finally, in Phase IV of the IND process (actual FDA review) , the drugs are
evaluated for adverse reactions over time, and the Phase III data is
supplemented to address particular concerns and the effects of the drugs on
specific groups of s ubjects .
Before commercialization , if the new therapeutic is a biologic, CBER
requires submission and approval of a Product License Application (PLA) and
an Establishment License Application (ELA) . 256 If classified simply as a new
drug , CDER requires the filing of a New Drug Application (NDA) . NDAs and
PLAs may be filed with the FDA only after the IND process is complete and
the requisite data gathered . The FDA, which has 1 80 days to review a NDA
and may request supplemental information, approves about seventy-five percent
of all NDAs submitted; approval of PLAs take a comparable amount of time.
However , even after a PLA or NDA is approved, the process of reviewing
applications takes an average of 2.5 years .
Emphasis on pre-market surveillance and testing , which heavily front
loads drug development costs , distinguishes the United States' drug-approval
system from its counterparts in other nations. 257 The practical effect,s of this
approach include enhanced patient safety during drug development and early
marketing, added R&D costs , 258 higher capital requirements for drug

256.
257.

See id.
Tufts University conducted a comparative study of drug development between the

United States and Great Britain which looked at the drugs approved in these countries between
1977 and 1987. The conclusion reached was that the British system relies more heavily on post

See Henry, supra note 2 19, at 637-38.
See, e.g. , Karen Southwick, Plying a Murky Gene-Therapy Pool Biotechnology: A
Promising Field is Hindered l:ty Red Tape, Money, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1 995, at D4 (The cost
marketing surveillance.
258.

ofGenzyme's gene therapy trials for its cystic fibrosis therapy "running about $15,000 to $20,000

per patient-more than three times the cost of a conventional trial. And that will translate into high
price tags for gene therapy when it is commercially available. ") .
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developers , and delays in drug availability. 259

2.

Reforms Responsive to the Genotechnology Industry

During the past few years , genotechnologies with the potential to impact
dramatically the lives of terminally-ill patients have reached the FDA in a wave
and, not coincidentally, reforms have been enacted to expedite the review
process. 260 These reforms are attributable primarily to patient pressure, most
notably that applied by AIDS activists and advocates for cancer patients. 26 1
Congress is currently contemplating a n overhaul of the FDA to make it easier
for drug and medical device manufacturers to make their products available
in the United States ' market. 262
Reforms already implemented have decreased the time of the review
process. The FDA and NIH are in the process of accelerating the review of
gene therapy protocols by combining their review processes . 263 Under the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1 992 (PDFA) , Congress has added 620
FDA reviewers , 300 in CBER. 264 Moreover, the PDFA introduced a new
classification of drugs, which enables the FDA to prioritize new drugs to be
reviewed. 265 There is also a safety test agreement among the United States ,
Europe, and Japan to eliminate duplication of animal testing. 266
Most important, recent FDA changes shorten time periods and reduce

259. The recently approved chicken pox vaccine is an illustration of some of the practical
effects of the United States' system. Some criticize the FDA's handling of the chicken pox vaccine
Varivax because two million children in Europe and Asia have had versions of it since 1984. John
Carey, Is the FDA Hooked on Caution?, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72. A concern which
slowed approval of the vaccine was that it is not known how long the vaccine will work and there
is a fear that the vaccine could lead to people contracting the disease as adults rather than as
children. This is rather problematic, for chicken pox strikes adults with much more serious
symptoms. Lawrence K. Altman, After Long Debate, Vaccine for Chicken Pox is Approved, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at l .
260. Henry, supra note 219, at 639. Carey, supra note 259, at 74. ("Some AIDS activists
say the [FDA] has been approving some drugs too quickly, without enoug h clinical testing to
figure out the best way to use them, or even if they work. ")
261 . See, e.g. , Peter H. Stone, Ganging Up on the FDA, 27 NAT'L J. 410, 414 (1995)
(National Kidney Cancer Foundation meeting with trade groups and think tanks to discuss issues
and strategies regarding FDA reforms) ; see also Anderson, Cancer and AIDS Groups Push/or
Changes in Drug Approval Process, 81 NAT'L CANCER INST. 829 (1989) .
262 . This proposal is being initiated through legislation expected to be introduced by Sen.
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), chair of the Senate' s Labor and Human Resources Committee. See
Bloomberg Bus. News, Bill Would Ea£e Biotechnology Restrictions, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5,
1995, at 43.
263 . BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 14-15.
264. Pub. L. No. 102-57 1 , 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) .
265 . Currently, two mutually exclusive ratings distinguish the therapeutic potentials of
drugs-'-type P (priority) and type S (standard). Type P drugs provide improved treatment over
alternative drug therapies through greater effectiveness. See Henry, supra note 219, at 627.
266. Id. at 639.
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the number of patients required for testing where technology deals with life
threatening diseases for which there are no alternative treatments available.267
These changes include (1) the creation of Treatment INDs, 268 (2) the creation
of Group C drugs for cancer , and (3) Parallel Drug Tracking269 -all of which
are intended to make investigational drugs available to patients who require
them at an earlier time. 270 In November 1 995 , the Clinton Administration
announced FDA reforms expressly intended to maintain American leadership
in biotechnology. 271 These reforms include elimination of requirements that
genotech companies file separate applications for new drugs and for the
manufacturing facilities that will produce them if the drugs are well
understood, seek approval for each group of biotech drugs shipped, and file
some twenty-one separate applications for each biotech drug approval. 272
Although there is not an abundance of genotech drugs with full FDA
approval,273 there are signs suggesting that FDA responsiveness is working
to speed drugs to market. In December 1 994, the FDA approved Genentech' s
Pulmozyme, a cystic fibrosis therapeutic. 274 This approval came only nine
months after the company filed its PLA275-about half the usual time-and
it was preceded by approval of manufacturing and packaging plans. 276

267. See 21 CFR § 3 12.34(b) (1993); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 ( 1 993); Food Drug Cosm. L.
Rep. (CCH) , 7 1 , 1 87 (Jan. 23, 1995); O'REILLY, supra note 242, at § 1 3 . 1 3 .
268. Treatment INDs, by permitting wider distribution of drugs prior to approval under
New Drug application standards, allow patients access to drugs about two to three years earlier
than their standard IND counterparts, and the developers of the drugs are allowed to charge
patients for their use., Henry, supra note 219, at 624. A major problem with Treatment IND's,
however, is that, because of their experimental nature, most insurance companies will not cover
them . Therefore, "[t]reatment INDs could also set up a two-tiered system whereby wealthy patients
would obtain the experimental therapy and those who could not afford the therapy would end up
in clinical trials. There is also fear that drug developers may price the investigational drugs too
high . " Id. at 625.
269. Parallel drug tracking makes promising INDs available to selected patients, concurrent
with the beginning of clinical trials designed to determine the efficacy of the drug. Id. at 625.
270. Henry, Problems, supra note 219, at 628 (These regulatory innovations are intended
to reduce the mean FDA approval time by 45 % , to 5.5 years .).
271 . John Schwartz, FDA Revises Biotechnology Rules, WASH. POST , Nov. 13, 1995, at
Al9.
272. Id.
273. Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 61 (stating that only one new genotech drug earned FDA
approval in 1994). See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2.
274. Pulmozyme is a genetically engineered copy of a natural human enzyme which cuts
strands of DNA that thicken lung secretions. See Fisher, Cystic Fibrosis Drug Approved, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 30, 1993, at lA. The drug was approved following a six to nine month
clinical trial involving 968 people suffering from cystic fibrosis. Id. No tests were performed to
assess the drug's safety and effectiveness in children under five years of age or in patients with
less than a 40% breathing function, and it also was not tested to see if it would be safe and
effective for more than one year. Id.
275. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15.
276. Lawrence M . Fisher, New Drug Approvedfor Cystic Fibrosis, LEXINGTON HERALD
LEADER, Dec. 3 1 , 1993, at A3.
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Genentech's success with Pulmozyme (and the FDA) is attributed to: (1) early
interaction with cystic fibrosis specialists, including scientists associated with
the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and the FDA to identify clinical strategies and
data requirements; (2) incorporation of quality-of-life and pharmaceutical
measures (the construction of a manufacturing facility and development of a
long-range business plan) in Phase II and III studies to avoid having to redo
such studies ; and (3) establishment of a foundation to help indigent
patients-removing the stinger associated with the drug's $10,000 annual per
patient cost277 and avoiding a pricing controversy like that associated with
AZT. 278 The FDA also approved C hiron/Berlex's Betaseron, a drug for
multiple sclerosis. 279 In fact, during 1 993 and 1 994, twenty-four genotech
products were approved by the FDA and 234 compounds were in various
stages of human testing. 280 During 1 995, fifteen genotech products were
approved,281 and 494 products presently are undergoing human clinical
trials . 282 (The significant approvals for July 1 994 through June 1995 are
included in Appendix II.) During the spring of 1 995, the FDA announced
reforms to speed new therapies-including many of these products-to
market. 283
Accelerating the process even more is FDA's recent willingness to
expand access to experimental drugs and perhaps even to forego regulation
under certain circumstances. Serono Laboratories Inc. received FDA approval
to expand access to Serostim, a genetically engineered human growth hormone
for AIDS patients suffering from severe weight loss. 284 The FDA also is

277. Fisher, supra note 274, at lA (stating that the cost could be $10,000 per year) .
278. See supra note 1 83 and accompanying text.
279. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 16.
280. Rosenberg, New England Firms Gained Approval for 3 Bio Tech Drugs, BoSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1995, at 76.
28 1 . BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 20. Three drugs approved were developed in New
England. Rosenberg, New Englmui. Firms, supra note 280 at 76; see, e.g. , Cambridge Biotech
Test, WALL ST. J . , Sept. 13, 1995, at B2 (Cambridge Biotech Corp. received FDA marketing
approval for a Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type 1 blood-screening test, with a n expected annual
worldwide market of $30 to $40 million.). It is anticipated that six more genotech products
developed in New England will be approved by the FDA in 1996: Avonex, a multiple sclerosis
drug produced by Biogen Inc . ; Redux, an obesity drug produced by Interneuron Pharmaceuticals
Inc . ; Graftskin, a natural skin cover for closing venous ulcer wounds, produced by Organogenesis
Inc . ; Seprafil and Sepracoat, surgical adhesion preventatives produced by Genzyme Corp. ; and
Serostim, a drug to prevent "AIDS wasting" produced by Serono Laboratories Inc . Ronald
Rosenberg, Biotech Firms Hope 1996 Brings FDA Approvals, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 8 , 1995, at
91.
282. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2 , at 23 (relying upon Goldman Sachs data) .
283. See infra notes 3 12-13 and accompanying text (identifying proposed reforms) .
284. Ronald Rosenberg, Serono Wins FDA OK, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1994, at 47.
The trials of this drug have been limited to company-sponsored studies involving approximately
350 individuals. Id. Nevertheless, the availability of the drug is demonstrative of willingness by
the FDA to expand access if patients are terminally ill.
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giving an expedited review to Genzyme' s Seprafilm, a technology that reduces
the incidence of adhesions after surgery, and which already has been approved
for sale in Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands . 285 Moreover, the FDA will
forego immediate regulation of Genzyme's cartilage restoration procedure-in
which healthy cartilage is removed, grown and multiplied in a lab, and then
transplanted back into the patient-which has been used on about 1 50 patients
in Sweden. 286 Based on the premise that the procedure grows but does not
change cells and because of the extensive control procedures Genzyme has
already put in place, the FDA is allowing Genzyme to perform the procedure
commercially.287 The relaxation of regulations in cases such as these
contributes to the current trend of expanding market access to new products .
E.

Other Examples of Regulatory Support

There are other federal efforts to bolster investment and R&D in the
genotech industry which, though less direct or encompassing than those
addressed above, deserve some attention. First, recently enacted federal tax
law excludes from taxable income fifty percent of capital gains from certain
small business stock, 288 and this law is expected to stimulate investment in
genotech firms and other start-up companies. 289 Observers also expect recent
SEC Small Business Initiatives limiting restrictions on "seed" financing for
private companies to benefit the genotech industry. 29° Furthermore, proposed
congressional legislation would limit shareholder actions by creating limited
corporate liability for statements and projections labeled "forward
looking . "291 These bills also propose to limit damages in investor fraud class-

285. FDA Decision Boosts Genzyme, BosTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 45. For reports
on the successes of Seprafilm's premarket testing, see Genzyme Will Seek FDA Approval to Sell
Its Sepra.film Product, WALL Sr. J . , Sept. 14, 1995, at B2 (Genzyme planning to seek FDA
marketing approval for Seprafilm based on favorable test results on gynecological surgery
patients); cf. Genzyme Treatment For Adhesion Helps Half of Trial Patients, WALL Sr. J., Oct.
25, 1995, at B4 (Seprafilm trials resulted in preventing post-surgical adhesions in 51 % of colon
surgery patients; "less-than-universal effect . . . rais[ing] questions about how widely the treatment
may be used if it is approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . . Genzyme has said it
hopes Seprafilm will become standard in abdominal and gynecological surgery and create a $400
million to $1 billion market.").
286. Larry Tye, Genzyme Gets OK to Revive Cartilage-Transplant Trial, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 12, 1995, at 45 .
287. Telephone Interview with Mark A. Hofer, General Counsel, Genzyme Corp. , Nov.
7, 1995.
288. See generally I.R.C. 1202 (1995).
289. Johnson, supra note 27, at 10.
290. Id. at 1 1 (analyzing the likely impact of the SEC Small Business Initiative's
Regulation D (504), which allows private companies to raise $1 million in a year without standard
SEC advertising, investor qualification, or information restrictions).
29 1 . The proposed bills are S . 240 and H.R. 1058, with H.R. 1 058 immunizing companies
for forward-looking projections and S. 240 having a more moderate requirement of "actual
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actions to a portion of the defendant's fault, rather than holding all defendants
jointly and severally liable. 292 Such changes would have a noticeable impact
on the genotech industry , which has and continues to be plagued with such
actions-many inspired by clinical trial failures. 293
The genotech industry also is likely to benefit from a renewed
commitment to promote federal-state partnerships. Many states, including
Massachusetts , California and Maryland have targeted developing a genotech
industry as a priority. 294 The importance of the industry to those states in
which it is concentrated suggests that it will be represented aggressively in
federal-state collaborations , especially considering how much these states are
doing for the industry. 295 The founding of the State-Federal Technology

knowledge" that the projection is false. See Karen Donovan, Class Actions Curtailed, NAT ' L L.
J., July 10, 1995, at A6.
292. Id.
293 . See, e.g. , Hoexter v. Biogen, Inc . , No. 94- 12198PBS (D . Mass. filed Nov. 4, 1994)
(alleging insider trading in violation of lO(b) , 20(a), 20(A), and l Ob-5); Lazar v. Vincent, No.
94- 12177PBS (D. Mass. filed Nov. 2, 1994) (Biogen, Inc .) (alleges misrepresentations and
nondisclosure of material facts regarding Hirulog); Jones v. Biogen, Inc., No. 94-12181PBS (D.
Mass. filed Nov . 2 , 1994) (allegations of lO(b), 20(a) , and lOb-5 violations); Leger v. Perseptive
Biosystems, Inc . , No. 94-12582PBS (D. Mass. filed Dec. 27, 1 994); Vision See's v. Perseptive
Biosystems, Inc . , No. 94-12575PBS (D. Mass. filed Dec. 27, 1994) . These suits are all brought
on grounds of misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts under sections I O(b) and 20(a)
1of the Securities Exchange Acts, (codified at 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (1988)) and under SEC
rule lOb-5 (codified at 17 C.F.R. §240. lOb-5 (1995)).
294. For documentation of Massachusetts' commitment to the biotech industry, see Stephen
Buckley, Jr. and G. Steven Burrill, BIOTECH 94: NEW ENGLAND (Ernst & Young) (1995); see
also ANNUAL REPORT, WORC. Bus. DEV. CORP. 3 (1995) (expansion and construction of new
biotech research parks in Worcester and Grafton, MA expected) ; Lissa Eckelbecker, Building on

Biotech: Plans for 1\vo Parks in Grafton Plyg Along

as

Industry Struggles,

WORCESTER TEL . &

GAZETTE, Nov . 6, 1994, at El (plans of Tufts University to open Tufts Biotechnology Park).
Maryland (with close proximity to NIH and Johns Hopkins University) and California are also
attractive to biotech investors . The Bay Area now has more firms-202-than any other region.
New England is next with 175. See Steve Kaufman, Bio-Roulette Failures Have Cut the Flow of
Funds to Biotech, But Big Rewards Tempt Some Investors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 28,
1994, at ID. In the competition to win federal funds, Maryland was designated recently as the
home of the AIDS Research Institute, a $12 million package. Co-discoverer of the AIDS virus
Robert C. Gallo, epidemiologist William Blattner of the National Cancer Center, and clinician
Robert Redfield of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research will head the Institute. It is
anticipated that the Institute will foster Maryland's efforts to become the focus within the genotech
industry. See Baltimore Wins Top AIDS Scientist 's Research Institute, BosTON GLOB E , May 25,
1995, at 16. See Bill Barnhart, An Improbable Dow Day Industrial, Transponanon Indexes Record
No Change, CHIC . TRIB. , Jan. 19, 1994, at 5 (addressing California's advantageous entrepreneurial
environment for technological innovation) . But see BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 15 (several other
states are attempting to secure larger biotech investment).
295 . A network of state biotechnology associations has fonned and is continuing to expand.
See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 44. State and local benefits offered to the industry include: R&D
and other investment tax credits; seed captial and/or operating capital funds; tax loss
transferability; sales tax exemptions; job creation incentives; investing state pension funds;
property tax abatement; subsidized land use tax until facilities are operational; and construction
fee waivers. See id.
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Partnership evidences commitment to an effort to foster a federal-state
cooperative approach to technology by promoting collaboration between the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National
Govemors • Assoc1ation. 296 Moreover, federal support for the industry and
the resulting accomplishments have inspired state efforts and competition to
attract the industry's budding businesses. 297
·

III.

·

Genotech at the Crossroads: Challenges, Choices, and Proposals for
Change

With all of its accomplishments and possibilities , the genotech industry,
as it begins to commercialize technologies , is at a proverbial crossroads . 29 8
In sharp contrast to existing regulatory support for genotech R&D , the legal
and regulatory infrastructure to commercialize genotechnologies is l acking. As
discussed above, due to financial pressures , the industry has been reshaping
itself-a process that has led to dramatic changes. 299 Though genotech now
is attracting investment dollars through initial public offerings (IPOs) and other
sources ,300 the dry times of 1 994 and much of 1995 may have left a lasting
impression. There is, or at least should be, awareness that clinical
disappointments, public controversy , and short-sighted policymaking to quell
the particular controversy of the moment may change the market again.
The following are some of the most important challenges facing the
genotech industry, choices before policymakers , and proposals for change. All
of these challenges, choices , and proposals bear upon the financial viability
of the genotech industry and its attractiveness to investors , which directly
affect the future and nature of the industry . Even more important, they also
will influence the improvements to human health associated with the
forthcoming generation of genotech therapeutics and diagnostics.
A.

The Drug-Approval Process
The vast majority of the nation's genotech companies , some of which

296. See BERGLUND & COBURN, supra note 1 83, at xiii; see also THE STATE - FEDERAL
(1995) (emphasizing the renewal of the
National Science and Technology System, state participation, encouragement of private sector
investments in technology, and national excellence in manufacturing).
297. See Kaufman, supra note 294.
298. See Day, supra note 90, at 1 8- 1 9 (summarizing and discussing problems : failed tests;
lawsuits; impatient investors; precarious reliance on a single-product; cost of publicity) .
299. See generally BIOTECH 96, supra note 2.
300. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 10; see, e.g. , Ronald Rosenberg, Genzyme /PO Scores,
BosTON GLOB E Oct. 14, 1995, at 64 (Company provided one of the highest stock offerings of
the year due to anticipated FDA approval of its two surgical coating products.).
TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP TASK FORCE, FIN AL REPORT

,
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have been engaged in R&D for more than a decade, have no products in
commerce. 301 The length of the FDA approval process affects the companies
whose products are being reviewed directly and also may affect the market
wide impression of the industry .302 One high-profile genotech company's
failure can have an industry-wide i mpact and there have been many such
failures . 303 Accordingly , one of the most pressing concerns of CEOs of
genotech companies is the ability to get technologies through the FDA and to
market, which, in turn, affects their most pressing concern-financing. 304
The difficulty the FDA has in evaluating these new genotechnologies is
illustrated clearly by the example of its review of dexfenfluramine, an obesity
drug developed by Interneuron Pharmaceuticals Inc. On September 28, 1 995,
the FDA's Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee ruled

301 .

McDermott,

supra

note 7, at A l . Robert E. Ivy, Chairman , President, and CEO,

RIB! Immunochem Research , Inc . ,

quoted in BIOTECH 95, supra note 2 at 26

pharmaceutical business, your first client is the FDA.
the patient.
302.

("If you are in the

After satisfying the FDA, your client is

After you satisfy the patient, you can start paying back the shareholder.").
Tom Petruno,

Renewed Interest in Biotech Stocks,

CHIC . SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993,

at 40. In the summer of 1995, the Health Industry Manufacturers Association

(HHA)

released a

275-page study showing that although the number of applications for products has declined, the
time it takes to evaluate these applications has increased 1 . 5 times. Regulalory Burdens Cited as
Leading Cause ofDelayed Technology, HOME HEALTH CARE DEALER/SUPPLIER, July/Aug. 1995,
at 20. Ronald Rosenberg, FDA Panel to Deal with Antiobesity Drug on Monday, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 30, 1995, at 6 1 (stating that the FDA advisory panel, after an intense nine-hour session,
still could not reach a quorum on a fat-fighting drug, and that the company ' s stock fell as investors
tried to gauge the FDA panel' s actions) .
303 .

See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2,

at 25-27;

see also Cassidy, supra note

88, at A l 3-14

("Demand has crashed because very few venture capitalists are willing to back start-ups after a
year in which there were several glaring examples of experimental drugs failing to live up to
expectations, companies grappling with long-term financial issues and the growing realization that
production costs are often too high for small biotech businesses. ");

see also

Day,

supra note

90,

at 1 8 ("Expectations that the FDA would approve [Medimmune Inc . ' s cystic fibrosis] drug had
run the company's stock up to more than $36 a share in November 1993. It went crashing down
to the $3 to $4-a-share range, stunning company executives . ") ; Kaufman,

supra note 294,

at lD

("The failure of many biopharmaceuticals in late-stage FDA clinical trials-about 30 in the last
three years-has also forced them to confront the staggering cost of financing a biotechnology
company . "); Ronald Rosenberg,

BiogenLost a Drug, Kept itsHealth, Reputation, BOSTON GLOBE,

Nov . 20, 1994, at Al-A2 (providing Biogen as an example of an industry roller coaster trend of
companies taking large risks and facing tough declines on research of a single drug that does not
produce anticipated results) ; Rosenberg,

supra

note 87, at 61 (tracking the successful rise in

Biogen, Inc. 's stock price with positive test results on an intramuscular drug, Beta Interferon, to
treat multiple sclerosis, and susequent plunge with disappointing results on the development of

Compare Marc Monseau, Possible Drug Approval by FDA
Helps Boost Shares of Biogen, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1995, at 31 (reporting a 7 . 1 % gain in
a blood thinner alternative, Hirulog).

Biogen, Inc. shares due to investor hope that the company would apply soon for marketing
approval for its multiple sclerosis product); Ronald Rosenberg,

Boosts Genzyme Shares, BOSTON GLOBE,

Optimism Over Antiscarring Drug

Jan. 26, 1 995, at 5 8 (reporting that Genzyme stock

climbed more than four points within 30 minutes of the announcement of success with HAL-F,
an antiscarring drug which would have a major impact on the market for surgical adhesions).
304. Specifically, the lack of clarity in FDA review standard guidelines concerns these
c;ompanies .

See BIOTECH 95, supra

note 2, at 26.

A False Start?
that dexfenfluramine is effective, but not safe enough for long-term use. When
the FDA asked the committee for clarification, an incomplete vote (some panel
members had left the room) resulted in a three-to-two vote for approval. 305
Finally, in November 1995, the full panel on a six-to-five vote recommended
approval of the drug-the first obesity drug approved by the FDA in twenty
years . 306
Currently, both Congress and the industry are pressuring the FDA to
reform the drug-approval process.307 Critics charge that the FDA has
contributed to increasing health care costs , monopolistic practices ,
unavailability of crucial therapeutics to particular categories of patients, and
a decline in the American advantage in biotechnology in the international
arena.308 The congressional reform effort is bipartisan, and it includes
hearings being conducted by the Senate's Labor and Human Resources
Committee and the House Commerce Committee's subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigation . 309 Although no new legislation is expected until 1996,
existing legislative proposals include: (1) contracting out product reviews to
private testing laboratories to speed up product approvals; (2) eliminating the
requirement that the manufacturers of genotechnologies build full-scale
manufacturing facilities as a prerequisite for approval of their therapeutics; (3)
eliminating required FDA review when a company makes standard changes
in its manufacturing practices; and (4) harmonizing FDA regulatory
requirements with those of other countries to avoid repetition of clinical
efforts .3 10 Although the Clinton Administration has announced revisions of
FDA rules concerning biotech nology products , legislation is required to codify
these regulatory modifications . 3 11
Perhaps more significant, in April 1 995 the FDA itself identified reforms
that could accelerate substantially the drug review process . To supplement
proposals two and three outlined above, the FDA proposed that: ( 1 ) a two-year

305. Rosenberg, supra note 87, at 6 1 .
306. Joseph Pereira, FDA Advisory Panel Urges Approval of the First New Diet Pill in
Decades, WALL ST. J . , Nov. 17, 1995, at B2; Ronald Rosenberg, Panel's OK ofDiet Drug Lifts
lnterneuron Stock, BoSTON GLOBE, Nov . 18, 1995, at 61 (indicating that the full FDA commission
is likely to approve it).
307. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 36.
308. Id.
309. Id.
3 10. Id. at 37. Eighty-five percent of genotech CEOs have predicted that such reforms
will have a positive impact on the industry. Id. at 10. There also is a proposal to provide genotech
companies with more flexibility in exporting products that are awaiting FDA approval to foreign
industrialized countries. Id. at 37. In light of the added caution many other nations have
demonstrated towards genotechnology, such legislation could lead to significant political backlash
against the United States . See supra Section 11.B.2. ; ily'Ta Part III.B.2. Accordingly, great attention
should be paid to cultural and political differences between the United States and target test
markets before such legislation is enacted.
3 1 1 . Schwartz, supra note 271 , at Al9.
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pilot program be created to examine the feasability of private-sector evaluation
of some low-risk medical devices; (2) FDA standards be harmonized with
international medical standards, enabling the FDA to accept drugs tested
abroad rather than mandating retesting in the United States; (3) a single major
clinical trial be accepted as evidence that a drug works ; and (4) 1 25 categories
of very low-risk medical devices be added to the 440 already exempt from
FDA review. 3 1 2 In November 1995 , the FDA announced that it intends to
streamline its approval process for genotech developers by, among other
things, eliminating the requirement that the FDA approve manufacturing plants
for genotech drugs . 3 13
The proposals identified above generally merit serious consideration, and
some should be implemented immediately. It seems particularly appropriate
to utilize the expertise of the private sector in evaluating genotechnologies,
which are novel technologies developed by leaders in science and academia
whose expertise is rare and, in some cases , perhaps impossible to match. The
FDA's proposal to introduce a two-year pilot program for low-risk
technologies is a safe beginning for such reform. S hifting such basic testing
to laboratories with some political distance from the drug-approval process may
result in accelerated review. Moreover, even if the direct involvement of
private laboratories is limited to very low-risk technologies , the overall review
process may benefit simply by exposing FDA laboratory workers and
administrators to the efficiencies of private sector commercial laboratories.
Also, this limited reform may lead to delegation of the basic testing
components for certain complex technologies to the private s ector .
Expanding the categories for low-risk medical devices would enable the
FDA to focus its limited resources on other more complex technologies . Such
reform also would benefit the private sector by enabling some genotech
companies to begin generating or expanding revenues. However, the impact
of this change on the genotech industry is likely to be minimal since most
genotech devices are classified as Class IIl.3 14 Furthermore , this proposal
raises serious questions. For example , many of the genotech products which
fall into the "devices " category are diagnostics. Though such products may
pose a minimal physical health risk to patients , the mental and societal risks
accompanying such technologies are considerable. 3 15 As discussed in Section
III.D, these issues must be addressed and resolved before patient exposure to
genotech diagnostics is expanded.

312. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 58.
313. Acron Zitner, JiDA Set to Give Biotech Firms a Boost, J3oSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1995,
at 63; see also Schwartz, supra note 271, at Al9.
314. Diane E. Hoffman, The Biotechnology Revolution and its Regulatory Evolution, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 471 , 5 1 1-12 ( 1988-89).
315. See infra notes 419-33 and accompanying text.
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Harmonizing FDA regulatory requirements with those of other countries
and accepting a single major clinical trial as evidence of a drug' s efficacy
would avoid wasteful duplication of effort. The world-wide scientific
community is particularly accustomed to working together and sharing
information in the field of genotechnology as a result of efforts such as HGP
and the work of organizations such as HUGO and UNESCO. In fact, as stated
earlier, many European-based pharmas have invested in genotechnology
developed in the United States , and some United States genotech companies ,
such a s Genzyme, now are conducting clinical trials abroad . If repetition of
clinical efforts were avoided, more resources could be allocated to
postmarketing surveillance. In fact, regardless of whether such reforms are
realized, meaningful post-marketing surveillance must be mandated to ensure
responsible application of genotechnologies. Long-term surveillance is the only
means to evaluate satisfactorily the safety of many genotechnologies , the side
effects of which may take years to emerge and are impossible to assess fully
at the pre-marketing stage. Moreover, such reform is commercially viable
because the expense of post-marketing surveillance would be offset by revenues
received by genotech manufacturers marketing the drugs being observed. In
other words , costs would be shifted to the post-marketing stage, with earlier
commercialization financing this more extensive observation. So long as it is
accompanied by adequate safeguards and meaningful consent requirements,
such reform also is the responsible regulatory course from the patient
perspective. Withholding tech nologies which extensive clinical trials suggest
will have a dramatic impact on the lives of the terminally ill and where existing
testing capabilities have been exhausted is simply not an acceptable option.
Improving the drug-approval system for genotech therapeutics and
diagnostics would profoundly affect the genotech and health care industries,
especially given the number of such technologies now in the drug-approval
process . 3 16 In addition to the proposals mentioned above, another possibility
for reform should be considered. Minimizing the " biologics" classification
would avoid many of the added regulatory burdens currently imposed, the most
onerous being : ( 1 ) the requirement that the products used in Phase III trials
be produced in the intended commercial-scale manufacturing facility; (2) the
limitation of access to marketing licenses to companies that manufacture the
biologic; and (3) the mandate that each significant participant in the
3 16. Such improvement also would, at least to some extent, preempt interference with
clinical trials by patients utilizing the "information super highway. " It already has been
documented that patients suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), also known as Lou
Gehrig's disease, involved in Neurontin (a drug used to treat epilepsy) trials went on-line and
reported positive results, enabling each other to determine if they were receiving placebos or �he
real thing. See William M. Bulkeley, E-Mail Medicine: Untested Treatments, Cures Find

Stronghold on On-Line Services; Doctors Fret the Gravely Ill May Share Information
Drug Testing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A l .

and

Skew
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manufacturing process hold establishment and product licenses for the new
technology. 3 1 7 These requirements are anachronistic remnants of a time when
biologics could not be produced with the purity of traditional drugs-a time
when the science of genetics engendered fear rather than confidence in its
practical prospects for improving human health. For the many modern
biologics that can be produced with drug-like purity and consistency, these
added burdens should be removed. 3 1 8 An alternative possibility is simply
eliminating the added burdens under the PHS, while maintaining the biologics
classification for other purposes, such as post-marketing surveillance, and the
minimization of bureaucratic delays. Such reform would, among other things,
enable genotech companies to enter manufacturing agreements with pharmas
without giving up ownership interests in the technologies, thus reducing some
of the dangers regarding pharma investment identified above in Section I.B.
A more ambitious solution would be to develop a new classification
system tailored to genotech-based drugs . Such a system would be flexible, with
multiple drug-approval tracks and clinical trial alternatives created with patient
and economic cost-benefit analyses in mind and building upon the reforms
introduced by the FDA in 1 988 and b y PDFA in 1 992. There are already some
indications that the FDA and NIH are recognizing this need for added
flexibility. For example , as stated above, the FDA is permitting Genzyme to
·continue its new cartilage restoration procedure pending development of FDA
regulation for such therapies , and some self-reforms already have been
announced by the FDA.31 9
The potentially conflicting objectives of making new technologies
available to patients and protecting the public from possibly harmful
technologies are embodied in all drug-approval processes and create a
necessary but extremely difficult cost-benefit analysis . The difficulty of such
an analysis is directly proportional to the novelty (and uncertainty) of the
technologies and their potential to improve human health. The analysis
becomes especially challenging when highly experimental technologies offer
potential treatment for those who are terminally ill and, more generally, for
those who are suffering from conditions not adequately treatable with

3 17. See 2 1 C.F.R § 601 . 1-.51 (1995).
31 8. See Gamerman, supra note 243 . The arguments for eliminating the distinction between
the review processes for biologics and more traditional drugs may be summarized as follows: (i)
modern biologics can be produced with drug-like purity and consistency; (ii) there are no scientific
distinctions between many products regulated as drugs and those regulated as biologics; (iii) there
are no significant regulatory controls under Biologics Act that are/could not be implemented under
FDCA. Id. at 226. In addition, "[b]ecause of the policies and regulations imposed by CBER,
biologics developers must commit far more of their limited financial resources to manufacturing
before they know whether they have an appropriate product than do drug developers. " Id. at 214.
3 19. Telephone Interview with Mark A. Hofer, General Counsel, Genzyme Corp., Nov.
7, 1995; see Schwartz, supra note 271 , at A l 9.
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established technologies. Many current biotech products do not substantially
treat their target diseases, and researchers and regulators may have difficulty
reaching agreement on how to design effective clinical studies and what the
goals of such studies should be. 320
For treatments targeted to the terminally ill,32 1 CBER might adopt an
approval track approach more like the United Kingdom ' s .322 This approach
is designed to ( 1 ) allow drug developers to make new technologies available
to patients unable to wait; and (2) remove the " experimental" label from these
technologies earlier, thereby both removing insurers' justification for refusing
coverage and generating patient data more quickly. The resulting economic
advantages for drug developers would have to be accompanied by stronger
patient consent and care requirements for health care providers and heavier
post-marketing requirements on the developers.323 Such an approach would
reflect the novelty of many genotech therapeutics and diagnostics , the long
term side effects and effectiveness of which may not be determined any other
way. Additional possibilities include aggressively expanding the use of
Treatment INDs,324 Group C drugs for cancer, and Parallel Drug Tracking
for low-risk genotechnologies such as tissue growth and adhesion
technologies .325 Another more prudent possibility is the acceleration of Phase
III for potentially life-saving technology by shortening trial time periods and
reducing the number of patients required to be tested where the technology is
320. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 26.
321 . A change in requirements for terminally ill patients would have to come from the
regulators, because the Supreme Court has held that it cannot come from patients or through the
courts. See United States v . Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) . In Rutherford, the Supreme Court
found that the lower court had erred in holding that the FDA should apply a looser standard in
approving drugs to be used by terminally ill patients on the grounds that such patients are going
to die without such drugs. 442 U.S. at 550-55 1 . The Court unanimously held that the FDA has
authority to require safety and effectiveness for all drugs, including those to treat the terminally
ill, and that Congress intended for the FDA to shield even terminally ill patients from fraudulent
cures. 442 U.S. at 558.
322. Drug testing in Great Britain also begins with animal testing, and investigational and
experimental drug use on humans requires certification and licensing. However, therapeutic use
(physicians administering drugs to patients) is permitted and excluded from the certification
requirement. It also is accompanied by reliance on and close patient monitoring by health care
providers and stringent post-marketing surveillance requirements on drug developers. Henry, supra
note 219, at 637.
323. Id. at 637-38 .
324. "The Treatment IND is intended to speed availability of drugs by allowing a sponsor
to distribute a drug more widely than before it has all the data needed to obtain a full market
approval under a New Drug Application . " Id. at 624. Treatment INDs allow companies to charge
the patients for the investigational drug, thus permitting patients access to drugs about two to three
years earlier. Along with its benefits, such a system leads to a difficult accessibility issue because
many insurance companies will not pay for investigational drugs. "Treatment INDs could . . .
set up a two-tiered system whereby wealthy patients would obtain the experimental therapy and
those who could not afford the therapy would end up in clinical trials. There is also fear that drug
developers may price the investigational drugs too high. " Id. at 625.
325. See generally id. at 623-28.
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for life-threatening and incurable diseases . Such a reduction in pre-market
testing again should be offset by imposing a higher post-marketing
requirement.
There are obvious dangers accompanying these proposals. These dangers
were illustrated in the recent failure of an NIH-sponsored e xperimental AZT
based AIDS vaccine, which was administered to at-risk newborns and to
infected expectant mothers to impede transmission of the AIDS virus from
mother to child.326 Noteworthy genotech disasters include those experienced
in trials by Xoma Corp. and Chiron , which had a profou nd negative impact
on the industry and its innovation . 327 Recently, an experimental drug was
tested on seventeen advanced cancer patients by Genetics Institute. In early
test-tube experiments , the drug restored normal immune responses in cells that
were damaged by the AIDS virus . However, a Phase II trial of the drug
resulted in the death of one patient and the hospitalization of eleven others .328
The general dangers of administering highly experimental protocols are
well documented,329 as are the lawsuits which arise out of them,330 the
impact of failures on the value of developers ' stock,33 1 and the lack of a
326. "AZT, the most common antiviral drug used against the AIDS virus, has been
dropped from a clinical trial among children after it proved to be the least effective, and to cause
the highest rate of side effects of three treatments, the National Institutes of Health a1U1ounced
yesterday. " AZT is Dropped from Clinical Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1995, at 6 (emphasis
added).
327. See Benedict Bahner, Hanging Back: Biotechnology Companies Are Struggling to
Survive at a Time of Investor Reluctance, CHEM. MARKEfING REP. , Mar. 7 , 1994, at IO
(Depressed stock prices are due in part to "the failure of high-profile septic shock therapies from
Centocor, Xoma and Synergen . . . . Most notable was Centocor's HA- IA/Centoxin, whose
clinical trials ended when tests showed a mortality rate 'excess' among patients tested with it.");

see also The "Virtual " Pharmaceutical Company and Other Trends in Strategic Alliances,
PREsswIRE, Jan. 24, 1995 (discontinuation of clinical trials of Chiron drug for septic shock had
a minimal impact on the company's stock price "compared with a 50% fall in capital value" of
Centocor, Synergen and Xoma which had "product failures in the same therapeutic areas ").
328. Mitchell Zuckoff, Drug Inquiry Targets Absence of Use ofTest Dose, Waiting Period,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 15, 1995, at 51; see also Genetics Institute Hopes to Restart Drug 's Testing,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 1995, at 74 (releasing preliminary results of internal investigation) .
329. See generally David W. Bates et al. , Incidence ofAdverse Drug Events and Potential
Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29, 29-35 ( 1 995). These dangers
have been made evident in recent investigation of mistakes regarding experimental cancer
treatments administered at the Dana Farber Cancer Institute. See Richard A. Knox & Daniel
Golden, Drug Dosage Was Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1 , 20; Richard Saltus,
The Doses and Risks of Chenwtherapy, BoSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 37 (Experimental
chemotherapy treatments are "a game played very close to the edge."). See also Scott Allen,
Deadly Legacy, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 1995, at 27-28 (emphasizing that experimental cancer
treatments carried out in the 1950s and 1960s are now generating law suits) ; Day, supra note 90,
at 18 (noting that failed tests are one of the genotech industry's "major challenges. ").
330. See, e. g., Allen, supra note 329, at 27-28.
331 . See Day, supra note 90; Rosenberg, supra note 87, at Al (noting that abandonment
of one drug's development after disappointing test results caused Biogen' s stock price to drop 25 %
in a few days); U.S. Bioscience Stock Falls 69% , BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1 8 , 1994, at 60 (noting
steep fall in stock price following failure to win FDA approval for experimental cancer drug,
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systematic mechanism for reporting mistakes regarding experimental
treatments .33 2 Nevertheless, the danger of suffering or dying from a terminal
illness while a viable treatment remains in the existing drug-approval
process-and therefore unavailable-also is obvious , as is the danger of
suffocating economically an industry capable of generating a myriad of such
technologies .
The changes discussed above would result in a shift of the genotech
industry's development costs to the post-marketing period, when patients are
using and paying for their technologies . 333 From the patient' s perspective,
additional risk would be assumed in exhange for quicker access and, for the
terminally ill , a chance for extended life. 334 Along with the heavier post
marketing requirements discussed above, Congress should enact a meaningful
informed-consent requirement accompanied by a regulatory compliance
defense. This enactment would both enhance patient voluntariness and
understanding and limit drug developer liability for unanticipated and
unforeseeable effects , which would have to be carefully and explicitly
defined. 335 Such legislation should include a mandatory counseling
component. True informed consent may not be realized through standardized
forms and/or from the apparent assent of the extremely vulnerable terminally
ill. Essentially, these proposals would form a more responsible legal and
regulatory infrastructure for the commercialization of genotechnologies, and
increase the likelihood that delays in their availability would reflect responsive
public policymaking rather than regulatory nonresponsiveness or an inability
to grapple with the issues raised by these new technologies .

Ethyol).

332. See Richard A. Know & Brian C. Mooney, Hospital Dosage Mistakes Not Rare,
BoSTON GLOBE, Apr . 16, 1995, at 1 , 14.
333. An overview of arguments for shifting clinical data requirements to post-marketing
is provided in Henry, supra note 219, at 624, 638.
334. Pulmozyme, the genetics therapeutic for cystic fibrosis discussed supra note 274, was
approved by European regulators in 1 993. See Louis Trager, Europe OKs New Drug
by Genentech; Cystic Fibrosis Treatment Should Benefit Patients, S . F . EXAM . , Dec . 17, 1993.
335. See Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481 (1994) for a discussion of the
importance of patient-care safeguards

and consent requirements in light of the inherent

patient/subject conflict involved in treating patients on experimental protocols. Safeguards cannot
completely eliminate the possibility of delayed effects during trials and even once technologies
have been marketed, especially for genuinely novel technologies.

See id.

at 1482. A regulatory

compliance defense could serve to limit legal liability for this inevitable occurrence, thereby
encouraging innovation. Such a defense as proposed by one commentator should be accompanied
by supplementing drug labeling with a digest of current literature on scientific studies relating to
the drug that would be accessible to both doctors and patients.

Id.

at 1482-88. An informed

consent requirement with a counseling component should also accompany such a defense .
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Property Rights and Other Market Protections
The novelty of genotechnology and the relative lack of jurisprudence

applying traditional patent policy to it have encouraged genotech firms to
"hedge their bets " by filing patent applications . For example, despite the
PTO's denial of the NIH's patent applications , companies continue to apply
for patents on partial gene sequences.336 This trend could result in several
companies each obtaining a patent on a segment of a complete gene,337
thereby necessitating elaborate licensing arrangements to enable any one of
these companies to commercialize the entire gene or its products .338 Issues
of patent ownership and validity are becoming more critical as technologies
become commercially viable and companies increasingly devote resources to
enforcing their patents through the courts. 339

336.

Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 , at 49-50, 57 (noting that more than a dozen

companies, including lncyte Pharmaceuticals, are vying to sequence DNA fragments, but since
patent applications are secret, there is no available estimate of how many patent applications claim
partial DNA sequences) ; see also Carey, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that HGS was "madly filing"
patents on gene fragments) . The company filing the most gene sequence patents is TIGR, headed
by J. Craig Venter and affiliated with HGS whose CEO is Dr. William A. Haseltine. See supra
note 100 and accompanying text. Recently, as Venter has turned to more basic science and
Haseltine has duplicated Venter's sequencing and begun producing 750,000 DNA code pieces
daily, the relationship between TIGR and HGS has become strained. Carey, supra note 8, at 77.
Venter's arrangement with HGS gave him the right to publish his findings in return for HGS
receiving commercial rights to the genes he discovered. Id. To ensure its commercial advantage,
and perhaps also to prevent any patent it applies for from being denied on the ground of
obviousness, HGS would now like Venter to delay publication. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 1 03 ( 1 988

& Supp. V 1 993) (obviousness bar to patentability). Merck is attempting to counter HGS's efforts,
however, by making gene fragments publicly available. Carey, supra note 8 at 73. "Merck
executives figure that i f everyone has the same information, the company's vaunted research and
development department can win most ofthe races to market. 'Mliking drugs from genes is like
going from a dictionary to the works of Shakespeare,' explains Merck's Alan R. Williamson, vice
preseident for research strategy worldwide. " Id. See also Elvyse Tanouye, SmithKline Beecham

Leads in Race to Use Genetics to Find Drugs, WALL ST. J . , Nov. 24, 1995, at A l , A5 (detailing
Merck's plans to deposit all results from its work with Washington University in the federal
government's gene databank which is accessible via the Internet to any scientist and illustrating
how such databanks can be searched for the genetic foundation of a new drug which can then be
used to create a competing product) .
337.

Smith & Kettelberger, supra note 1 5 1 , at 47.

Id. The transaction costs of commercialization under such circumstances would likely
be considerable. If licensing were to become a pervasive problem for the industry, an industry
group might form-like ASCAP or BMI-to centralize licensing and decrease transaction costs.
338.

339.

See Day, supra note 90, at 18 (noting that many companies devote considerable

resources to launching or defending against patent suits); Eric C. Woglom & Margaret A. Pierri,

U.S. Is Unifying Utility Requirements, NAT' L L. J . , Feb. 20, 1 995, at C37 (focus of patent activity
in genotech moving from procurement to enforcement); Amgen Wins' Round in Patent Dispute,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1 5 , 1995, at D2 (federal district court upheld decision finding Genetics
'
lnstitute's patent for Epogen invalid and unenforceable against Amtech); Sally Lehrman,

Genentech, Lilly Settle 8-Year Fight Over Drug, S.F. EXAM . , Jan. 6, 1 995, at B l (noting that Eli
Lilly settled patent suit over Genentech's human growth hormone for $145 million, and that
companies spent $75 million protecting respective technologies).
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Because of the complex funding structure of most research efforts-with
money provided by government, academia and industry-ownership of the
resulting work product and any patent rights thereto may be unclear.340 An
example is the controversy over the BRCA l gene, mutations of which have
been found to cause a predisposition to breast and/or ovarian cancer.341 The
work isolating the gene was conducted in collaboration by researchers at the
NIH, the University of Utah Medical Center, McGill University, Eli Lilly, and
Myriad Genetics, Inc.342 However, the patent application named only
researchers from the University of Utah and Myriad Genetics as inventors .343
The NIH, which had provided valuable assistance to the project at taxpayer
expense, objected. 344 Eventually a settlement was negotiated resolving control
of diagnostic testing and treatments , and the Nm was added to the patent.345
These types of disputes are likely to continue to arise as research funded by
government agencies, academia and the private sector results m
commercialized technologies .
With pharmas expressing greater interest in genotech companies and their
technologies , and with financial stakes rising as commercialization of
genotechnology begins , the validity of patents is likely to be challenged more
often. 346 The PTO's new utility guidelines347 and recent issuance of some

340. See supra Section l.B for a discussion of collaborations involving government,
academia and industry .
34 1 . Malcolm Skolnick et al . , The BRCAJ Gene: Commercialiwtion vs. the Public Interest,
HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 1 995, at 2 ("The BRCA I is likely responsible for approximately half
the incidence of hereditary breast cancer or about five percent of all breast cancer diagnoses.");
see also Richard Saltus, Gene in Some Jewish Women Tied to Cancer Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
29, 1995, at l (stating that I in 100 women of European Jewish heritage may carry BRCAI, a
higher rate than that found among non-Jews); Richard Saltus, Genetic AjJl.ictions Evolved from
Ashkenazi History, BoSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1995, at 7.
342. Skolnick et al. , supra note 34 1 , at 2.
343. Id.
344. Id. ("Rep. Wyden [D-Ore.] noted that NIH had provided valuable and seminal
assistance to the project and that since the government had a role in the discovery and the research
had been partly financed by the taxpayers it was important for NIH to insure that BRCAl would
be used for the public good and fairly priced."). This objection seems somewhat anomalous in
light of general federal technology transfer policy described in Section II.B. l .
345. Id. Under the agreement, two NIH scientists responsible for the background research
are to be listed as co-inventors on the patent application and NIH will receive 25 % of future
royalties. Anne Wilson, U., Parties Settle Dispute on Cancer-Gene Patent, SALT LAKE TRIB . ,
Feb. 16, 1995, at B l .
346. See, e.g. , Amgen, Inc . v . Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 92.7 F.2d 1200 (Fed .
Cir. 1991) (addressing defendant's counterclaim that Amgen 's patent was invalid). A duly issued
United States patent carries with it a presumption of validity that must be rebutted by the alleged
infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
347. For the last several years, companies complained that the PTO had been holding
genotech inventions to higher standards of utility and non-obviousness than other, more traditional
inventions. See Woglom & Pierri, supra note 339, at C37, C38 (PTO established special
section-"Group 1800" -to evaluate genotech patents; as time passed, patent bar began to believe
that genotech applications were held to a higher standard of utility than that applied in other

225

The Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 1 3 : 163, 1996

patents of questionable validity make this likely. For example, in March 1 995,
the PTO granted a patent to Dr. W. French Anderson and the NIH which
covers "any method of introducing genetically altered human cells into a
patient to combat disease. "348 The NIH has granted Genetic Therapy, Inc.
an exclusive license to commercialize the underlying technology. 349 Although
the patent has been derided as overbroad, 350 it may be cheaper for other
companies to license the technology than to litigate the validity of the patent.
This controversy highlights an important policy concern: to the extent
that the PTO has de facto relaxed its requirements for genotech inventions and
will issue more questionable patents, 351 the rest of the industry bears the
burden of either litigating the validity of these patents or entering into license
agreements with those who hold them. Assuming many g enotech companies
opt for the latter, probably cheaper, alternative, then the PTO essentially has
facilitated a redistribution of wealth within the industry by granting those
allotted questionable patents something of value without the public receiving
comparable value in the form of the information disclosed in the patent
specification. This result is at odds with the traditional view of patents as a
quid pro quo for disclosure of information meeting the rigorous statutory
standards.
Simply stated, while the United States, through the NIH, may have "jump
started " the genotech industry by encouraging early patenting of discoveries,
it has succeeded primarily in sowing confusion and litigation. These
controversies demonstrate that the PTO' s application of statutory standards in
the context of genotechnology should be scrutinized for consistency with
traditional applications of those standards and the fundam ental objectives of
the patent system to ensure that the policy objectives underlying those
standards are not lost.

examining groups; length and difficulty of genotech patent prosecution supported this claim; PTO
accused of functioning like second FDA) . The PTO responded with new guidelines that should
make it easier for genotech firms to obtain patents. Id. See also Utility Examination Guidelines
and Legal Analysis Are Finalized, 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 281 (1995). Note
that the guidelines addressed only the § 101 utility requirement, and did not clarify the standards
for non-obviousness.
348. Slind-Flor, supra note 186, at A6 . .
349. Genetic Therapy, Inc. Announces Issuance of Broad Gene Therapy Patent, Business
Wire, Mar. 2 1 , 1995, available in WESTLAW, Newswires & News Services, Business
Newswires, Business Wire File (license granted under CRADA between Nill and GTI).
350. Id.
351 . See John H. Barton, Patent Scope in Biotechnology, 26 lNT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 605 (1995) (arguing that broad patents may hamper innovation and suggesting
legal reforms); cf Patents: Utility Examination Guidelines and Legal Analysis Are Finalized, 1995
DAILy REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) 1 4 1 ( 1995) (reporting PTO publication of final guidelines
for review of liberalized patent application requirements).
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1.

The Basics of Patent Policy

At the heart of all patent s ystems is the theory that if society "honor[s]
the creator of a useful thing , . . . society will get more useful things . "352
This formulation represents policy judgments based on both economics and
ideas of social welfare that are reflected in the substantive provisions of the
Patent Act . 353 Economically , the patent system is a response to a "public
goods" problem:
In economic terms, a "public good " is one that has the property of
nonexclusivity: Once the good has been produced, it is impossible
(or prohibitively costly) to exclude any individual from benefiting
from it, whether or not he or she pays . . . . In granting a limited
monopoly through copyright or patent, government attempts to
compensate for distortions arising from nonexclusivity. According
to this rationale, without the counterbalancing grants of monopoly
power bestowed through copyright and patent, the inability of
authors and inventors to appropriate economic returns from their
labors would result in the underproduction of new works and
inventions . 354
Through amelioration of the public goods problem, the patent system aims to
provide incentives for research and development.
By granting a limited monopoly, the patent system not only spurs
development but also introduces market imperfections. 355 Particular
provisions of the Patent Act help ensure that the detriments associated with
monopolies do not outweigh the benefit of increased investment in inventive
352. MERGES, supra note 192, at 2 (noting also that the textual statement embodies the
tension that permeates all patent debates-tension inherent in a system in which social benefits
in the form of technological progress are achieved through private rewards) .

353. 35 U.S.C. ( 1 988 & Supp. V 1993) . Congress' power to enact statutes like the Patent

Act is granted by the U . S . Constitution in art. I, § 8, cl .8: "The Congress shall have the power
. . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .

.

.

.

" See

U.S.

CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1 85 (1992).
354. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 353, at 185. Note
also that market imperfections created by the public goods problem may be corrected by
government subsidization. In the genotech area, government has used not only the grant of
exclusive rights through the Patent Act to help encourage genotech innovation, but also has been
a primary source of funding for that activity. See supra text accompanying notes 155-160, 190-94.

355. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 353, at 186
(monopolists will tend to produce less of the good and charge a higher price; a monopoly can
create excessive incentives for innovative activities accorded monopoly status; a monopoly can
produce "spillover" effects-externalities-in other markets; administration of intellectual property
regime is costly) .
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activities. For example, exclusive patent rights356 are limited temporally,357
as well as subject to certain other limiting doctrines. 358 Moreover, an
inventor will not qualify for a patent in the first instance unless his or her
invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and non
obviousness and is adequately described in an enabling disclosure. 359 Thus,
in return for the grant of a limited statutory monopoly, the patentee must agree
to disclose his invention.360 These limits help to correct the market
imperfections of a monopoly.
The Patent Act aims to increase the store of useful information available
to society and other inventors by granting exclusive rights to encourage
inventors to invest in those activities likely to produce such information. At
first glance, the theoretical underpinnings of the Patent Act seem to support
fully granting patents on genotech inventions . 36 1 The genotech industry
generates a wide spectrum of technologies . Furthermore, the investment in
bringing a new genotech drug to market is usually large-as much as $400
million-while the time lag between idea and introduction of the drug to
market may be as long as twelve years . 362 Because investor mentality tends
to be "if you cannot patent it, do not invest in it, " without some type of
exclusive rights to enable firms to recoup their investments in genotech

356.

35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Every patent shall contain . . . a grant

to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making ; using, or selling the invention

throughout the United States . . . . ).
"

357.

Woglom & Pierri , supra note 339, at C37, C39 (in 1995, Congress changed the term

of a patent from 17 years from date of issue to 20 years from date of filing so as to conform to
GATI specifications).
358. For example, the judicial doctrine of patent misuse-closely related to antitrust
law-prevents the patentee from leveraging his monopoly in one market into another. See generally
MERGES, supra note 192, at 866-928; U . S . CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE 58 (1989) (limited experimental or
fair use exceptions may protect otherwise infringing uses).
359. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 0 1 - 103, 1 12 ( 1 988 & Supp. V 1993).
360.

The intended benefit to society has shifted over time:
Under the original patent

systems,

society's

benefit

was

the

introduction of a new art or technology into the country. By the Jate
eighteenth century, the primary benefit was seen as the technological
know-how behind the inventor's patent. The beneficiaries on this view
were not just the public at large, but instead others skilled in the
technical arts

who could learn

something

from the patentee's

invention. This was a major change in the economic role of patents ,
for it shifted the emphasis from the introduction of finished products
into commerce to the introduction of new and useful information to
the technical arts.
MERGES, supra note 192, at 5-6.
361 . Woglom & Pierri, supra note 339, at C37-38 ("Patents are the lifeblood of the
bio�echno ogy industry-an industry that offers much promise, but as of yet limited profits. As
_
cap1tal-ra1smg tools, patents are critical to the industry's staggering research and development

�

efforts.").
362. See supra note 239 and accompanying text .
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advances , research may never be conducted at all or, if conducted, may never
move out of laboratories and into the marketplace. 363

2.

The Patent Act and Genotechnology

Pursuant to section 101 of the Patent Act, " [w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process , machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. "364 Thus ,
for an invention to qualify for patent protection, it must fall within the
categories of statutory subject matter and be both novel and useful. 365
Additionally, under section 103 of the Act, the invention must have been non
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made . 366 Finally, to obtain a patent, the applicant must provide a written
specification that sets forth an enabling disclosure. 367
S ince Diamond v. Chakrabarty , it has been settled law that, while
naturally occurring phenomena are not patentable, genetically engineered living
organisms may fall within the Patent Act's statutory subject matter. 368
Chakrabarty reiterates the historic substantive distinction between discovery
and invention. Discovery of a naturally occurring phenomenon, despite the fact
that it may require a large investment, is not patentable while
invention-human-engineered transformations of natural substances-may
be.369 Thus , pursuant to existing PTO policy and established law, patent
protection applies to "those organisms that an inventor has altered in a new

363.

Victoria Slind-Flor,

Biotech Bar Frets About the Future, NAT'L L. J. , June 5, 1995,

at A6 (reporting that the Biotech Industry Organization, responding to opposition of the religous
right, stated that without patent protection, the "next generation of modem medicines and cures
will never get out of research labs" ) .
364.

3 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

365.

In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,

conditions relating to novelty.

960 (C .C.P.A. 1 979). Section 102 further elaborates the
See 35 U . S . C § 102 (1998 & Supp. V 1993) .

366.

35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

367.
368.

35 U.S.C. § 1 12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
447 U.S. 303, 308- 10 ( 1980). The Court upheld a patent on human-made, genetically

engineered bacteria capable of breaking down crude oil, concluding:
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable . . . . [Respondent's] claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture . . . . [G]ene c

�

technology was unforeseen when Congress enacted § 101. . . . The grant or derual
of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to
its attendant risks . . . . Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine
whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want
of incentives, but that is all.

447 U.S. at 309, 3 1 4, 3 1 7 .
369. MERGES, supra note 192, at 124 (comparing
v. Kalo Innoculant Co. , 333 U.S. 127 ( 1 948)).
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and useful way or to genes when they have been isolated as synthetic
molecules, aform in which they do not occur in nature. "370 Recently, patents
of purified chemicals , including purified genetic sequences , have been upheld
as these purified chemicals do not occur in nature. 371
Less certain is whether patent protection will be available for the
discovery of a gene sequence or partial sequence . 372 NIH's patent
applications for partial gene sequences generated a well-publicized controversy.
The PTO rejected the applications based upon lack of utility, novelty and
nonobviousness-not for lack of statutory subject matter. 373 The PTO's action
could reflect its desire to avoid the issue of statutory subject matter in this
context or a substantiation of the contention that the historical distinction
between discovery and invention has been eroded to a nullity.
An applicant for a patent must set forth an invention that is useful , novel ,
nonobvious , and disclosed in an enabling disclosure in addition to claiming
statutory subject matter. 374 Although the PTO 's new utility guidelines make
it less likely that applications claiming a genotech invention will be rejected
for lack of utility, this requirement still presents a meaningful hurdle for the
patenting o f gene sequences of unknown function. 375 As other governments
and companies like Merck publish their genetics findings , particularly with
respect to partial DNA sequences , the patenting of later full-length sequences
potentially could be barred because they are no longer either novel or
nonobvious. Finally, because genotech advances may be difficult to describe
in an enabling disclosure, patentees may find it infeasible to provide the
specification required by the statute. 376

370.
371 .

Oman, supra note 13, at C43 (emphasis added).
See, e.g. , In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C .P.A. 1970) (holding vasodilators

patentable because purified version exhibited properties not possessed by unpurified version). Two
commentators have put the point thus:
Man's act of purifying and isolating a natural substance from its source, and
providing the "substantially purified" substance for commercial use has
routinely been found sufficient to remove the "phenomenon of nature"
rejection from claims to DNA sequences. "The PTO has issued numerous
patents on DNA sequences and some of the patents have been judicially
enforced, although no one has challenged their validity on the ground that
they claim a phenomenon of nature . " Thus, such grounds for invalidation
seem unlikely.
Smith & Kettleberger, supra note 1 5 1 , at 57 (quoting Rebecca S . Eisenberg, Genes, Patents
Product Development, 257 SCIENCE 903 , 905 (1992)).
372. Id.

and

373.

Id.
See 35 U. S .C. §§ 101-103, 1 12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
375. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
376. See sup�a note 2 1 7 and accompanying text (new legislation making it easier for
374.

·

.
b10tech firms to obtam process patents adopted in part to account for difficulties of describing
advance in enabling disclosure) .
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3.

Proposals for Change

Genotechnology offers perhaps unprecedented potential for the alleviation
of human suffering . However, private corporations are unlikely to make the
investment required to develop the industry unless they are able to realize a
competitive return on that investment. Uncertainty often creates risk which
causes investors in truly novel ventures to demand a premium on their returns
relative to other , safer investments . While there are many factors contributing
to the inherent riskiness of a genotech investment, u ncertainty regarding
patentability is likely to be one of them . Thus , any proposal for change in the
patent system should at least attempt to make the patentability of genotech
discoveries and the enforcement of resulting patents more predictable.
First, the law should be clarified by a return to the first principles
enunciated in Chakrabarty. 377 Mere "discoveries " of partial or full gene
sequences and/or the proteins a gene produces (however great these
accomplishments may appear today) are just that-discoveries , and not
patentable inventions . 378 While this distinction between discoveries and
patentable inventions has been ignored in recent years , it should be revived.
A patent is not a reward for effort or money expended in discovering nature
but, rather, a reward for the new and useful invention that results from that
discovery. Industry likely will object to this proposal, contending : (1) that
substantial investment is required to isolate genes and the proteins they help
form and, without patent protection, such advances will not occur; (2) without
patent protection, firms will turn to trade secret protection, withdrawing
knowledge from the public domain; and (3) the patent system avoids wasteful
duplication of research through its disclosure system .379
While genotechnology exhibits some characteristics of public goods, the
necessary answer is not that all of the industry's R&D must be patentable.380
Enacting the proposals set forth in Section III.A would alleviate some of the
front-loading of costs , lessening the need for strong property rights at the
outset. Also, Congress could consider enacting legislation along the lines of
the Orphan Drug Act, which would grant more limited exclusive rights to those
377. See supra note 368.
378. See, e.g. , Stephen Crespi , Biotechnology Patenting: The Wicked Animal Must Defend
Itself, 9 EUR. IN TELL PROP. REV. 43 1 , 432 (Sept. 1 995) (citing London Times commentary on
death of EC's draft directiv e on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: "Genes are
neither products nor inventions: they are the means by which living things instruct these cells to
produce proteins. The isolation of a new gene ought properly to be regarded as an act of
discovery-which is not patentable-rather than an act of invention-which is. ") . Crespi, however,
does contend that genes may be patented under certain circumstances. Id. at 441 .
379. See Oman, supra note 1 3 , at C43.
47-48
380. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS,
nt
governme
problem;
goods
public
solve
to
means
only
(1988) (granting exclusive rights is not
could produce the good or grant subsidies for its production) .
.
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technologies which are not traditionally considered patentable but for which
some market incentives may be required.
Additionally, duplication of effort is already occurring . 381 The most
obvious example is the competition between Merck and HGS to identify gene
sequences . Merck makes its discoveries publicly accessible while HGS, with
patent applications in hand, is charging the private sector a hefty fee for that
information . 382 The proposed cabinet-level Science Department,383
introduced to coordinate R&D programs among federal agencies, may
eliminate some of this duplication of effort. Vigorous enforcement of the
antitrust laws, particularly those related to monopolies , s hould also assist in
making sure that genetics information remains available even if the
consolidation trend in the genotech industry continues . 384
Besides returning to foundation principles , the PTO should concentrate
on (1) ensuring that it applies the correct standard for determining
nonobviousness;385 and (2) expanding and ordering its prior art database so
that it does not issue patents that will later be held invalid. 386 The former

38 1 . See supra note 336 and accompanying text. HGP, Merck and HGS efforts are all
largely directed to identifying and cataloguing gene sequences. Note that considering this
duplication of effort, if patents were to issue on partial gene sequences, (1) the number of
interference proceedings would likely increase and (2) complex cross licensing arrangements may
have to be concluded. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text. A bright-line rule may allow
industry to devote more resources to drug development by obviating the need for costly patent
litigation or incurring transaction costs in licensing arrangements . Moreover, granting patents
would hardly avoid duplication of effort as other inventors not licensed under the patent would
have to "invent around" it, likely duplicating much of the original patentee's efforts.
382. See Tanouye, supra note 102, at B l , BS (Merck making results of its efforts publicly
available; HGS does open parts of database to academic and government researchers but keeps
.
other parts private and reserved for commercial use). Incidentally, Merck's approach undercuts
the argument that companies will necessarily seek trade secret protection.
383. Browning, supra note 179, at 1 005.
384. See Elisabeth 0. Teisberg et al . , Making Competition in Health Care Work, HARV.
Bus. REV. , July-Aug. 1994, at 131, 140. Firms like HGS charge a high fee for database access
and require that licensees afford HGS a right of first refusal on commercial development. Survey,
supra note 2, at Sl2 (calling HGS strategy an attempt to corner gene market) . However, the
antitrust laws were set up to deal with situations in which a company engages in unfair trade
practices in furtherance of a monopoly or attempt to monopolize. Moreover, HGS is hardly the
only source of genetic information. Merck and HGP plan to make information generally available.
This suggests that government and industry should adjust their thinking and focus not so much
on patents for gene sequences but on finding a meaningful way to provide access to genetic
information, perhaps through an on-line service, using contractual terms rather than patent
protection to appropriate any access fee required to recoup investment. See al.so Tanouye, supra
note 102.
385. See Patents: Biotech Industry Critical ofPTO Examining Procudures at Hearing 1 994
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA) 202 (1 994) (many accused PTO of applying stricter
standard of nonobviousness for biotech patents than other inventions) .
386. Cf. John Carey , Untangling the Legal Strands of DNA, Bus. WK. , May 22, 1 995,
at 78 (if pieces of genes happen to be in public database, PTO may consider them "prior art"
making the full gene unpatentable; if genes become too easy to find and sequence, courts may
deem information "obvious" and thus unpatentable).
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may require the PTO to establish guidelines much as it did in clarifying the
utility standard. The latter may necessitate assistance from industry in
formulating a reliable prior art database. Further, Congress should adopt some
version of H.R. 1732 to afford third parties more meaningful access to patent
reexamination proceedings, helping to assure that issued patents are, in fact,
valid.3 87
Finally, Congress may want to consider issues of patent ownership as
private and public monies become increasingly commingled, the commercial
viability of genotech is realized, and the controversy surrounding BRCA l is
repeated and multiplied. 388 Only the private sector will efficiently,
aggressively, and extensively derive practical applications of genotech in the
near future, but public concerns regarding the expenditure of federal funds
must be addressed. Federal technology policy continues to encourage "giving
away" federally funded technology. The revolving door between federal
agencies and the private sector continues to spin. Substantial federal funding
for genotech research reaches private firms both directly and indirectly through
grants to academia. To some extent, the federal approach to technology
transfer has been schizophrenic . The federal practice has been to finance
research conducted by public institutions which have partnerships with private
concerns and to allow these private firms to own the resulting patents and
derive revenue therefrom. There is no sign of any deviation from this general
approach. However, the approach is undergoing increasing public scrutiny ,
leading some legislators to question if not the entire federal technology transfer
scheme, then at least whether or not the government should be sharing in the
revenue derived from the research it funds . 389
To respond to public criticism, and to allow genotechnology firms more
accurately to assess the true costs of their technologies, Congress should
consider ways to establish a tangible financial return on its direct investment
in genotech which does not remove or impede commercial incentives. For
example, Congress should consider requiring the sponsoring agency to include
a CRADA provision calling for "royalties " paid into a public fund when a
company profitably commercializes technology developed under the CRADA.

387. See House Subcommittee Considers Bills on Reexamination and Early Publication,
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA) 1 74 ( 1 995) (H.R. 1732 would afford third
parties opportunity for greater participation in reexamination proceedings and expand bases for
and scope of re-examination).
388 . See supra notes 341 -45 and accompanying text.
389. There is some precedent for the federal government sharing in royalties gene�a ed
by products based, at least in part, on federally funded research. See supra note 345 (descr�b�ng
(descnbmg
resolution over patent application for BRCAl ) ; cf Bartlett, supra not� 1 8 ,
NIH regulations published in November 1 994 that watch more clos�ly its uruv�rsity and res�rch
ce
institutions grant and contract recipients and their involvement with comparues for complian
.
Act)
le
with NIH policies as mandated by the Bayh-Do

�

� at �46
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This fund could be used to increase patient access to drug treatments by

subsidizing IND Treatments and Group C drugs . The fund� also co�ld
.
subsidize the development of effective drugs for rare conditions which
otherwise would not be economically feasible to produce. At the very least,
these funds could offset cuts in federal funding to teaching hospitals proposed
under pending health care reform .
Such an approach should be designed carefully to avoid discouraging
firms from entering into CRADAs and partnerships with academia, and from
investing in genotech.

First, the government

should require

detailed

recordkeeping of its own agencies and the recipients of federal funding to
assure that inventors-and thereby patent owners-may be identified with
reliability. Second, the royalty cash flow should be structured as a percentage
of net profit, in order to ensure that the genotech firms are not forced into
incurring losses by paying royalties to the federal government, and, in order
to avoid conflicts of interest, channelled into a separate R&D fund to enhance
the availability of effective genotechnologies. To protect against commingling
the royalty fund with other federal funds, Congress should enact legislation
providing for segregation and mandating that a high percentage of the royalties
collected in any one year be allocated over the following two years . 390
Disbursements from the fund should be authorized only for certain purposes
such as financing genotech treatments for the indigent or offsetting cuts to
basic scientific and clinical research funding for teaching hospitals . In this way,
private financing may replace some of the federal monies eliminated as the
budget is pared.
Of course, administering such a fund may be expensive and, to be
effective, would require a level of i mpartiality seldom demonstrated by
Congress. To instill a basic level of meritocracy, the structure could allow all
facilities administering genotechnological treatments to apply for grant funding
with data demonstrating the efficacy of experimental treatments and budgetary
needs on a per patient basis. The grants could be allocated by experts in the
field who are capable of both evaluating the applications and avoiding conflicts
of interest. In this way, any given experimental treatment would be financed

th�o �gh the institution . which demonstrates the greatest capability, perhaps
.
ehmmatmg some duplication of effort and creating incentives for providers to
be the best and the first to offer an experimental treatment with proven
efficacy· This grant structure is familiar to the science and health care

commu �itie s . _Moreover, the process of preparing such applications may
_
compel mst1tutions to assess their own efficiencies, priorities and capabilities.
390. Se� Ros PEROT' INTENSIVE CARE:
WE MUST SAVE MEDICARE AND MEDICAID Now
�
41-4� (1995) (discussing the problem of commingled Medic
are
myth) .
funds and the "trust fund"
Applicants fo r a patent are alread
· d to state m the apphcat1on whether or not the invenuon
Y reqmre
was made with federal funds .
·

.
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C.

Direct Financial Investment and Economic Incentives

As discussed above, the genotech industry is now consolidating .391 By
itself, this trend is unremarkable and reflects a wider, national trend among
industries, including health care. 392 Most industries , as they progress from
a scattering of start-up enterprises to a collection of companies with products
in their pipelines , go through a phase in which smaller companies combine
with larger ones , or go out of business altogether. This consolidation is usually
efficient in the sense that economies of scale may be realized while innovation
increases, leaving the industry with the appropriate number of firms and
capitalization structure to maximize innovation after the shake-out is over.
There is ample evidence that genotech stock was overvalued during most of
the 1 9 80's, and that analysts either believed the industry's own inflated
expectations or failed to understand the inherent risks accompanying the
industry's efforts . 393 As these risks became apparent, the downward trend
in the prices of stock in genotech companies was inevitable, and it represented
nothing more than market adjustment to the true financial and factual
situation. 394
However, as these risks became apparent, investment dollars-particularly
from venture capitalists-began drying up, effectively forcing genotech firms
into the arms of pharmas . 395 The pharmas are to some extent competitors
of genotech firms since genotechnology may supplant the demand for
conventional pharma drugs . Thus, while the marriage between genotech
companies and pharmas seems necessary and beneficial to the industry, 396
concerns abound. Selling control over genotech therapeutics and diagnostics
to the entities that own conventional drugs which will be made obsolete, may
delay the introduction of some genotech therapeutics until licenses on the
conventional money-makers run out. Pharmas may get more genotech
therapeutics and diagnostics to market, but their overhead also may make more

39 1 . See supra Section LB. However, the massive industry consolidation predicted has
not yet occurred. BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 9. In 1995, " [w]hile 19 companies merged or
delisted, an additional 1 4 went public . " Id.
392. See Teisberg et al . , supra note 384, at 138; Scot Lehigh, Caution: Merger Ahead,
Unions and Hospitals Are Consolida.ting-Leading Where ?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug . 6, 1995, at 7 1 ;
Robin Side!, US Mergers, Led by Media, Banks Break Record in Third Quarter, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 1 , 1995, at 55.
393. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 77-81 (1990)
(discussing how analysts, failing to adjust for the vagaries of the FDA approval process, patent
uncertainties, and pharma investmen ts, were consistently disappointed in their forecasts of high
earnings; genotech stock prices returned to traditional P/E multiples in late 1980s).
394. Id.
395. See supra Section I.B.2 .
396. Id.
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of them price-prohibitive. 397 This concern is tempered, however, by evidence
that market forces are bringing down the cost of drugs o verall. 398
Perhaps most important, increased pharma control may result in a loss
of the innovation and entrepreneurial spirit which can be credited with much
of what the genotech industry has accomplished to date. According to a recent
survey of genotech CEO's, " [f]ifty-four percent of CEOs cited the difficulties
of working with the bureaucracy associated with larger companies, and 48
percent noted that hidden agendas can also ruin a deal as , over time, unspoken
motives for creating the alliances begin to surface . " 399 The more established
genotech firms have been able to structure alliances with the pharmas in a
manner that allows them to retain some measure of independence. 400 Other
smaller firms, however, are less able to do so.401
The return of investment appeal of genotech tempers these concerns
regarding pharma involvement, lessening the vulnerability of the genotech
industry to pharma control. Nevertheless, pharmas already own considerable
interests in genotech , and dependency upon pharmas may increase when
resources for manufacturing and distribution are needed. Also, widely
publicized clinical disappointments and misguided federal policymaking could
extinguish easily the present general investment appeal of genotech . Federal
policies that slow the commercial availability of technology in a knee-jerk
response to clinical disappointments are likely to be much less effective than
measures that assess reasonably the risks and benefits involved.
These concerns about pharmas should not necessarily lead to regulation
397. Cf. MALKIEL, supra note 393, at 79 (discussing the risk that genotech firms' profits
from successful drugs will be siphoned off by marketing partners, usually drug companies) .
398. See generally THE BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note 12.
399. BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 36; see also Teisberg et al . , supra note 384, at 138
("Excessive consolidation will risk creating very powerful [entities] with less need to respond to
their customers. It will also limit the experimentation that is critical to stimulating new procedures
and treatments . ") ; Burton & Rundle, supra note 147 (Eli Lilly selling Hybritech, Inc. which it
had hoped would develop monoclonal antibody-based cancer drugs and diagnostic tests; "Former
Hybritech executives regard the company ' s tenure under Lilly as a case study of how a giant
pharmaceutical concern can hamstring an entrepeneurial enterprise.").
400 . The innovation of these CEOs is reflected in the elaborate alliances they have
structured with the academic world to develop their foundation technology and in the even more
elaborate alliances they are forming with multinational pharmaceutical companies, not-for-profit
organizations, and each other to survive and bring their therapeutics and diagnostics to market.
For example, although the genotech CEOs are selling interests in their company' s technology to
pharmaceutical companies in order to survive, many are entering into "non-monogamous"
agreements to meet several strategic goals-including the preservation of a healthy level of
independence. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 19.
401 . Id. at 33 ("The pharmaceutical companies have more leverage and can wait for
capital-hungry biotech companies to accept lower offers . . . . [B]ig pharma is less willing these
days to accept less than worldwide product rights, which makes it more difficult for biotech
companies to subdivide their markets for licensing purposes. "); Ronald Rosenberg, Financing of
Gene Industry � Tough Sell, BoSTON GLOBE, May 2 1 , 1995, at 108 (Numerous partnerships with
pharmas are bemg formed , but many genotech companies may be signing oout of desperation.).
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to discourage genotech-pharma alliances. Arguably, the alliances create more
possibilities than dangers . Instead of developing drugs that merely identify
illness and address symptoms , such integrated teams more successfully could
research and develop drugs that actually target and eliminate illness .402
Market-driven forces are putting tremendous pressure on the pharmas, thus
suggesting that pharmas will not hold back on introducing new
technologies.403 Moreover, to the extent that other sources of United States
financing are not reliable in the long-term , the pharmas may offer an
alternative to off-shore migration of the technology and foreign acquisition of
an industry rooted in the United States economy.404
The concern over pharma control also may be misplaced. The alliances
may simply buy time for the genotech industry to recover from the inevitable
clinical disappointments and regulatory struggles in its present and near
future. 405 Many of the genotech firms are structuring multiple deals with
different pharmas , each deal built around specific technologies, thereby
enabling the genotech firms to maintain a level of independence. 406 To the
extent there are concerns that consolidation through alliances with pharmas will
have an adverse impact on i nnovation, federal policy committed to enforcing
antitrust laws in the field of genotechnology should address these concerns .
In sum, Congress should assess and monitor the economic incentives of the
industry, yet refrain from large-scale regulatory changes to control the market
beyond those outlined above .
As argued throughout this Article, new regulation to eliminate false
barriers to market entry for genotechnologies and to provide consistency
between federal R&D policy and policy bearing on commercialization of these
technologies needs to be implemented. An effort must be made to coordinate
FDA, PTO, NIH and other policy directly bearing upon the industry.
Overregulation for its own sake will delay the introduction of technologies
without concomitant increases in patient safety , thereby depriving patients of

402. BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC . , supra note 12, at 65-67; Ronald Rosenberg,
Taking Gene Therapy to the Market: Biotech Start-ups, Drug Firms Try New Approach, BoSTON

GLOBE, Jan. 22, 1995, at 80.
403 . See THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR
U.S. PHARMACEUTICALS: THE ROLE OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES IN A APPROACH TO
HEALTH CARE 14-26 ( 1 993).
404. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, �t 56 (addressing issue of off-shore migration); .,_\
.
Inc. , Before the House
of V1agene,

Prepared Testimcny of Robert T. Abbott, President and CEO
Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Federal News Wire (Fed. Info. Systems Corp.)

(Sept. 28, 1 994) (foreign acquisition of United States ge�o��ch indu�try potential_ con��u:nces
of current harsh financing climate; pharma company acqms1bon provides alternative hqmd1ty to
traditional public offering) .
405 . See Kaufmann, supra note 137, at ID.
406. See BIOTECH 95, supra note 2, at 18.
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the benefits of new drugs and negatively affecting health costs .407 As long
as the industry is competitive, it will produce drugs efficiently.
Congress must focus on identifying and correcting those situations where
the market is imperfect or where other social or ethical concerns compel a
different result. 408 If genotech products are held back from the market as a
result of federal policy, it must be because they are being fully and efficiently
assessed and not because of regulatory shortcomings . Additionally, federal
policy must focus not just on the efficacy and safety of the technologies but
also on the ethical and social questions they raise.
D.

Ethical Issues

Like most social and political revolutions, the revolution in health care
associated with genotech is accompanied by substantial s ocial and ethical
questions . 409 With the United States fostering the growth of a genotech
industry and leading the world's efforts in the field of human genetics, it is
unconscionable that the United States has not assumed the lead in addressing
the ethical implications of these technologies. 4 10 The reality is that the United
States is lagging behind many of its sister nations , including many European
nations and their collective conscience as embodied in the European Union,
in even acknowledging these blatantly obvious issues . Needless to say,
therefore, the United States has not begun to address them in a direct and
practical manner. 41 1
407. See Rob Norton, History 's Lessons of Health Care Costs, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1993,
at 86-87 (discussing historical inefficacy price caps) ; Four States Driving Up Medical Home Health
Care Costs, HOME HEALTH CARE DEALER/SUPPLIER July-Aug. 1995, at20 (attributing technology
delays to regulatory burdens); see generally, THE BoSTON CONSULTING GROUP, INC., supra note
12.
408 . See generally Gorman, supra note 16.
409. See THE GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY (Mark s. Frankel & Albert
Teich eds . , 1994); THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES (Ruth Ellen Bulger
ed . , 1993).
410. See generally ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 17.
41 1 . See U . S . CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
IN U.S. PUBLIC PoLICY-BACKGROUND PAPER (1 993) [hereinafter BIOMEDICAL ETHICS] . Although
the United States has attempted to establish ethical guidelines for medical care and research issues
(for example, the use of human beings in research), HGP-specific issues have not been adequately
addressed even though three percent of the HGP budget is committed to addressing ethics issues
through the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI) component of the HGP-the largest source
of federal funding for bioethics. Id. at 8. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39.
The fact is that scientists, policymakers and even much of the public have grown too
comfortable with science's capabilities in the area of human genetics. When the first gene was
cloned in 1972, "scientists were so worried about the implications of what they were doing that
they considered a voluntary moratorium on the recombination of cloned genes into the DNA of
other organisms. Now, . . . [t]he creation of recombinant people, with foreign genes stitched into
their cells, is widely accepted. " Survey, supra note 2 , at S4. But see Oman, supra note 13, at C44
(suggesting that "the United States has been very sensitive" to ethical issues raised by human
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Although theoretically sophisticated ethical treatment of the issues raised
by genotechnologies may prove helpful, there is an immediate need for applied
ethics. Many of the societal ramifications of simply not dealing with the ethical
aspects of genetics technologies are readily ascertainable. Task forces
assembled both b y the Institutes of Medicine and HGP have acknowledged that
commercial and academic laboratories are making genetic testing capabilities
easily accessible to the public too quickly and that many genetic tests are
subject to misinterpretation. 4 1 2 Legal liability for wrongful birth as well as
wrongful life and general malpractice is likely to pressure health care providers
to err on the side of making such genotech diagnostics-however
imprecise-available . 41 3
There also are foreseeable economic consequences associated with these
technologies . The lack of adequate consideration of the societal and ethical
implications of genotechnologies , and introduction of resulting guidelines and
regulations , leave the industry subject to broad-side attacks such as the recent
challenge stirred up by an environmental activist, Jeremy Rifkin, and a
coalition of conservative religious leaders .4 14 Genotech is, in essence ,
medicinal evolution, and unchecked political controversy could erect high and
even impenetrable barriers. For example, in light of the growing dependency

genetics research).
On the other hand, "[a] recurring theme in most of the academic commentary on the Human
Genome Project is the need for community involvement. A recurring complaint is the relative lack
of community participation until now . " Kirby, supra note 33, at 17-19. Concerns have been
"expressed about the way in which the Human Genome Project itself has been initiated and funded
by governments and scientists with very little input from the public . " Id. at 14. For an example
of European efforts to address the ethical and social implications of genetics technologies, consider
that France has proposed uniform legislation to make such issues the matter of true public policy,
rather than being determined by individual doctors on a patient-by-patient basis. Id. ; see also
Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1 5 1 3 . Also, the Council of Europe is developing a regional
convention. See Kirby , supra note 33, at 18; Richard H. Nicholson, Old World News: One Law
for All?, HASTINGS CENTER REP . , Mar. -Apr . 1 995, at 4, 4 (addressing debate whether the
proposed European Convention on Bioethics now being prepared by the Council of Europe should
be used to enforce moral principles).
412. See generally ASSESSlNG GENETIC RISKS, supra note 1 7 ; Malinowski, supra note 39;
Saltus, supra note 1 7 .
413. See Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1504-07.
414. Under the leadership of Rifkin, head of the Foundation on Economic Trends which
consistently has opposed genetic engineering research, this alliance of 80 religious leaders asserted
the ethical position that patenting basic units of life demeans it; their immediate political objective
was to obtain a ban on the patenting of cells, animals and other basic forms of life. Kathleen Day,

Church Groups to Fight Patenting of Life Forms; Coalition to Press for Congressional Action,

WASH. PosT, May 1 3 , 1995, at A3; Ronald Rosenberg, Call to Ban Patents Stirs Industry Fears,
Boston Globe, May 1 9, 1995, at 39. However, " [m]any genetic scientists and executives
themselves say the basic knowledge of the chemical code of life-DNA-should be in the public
"
domain, with patents going only to unique processes and products derived from DNA knowledge.

Id.
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upon European pharmaceuticals , 415 there is a real danger that political
controversy in the United States over human genetics could result in a repeat
of the RU486 experience, meaning that technologies could be kept out of the
consumer market for purely nonscientific reasons .41 6
Ethical issues are readily apparent in virtually all aspects of the genotech
industry and its technologies. These include ( 1 ) patient care issues, such as
insurance
coverage, 417
counseling,418
cost, 419
accessibility ,420
and

415. See BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 30. However, 69% of 1 995 biotech deals were
structured with United States firms. Id. at 3 1 .
416. See generally Claire L. Ahern, Note, Drug Approval in the United States and
England: A Question ofMedical Safety or Moral Persuasion ?-1he RU-486 Example, 17 SUFFOLK
TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 94 ( 1 994) ; LAWRENCE LADER, RU 486: THE PILL THAT COULD END
THE ABORTION WARS AND WHY AMERICAN WOMEN 00 NOT HAVE IT ( 1 991).
417. The possibility that insurers already are using genetic test results in making health
coverage decisions was recognized by Francis Collins at the Sept. 29 hearing of the Senate Career
Coalition. Scientists, Insurers Disagree on Genetics Test Resve.x Access, THE CANCER LETTER,
No. 38, Oct. 6, 1 995, at 2; see also M. A. Dewar et al. , Genetic Screening by Insurance Carriers,
267 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1207, 1207-08 (1992) (letter to the editor); Mark Rothstein, Genetics,
Insurance, and the Ethics of Genetic Counseling, 3 MOLECULAR GEN. MED. 159-77 (1993).
Insurance discrimination based upon genetic predispositions has not been directly addressed by
the federal government, with the exception of a recent EEOC decision regarding employment
discrimination and not specifically addressing the issue of insurance. See infra note 423. However,
several states, including Arizona, California, Maryland and Montana are regulating genetics-based
insurance discrimination . See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448 (1 990 & Supp. 1995); CAL. INS.
CODE § 1 1 512.95 (West 1 990 & Supp. 1995) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 223 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33- 1 8-206 ( 1 993). See generally Survey, supra note 2, at 1 5 .
418. See generally, AsSESSING GENETIC RISK, supra note 17; Malinowski, supra note 39.
419. Genetics technologies may be more effective, but also more expensive than existing
treatments. Accordingly, hospitals, doctors, patients , and insurance companies may find themselves
faced with a choice between an affordable traditional treatment and a cutting-edge alternative that
offers a marginal advantage at a much higher price. A prime example of this dilemma was the
introduction of Genentech' s clot-busting drug known as t-PA or Activase. See Doctors Face Ethical
Dilemma Over Which Heart Drug to Use, OREGONIAN, Sept. 5, 1993, atD4. The drug could save
10 more lives than an existing drug, Streptokinase, for every 1000 heart attack patients treated--a
result of2000 lives/yr. Although Genentech offers the drug free of charge to some needy patients,
the cost for t-PA is at least $2000 per patient, while streptokinase costs only $200. Id. ; Tom
Schmitz, High-Tech Heart Drug Gets Tiny Edge in Study, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May l ,
1 993, at IA; Byron Spice, Costlier Drug is Betterfor Heart Trouble, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETIE,
May I , 1993, at A5. Another cost issue is that, in light of some of the tremendous costs of genetic
technologies, it is unlikely that insurance companies will cover them readily and that we as a
society can afford them-at least until other costs have been lowered through the technologies.
For example, Genzyme's Ceredase/Cerezyme treatment for Gaucher's Syndrome, which afflicts
5000 people worldwide, costs $ 1 50,000 a year initially, followed by a maintenance program of
monthly infusions for the rest of the patient's life at a cost of approximately $60,000 per year.
Ronald Rosenberg, Genzyme 's Plans to Beat Obsolescence, BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1995, at 60.
("Indeed, Genzyme has received some harsh criticism both for the drug's high price-as much
as $350,000-when it was first introduced-as well as for its overly aggressive efforts to sell
directly to patients . ") . Such high costs are especially controversial when the underlying research
and development was funded in part through federal funds and/or benefitted significantly from
federally-transferred technology, or agency resources were expended to expedite review of the
technology. See supra note 326 (addressing AZT controversy); see also note 388 and
accompanying text (addressing BRCAl controversy). The difficult cost-benefit analysis associated
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informed consent for both treatment and research;42 1 (2) patient rights issues ,
such as privacy422 and discrimination;423 (3) the inherent patient/subject
with patient accessibility and insurance coverage may, under the Americans With Disabilities Act
be conducted by juries . See Howard Schaffner & Monica E. McFadden, Disabilities Act Make
Denial of Benefits Risky, NAT'L L. J . , Jan. 16, 1995, at Cl7-19.
420. See generally ublic Prioritiesfor Genetic Services, HASTINGS CENTER REP. , May
June 1 995, at S l -23 (Special Supplement) . The problem of reasonable and equitable access to
genetics technologies; the circumvention of the benefits of such technologies by inadequate laws,
public policies, and commercialization which collectively skew equitable distribution; and the
issues of informed consent and privacy are addressed in John D . Blum, Book Review, 15 J. LEG.
MED . 345 (June 1994) (reviewing EUGENE BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1993)). An especially complex issue is the accessibility of investigative treatments for
the terminally ill. See supra Section III.A (addressed in the context of FDA policy).
42 1 . The impact of genetic diagnostic capabilities on patient care has not been assessed,
even though the expansion of these technologies is explosive :
The current explosive pace of research in the molecular biology of cancer has
resulted in a proliferation of new tests. If these are implemented, more and more
people will be advised that they have an early cancer and can be treated.
Unfortunately, there are indications that finding a cancer early may not be better,
unless it is one that will progress if untreated . . . . Aside from the burden of fear
and anxiety that accompany a cancer diagnosis, the risk from possibly unnecessary
surgery, the patient with an early detected cancer faces the risk of uninsurability due
to a pre-existing condition.
Skolnick et al. , supra note 341, at 2. The issue of consent and confidentiality in the context of
research for HGP and HGDP is discussed in Knoppers, supra note 164, at 6- 1 5 (discussing and
citing international legislation to address these issues).
422 . See generally, Bartha N. Knoppers, Confidentiality in Genetic Testing: Legal and
Ethical Issues in an International Context, 12 MED. & LAW 573-82 (1993). The danger of
dissemination of genetic information has been acknowledged through the introduction of the
Genetic Privacy Act, the first legislation proposed by the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues (ELSI)
component of the Human Genome Project. See Gene Privacy Act Introduced, HUMAN GENOME
NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 4, 4. This Act, which has been introduced into six state legislatures,
would require explicit authorization to collect DNA samples for genetic analysis,
limit uses of the samples for genetic analysis, limit uses of the samples and genetic
information obtained from them, and set forth penalties for violators. The act aims
to protect individual privacy while permitting genetic analysis for medical and
identification purposes and legitimate research.
Id. Legislation to ensure the confidentiality of genetic information also has received public support
from powerful legislators, including Senator Barbara Mikulski, a Democrat from Maryland. See
Bob Hohler, Congress is Urged to Fund Gene Research in Health Plan, BoSTON GLOBE, May
14, 1994, at 5 . Such legislation has been proposed in the past-the Human Genome Privacy Act
(HGPA), which was introduced before the House of Representatives on Sept. 1 3 , 1990; H . R.
5612, lOlst Cong. , 2d Sess. (1990). See George P. Smith & Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic
Determinism or Genetic Discrimination ?, 1 1 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 52-57 (Fall
1994). Existing privacy protection is allotted under the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1988), which restricts the type of information the government may collect, explicitly
restricting the collection of information by federal agencies. The privacy of patient records in
general is addressed in Alison Bass, HMO to Limit Access to Data: VA Units Take Opposite Tack,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1995, at 1 .
423. See EEOC, Directives Transmittal, Executive Summary: Compliance Manual § 902
(Mar. 14, 1995); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
Responses to New Technology, 74 B. U. L. Rev. 1 ( 1 994); Charles B. Gurd, Whether a Genetic

;

�

Defect is a Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: P'.eventing �netic Discriminatio�
!Jy Employers, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 07 (1 992) ; Francis H. Miller & Phihp A. Huvos, Genetic
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conflict surrounding patients in experimental clinical trials424 and those whose
DNA is being used for the underlying HGP and HGDP research;425 (4)
professional and business ethics issues , such as pricing426 and conflicts of
interest427 and allegations of favoritism on the part of the federal
Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cutting, and the Americans with Disabilities A ct, 46 ADMIN. L. REv.
369 (1994); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REV. 23 (1992). The scope of the danger o f discrimination based
upon genetic information is immense for, " [a]t some level, there is something in everyone's
genome that could get them into trouble eventually. " Survey, supra note 2, at S15; see also
Richard Saltus, US Ruling Bars Discrimination Based on Genes, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1 1 , 1995,
at 5. The policy statement by the EEOC barring discrimination based upon genetic predisposition
under the Americans with Disabilities Act reflects a growing recognition of the societal impact
of scientific advances. However, this ruling strictly pertains to employment; though most people
receive insurance coverage through their employer, the decision does not address insurance issues
directly. Under the EEOC's new interpretation, an employer cannot terminate an employee or
renege on a job offer because of the results of genetic testing. As for the state level, the California
legislature has voted to ban all discrimination on the basis of genetic status . Survey, supra note
2, at Sl5.
424. See Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481 (1994) (addressing the conflict
between the drug-approval process and patient protection, primarily from the approach primarily
of patient care). The dangers associated with clinical trials are exemplified in the chemotherapy
incidents at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute disclosed in spring 1995, the subsequent disclosure
of numerous other such incidents at Boston-area hospitals, and the patient deaths and
hospitalizations resulting from the Phase III clinical trial administered by Genetics Institute of
Cambridge, Massachusetts . See David W. Bates et al. , Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and
Potential AdverseDrug Events: Implicationsfor Prevention, 274 JAMA29 (July 5, 1995); Richard
A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Doctors Missed Clue to Chemotherapy Overdoses, BoSTON GLOBE,
June 19, 1995, at 20; Richard A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Drug Dosage was Questioned: Dana.
Farber Pharmacist Sent Order Back to Doctor in Breast Cancer Case, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19,
1995, at 1 , 20; Richard A. Knox & Brian C. Mooney, Hospital Dosage Mistakes Not Rare,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1995, at I , 14; Richard A. Knox, Hospital Drugs Hurt I in 15, BoSTON
GLOBE, July 5 , 1995, at I , 13 Richard A. Knox, State Cites Dana-Farber Failures, BoSTON
GLOBE, May 3 1 , 1 995, at 2, 28; Ronald Rosenberg, 2 More Hospitalized in Drug Test, BosTON
GLOBE, June 1 3 , 1995, at 45, 64; Michell Zuckoff, Drug Inquiry Targets Absence of Use of Test
Dose, Waiting Period, BosTON GLOBE, June 15, 1995, at 5 1 .
425. See generally Knoppers, supra note 164, at 6-22.
426 . The lack of regulatory control despite extensive federal investments and direct
contributions in the underlying technologies have given rise to controversies over pricing and
commercialization of technologies, such as the controversies associated with AZT and BRCAl ,
a gene responsible for approximately half the incidence of hereditary breast cancer or about five
percent of all breast cancer diagnosis. See, e.g. , Skolnick et al . , supra note 341 . There is ample
and persuasive evidence that price caps should be rejected "because they will have devastating
1
effects on innovative new drugs and devices. " Teisberg et al. , supra note 384, at 140; see also
Norton, supra note 407. Nevertheless, without measures to alleviate the impression that federal
funds are being used to reap huge commercial returns for the industry and at the expense of public
health (including more effective and aggressive public relations efforts by the industry), pricing
controversies will continue to arise.
427 . To the extent that genetics technologies will streamline drug consumption by being
.
more effective and through enhanced diagnostic capabilities, there is an obvious potential conflict
associated with the pharma buy-up of genetics technologies. See Schrage, supra note 73, at 32
("The mor� genetic information �hat's generated, . . . the better tailored and targeted drug
.
therapies will become. Your genetic profile will become an indispensable part of the medications
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government,428 many generated by the direct involvement of researchers in
entrepreneurial efforts to raise capital for and commercialize their work·429
'
and (5) global issues bearing upon international human rights , such as the

impact of the patenting430 and commercialization of genetics technologies on
biodiversity and the environment.43 1 Ironically, as suggested above, the most
readily
available
technologies-genetic
diagnostic
and
screening
capability-raise many of the most ominous ethical questions . These questions
include self-selection, also known as eugenics,432 and patient care issues such

you might be prescribed . ") (citation omitted) .

428. A deluge of such allegations has accompanied the patent granted to Dr. W. French
1995, and licensed exclusively to Genetic
Therapy Inc. of Gaithersburg, Maryland. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
429. The genotech industry is, by its very nature, a conglomerate of high science and raw
Anderson and his colleagues at the NIH on March 2 1 ,

venture capitalism, which has given rise to allegations and actual incidents of scientifie misconduct
and questionable practices.

See, e.g. , US Health Officials Criticize Drug Firms Marketing Ethics,
1 3 , 1994, at 12A (Genentech to stop funding height screening

SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct.

because critics say it was a veiled effort to get short kids to take growth hormone; charges that

Genentech executive paid $1 million in kickbacks to Minneapolis doctor); Robin E. Margolis,
Regukuory Update, HEALTH SPAN , Oct . , 1994, at 30 (the Office of Research Integrity at HHS

brought allegations of scientist misconduct against BioQuest, Glaxo Institute for Molecular
Biology, and Stanford University , alleging that they misstated credentials and fabricated data to
obtain grants) . Providing scientists and top executives with equity holdings is the only way to
attract top-flight people to fledgling firms, which stand a high risk of failure, and the only way
to do this is to raise capital premised upon success. The end result may be a hard-sell to investors

and pressure and scientists to embellish
Wealth in their Genes , WASH. PosT,

See Kathleen Day, Biotech Executives Find
8, 1994; Fisher, supra note 101 , at 9A (" [T]he

is its success.
April

commercial recruitment of leading scientists from publicly supported universities and federally
backed genome centers has stirred professional resentment among some geneticists, who argue
that the rush to commercialize or patent pieces of the genome project will hinder the greater
discoveries that can come when the scientific community freely shares its discoveries . "). This is
especially troublesome during a time when reported incidents of scientific fraud are becoming more
prevalent. See Anthony Flint, US Curbs on Data Fraud Not Expected: Research Institutions Need
to Control Problem, Head of Federal Panel Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1 1 , 1 995, at 3.
430. Much controversy has surrounded the commercialization of R&D paid for (if not
conducted) by the federal government. See, e.g. , Skolnick et al . , supra note 341 , at 2-3 . The
international community has been critical of the NIH's efforts to patent gene sequences despite
the theme of international cooperation associated with HGP.

See Malinowski, supra note 89, at
8; cf. John Richards, International Aspects of Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 4 FORDHA M
INTELL. PROP. ME DIA & ENT. L.J. 433 (Summer 1993) (citing 23 countries as having specific
provisions barring the grant of patents for inventions whose publication or exploitation would be
contrary to morality) .

43 1 . See Goldman, supra note 216, at 695; Kirby, supra note 33, at 1 8 ("The greatest
care is needed now as we face the possibility of reducing, or even eliminating, elements of
[humans' genetic] diversity . ") .

432. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1493- 1 497. How genetics technology
is used, not the technology itself, is the issue, and the capabilities and temptations ntroduced by

�

genetics technologies are the danger: "To use genetic technology as a way of trymg to control
what other people will become is not only immoral; it is also to miss the point. The true
significance of genetic technology, and the power that it is delivering over !if�, i� n�t th�t people

can be designed from scratch, but that they can break free from some of the hm1tat10ns imposed
by their inherited genes . " Survey, supra note 2, at S l7.
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as insurance coverage and access, counseling/informed consent requirements,
and increased demand for in-vitro fertilization and late-term abortion. 433
Perhaps now, when the consensus among policymakers seems to be that
health care funding must be cut, 434 the most fundamental ethical and public
policy question is , "Who is going to pay for the forthcoming generation of
genotechnologies? " The myriad of genotech products and capabilities
underscores this question, especially given the fact that there is no cost
effectiveness requirement for drug approval within the United States.
Moreover, the American health care culture is such that patients expect
technologies with any enhanced efficacy over market substitutes to be made
available, and providers generally have been ready to oblige, regardless of
cost.435 As stated above, legal liability has made providers especially willing
to make genetic diagnostic capabilities available. 436 Responsive to such
pressures , genotech diagnostic products are multiplying and rapidly being
pushed into commercialization.
The silence has lingered far too long.437 These issues must be addressed
and governing regulations introduced and enforced. Although the Office of
Science and Technology Assessment has proposed the introduction of a
National Bioethics Advisory Commission,438 what is needed is an
independent agency.439 To be more precise, what is needed is a counterpart
433. The National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research has warned "it is
premature to offer DNA testing or screening for cancer predisposition outside a carefully
monitored research environment. " Richard Saltus, Plan to Market Tests for Cancer Gene is Hit,
Bo STON GLOBE, Mar. IO, 1994, at 3. The warning, prompted by successes such as discovery of
the BRCA l Gene, "noted that many questions remain unresolved, including whether a person is
better off knowing about a future risk if medicine can do little to prevent the disease, and how
to avoid genetic discrimination . " Id. Oncor, a Maryland genotech company, has announced that
it will begin offering gene analysis services to families. Id. One implication of this technology
is increased demand for in-vitro fertilization and late-term abortion. See Survey, supra note 2, at
S l 7. See generally Malinowski, supra note 39, at 1451 -54.
434. See generally PEROT, supra note 390.
435. Id. at 303. The issue of cost cannot be addressed adequately in this survey article.
436. See Malinowski, supra note 39 (addressing "wrongful birth"/"wrongful life" actions) .
437. This silence may be due in part to the distinction made between risk assessment and
risk management. As explained by Dr. James Dickson, when research (risk assessment) elements
of the Public Health Service entered themselves too far into the arena of the management of risk,
there can be political repercussions. Telephone Interview with Dr. James Dickson (Aug. 7, 1994).
438. National Bioethics Advisory Commission Proposed Charter, 59 Fed. Reg. 155, at
41 584-85 (Aug. 12, 1994) . Several commissions have been formed in the past two decades to
address bioethics issues. See Jay Katz, Do We Need Another Advisory Commission on Human
Experimentation ?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. , Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 29, 29. Furthermore, NIH and
the Department of Energy each fund Ethical, Legal , and Social Issues (ELSI) programs, which
are the largest Federal funding source for bioethics studies. See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS , supra note
4 1 1 , at 8 . These commissions and programs, lacking the independence proposed above, have either
been unsuccessful or unable to withstand political sea changes.
439. See Katz, supra note 438, at 29-3 1 . For discussion of the creation of such a body
within the United States and an actual proposal to do so in France, see Malinowski, supra note
39, at 1513-17. Cf Nicholson, supra note 4 1 1 , at 4 (addressing debate on whether or not the
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to the FDA and NIH that has as much regulatory authority as those agencies
but which is focused on genotechnology and committed to responsible
gathering and dissemination of information to enhance public awareness of
genotechnology and the development of needed health policy.440 This agency
should be staffed to represent the perspectives and interests of patients, the
genotech industry , health care providers and educators , and the insurance
industry . It should be made accountable to the public and Congress and vested
with enough authority and resources to investigate genotechnologies and
directly introduce regulations . Resulting mandates could require the inclusion
of provisions within CRADAs which directly address some of the ethical issues
identified above by providing added safeguards against irresponsible uses,
thereby alleviating public concern.
Of course, the composition and conduct of such an agency would have
to be carefully monitored to ensure that it functions effectively and is not
captured by industry or used as a showpiece to stifle dissent from groups such
as the religious right. It is critical that the recommendations of such an agency
be crafted carefully and publicized extensively. Although the alliance nature
of the genotech industry suggests that it will be represented by a powerful
lobby , the public accountability mandate of the proposed agency and high
profile nature of genotechnology should safeguard against undue industry
influence. Tenure limitations on those appointed to guide the proposed agency
would provide another safeguard. Moreover, this interdisciplinary approach
to health policy decis ionmaking has shown potential in the past-though it
always has been applied in the context of bioethics. A n independent agency
could reduce the element of political vulnerability evident in the functioning
of previous United States bioethics commissions which were disbanded before
accomplishing their stated goals . 441
Whether through the proposed independent agency or not, the most
difficult ethics issues accompanying genetics technologies will be addressed,
and that process will result in regulation. At least one proposal for regulation,
the Genetic Privacy Act, which was drafted by a team of academics including
George Annas and introduced during the spring of 1 995, has attracted the
attention of some state legislatures .442 At the present time, approximately
twelve states have enacted genetics regulations, including Colorado and New
proposed European Convention on Bioethics now being prepared by the Council of Europe should
be used to enforce moral principles) .
.
such an mst1tut10n
440. France already has taken substantial legislative steps to introduce
into its political system. See Malinows ki, supra note 39, at 151 �- 1 7
note 3 , at 14 844 1 . See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 4 1 1 , at 1-5; Malinowski, sup:a
s of B1omed1cal
Subject
Human
of
ion
99. An exception is the National Commi ssion for the Protect
ban on human
the
for
ible
respons
is
which
,
974-87
1
and Behavioral Research, in existence from
1498-99.
at
id.
See
.
consent
experimentation without the subject's
442. See generally DiChristina, supra note 24, at 1 8 .
.
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york. 443 Nevertheless,

comprehens ive legislation must be debated and
enacted at the national level. As set forth above, these issues simply are too
controversial and obvious to be ignored much longer without significant
consequences-especially with more genotechnologies entering commerce.
Instituting the proposed agency would enhance the possibility of generating
health policy with foresight and thought, rather than leaving it to be addressed
by Congress in a reactionary fashion in response to political challenges and
public emotion.444
If the commercialization of genotechnology is to be slowed down, it
should be slowed for policy reasons, not because it is easier to delay market
availability than to deal with these technologies. Again , in light of the human
health and other societal implications associated with these technologies ,
ignoring the policy and regulatory questions and shortcomings surrounding
genotechnology is , at best, irresponsible. Moreover , the reforms suggested
here might inspire members of the genotech industry to better organize
themselves , consider more carefully the ethical issues accompanying their
work, and-in a constructive manner-make proposals which embody the
industry's insight. 445
Conclusion
Since the beginning of this decade, the front-pages of the nation's major
daily newspapers have continuously been occupied by the genotech industry's
discoveries . Nevertheless, health policy responsive to practical applications of
the resulting technologies is insufficient, especially at the federal level . The
nation 's policymakers have not addressed issues as obvious and important as
insurance coverage for genotech therapeutics and diagnostics , privacy of
genetic screening results , and informed consent requirements for genetic
screening in a practical manner. Thus, the diagnostics and therapeutics that
the genotec h industry has been developing over the past several years , which
are about to begin reaching the public, are almost as ominous from a health
policy perspective as they are inspiring to the patients who will benefit.
Federal policy, to a large extent, has driven the genotech industry to its
present cross-roads . Policy supportive of genotech R&D has not been followed
by an adequate regulatory and health policy response to commercialization of
443 . Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3- 1 104.7 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2733
(1990 & Supp. 1995); see also Associated Press, Geneticist Calls for Privacy in Test Results,
BoSTON GLOBE , Sept. 30, 1 995, at 3.
444. See, e.g. , supra note 414 (addressing recent challenge to patenting of genetic
discoveries raised by a coalition of religious leaders and Jeremy Rifkin).
445 . The introduction of regulation in the medical profession had a similar effect, inspiring
the profession to organize and become central to the health policy of the nation. See generally
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE ( 1 982).
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the resulting products. The industry' s accomplishments in science and health
care have been achieved by small, entrepreneurial companies aided by the
endorsement and direct and generous support of the federal government during
the late 1980s and early 1990s . The federal government's public support of
HGP also has enabled genotech companies to draw vast amounts of capital
from the private sector , thereby directly helping to launch the industry .
Unfortunately, federal policy as well as the pharmas' involvement may have
created a "false " market built upon inflated and unobtainable expectations,
resulting in major disappointments and the loss of investor interest. Investment
capital , taxpayer dollars and, more important, invaluable human capital may
all have been accessed too early-before the basic research necessary to turn
genotechnology into safe and effective products was complete.
Although the market appeal of genotech stock has returned, it is uncertain
how long it will remain. The insufficiency of the existing regulatory and legal
infrastructure, along with the potential for public concern about drug
disappointments and reactionary policymaking, threaten the industry's market
appeal and future. When the genotech industry completes the metamorphosis
it is currently undergoing, and the industry's first generation of technologies
are well within the realm of public awareness, it may be that existing talent
and venture capital was spent, and the industry closed a tremendous learning
curve only to have its accomplishments purchased cheaply by pharmas or held
back by reactionary policymaking.
At the present time, some element of change is certain. How the genotech
industry is reshaped , or reshapes itself, will be influenced by federal policy,
industry 's own successes and failures , interest on Wall Street and among
investors in general , and leadership within the industry. In the m idst of the
present uncertainty , and on the eve of the introduction of practical applications
of genotechnologies into commerce, there is an opportunity for policymakers
and industry to have a profound impact on human health. The federal
government's timely response through the introduction of an adequate
regulatory infrastructure could accelerate the availability of genotech products ,
enhance and stabilize the investment appeal of the industry, ensure a safe level
of oversight and responsibility, and avoid some readily apparent potential
abuses of genotech capabilities . In light of the profound impact of the
underlying technologies on human health , the United States' economy, and the
United States ' overall vested interest in the genotech industry, this opportunity
is accompanied by an obligation to assess the adequacy of existing federal
policy regarding the commercialization of genotechnologies . Though delays
in market availability may be necessitated by direct and thoroughly
contemplated policymaking, such delays should not be tolerated when due to

regulatory inefficiencies and non-responsiveness.
The problem is that this opportunity to maximize the benefits from
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genotechnology in the near future is not discernible without foresight-the same
level of foresight shared by the scientists and venture capitalists responsible
for the evolution of the genotech industry and advent of practical applications
of genotechnologies . Unfortunately, despite the significant role that lawyers
are

playing

in

the

unfolding

of the

genotech

industry, 446

lawmakers

historically have been blind to such opportunities. As recognized and stated
by Justice Warren Burger more than a quarter-century ago , " [t]he law does
not search out as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and
demands . "447
Federal policy has expanded and augmented scientific and medical
research resulting in a great number of new technologies . However, existing
federal policy is no longer adequate. The gap between genotechnologies and
the regulatory infrastructure bearing upon the introduction and uses of
genotechnologies has broadened. Before elected public policymakers can
thoroughly

address and question the uses

of genotech therapeutics and

diagnostics , health policy will be determined by health care providers on a
technology-by-technology, patient-by-patient basis. Another possibility is that
public anxiety will trigger short-sighted policymaking which may extinguish
commercial incentives and generally prevent future commercial applications
of genotechnology.
The lack of regulatory foresight and infrastructure should make both the
genotech

industry

and those who would benefit from the forthcoming

generation of genotech therapeutics and diagnostics-all of us-uncomfortable,
if not downright anxious . Without regulatory foresight, the industry is more
likely to suffer a broad-sided political attack , as exemplified by the recent
challenge to the patenting of genetics discoveries launched by a coalition of
some eighty religious leaders-the first substantive political challenge to the
genotech industry,

but certain! y

not the last. 448 The danger is that the

446 . Law and lawyers are heavily involved in the genotech industry' s development, though
their involvement is reactionary :
[L)aw and lawyers are playing a significant role in biotechnology's development.
The case for that proposition is clear. Biotechnological product development has a
relatively uniform "life cycle, " beginning with "conception" in the research of
universities and other not-for-profit institutions and "growing" through licensing and
technological transfer, patenting, and financing, maturing through regulatory
approval, and sometimes dying an "unnatural" death through product liability, rather
than in the old-age of obsolescence . With a life-cycle constrained by legal and
regulatory events, the law and lawyers play an indispensable role in facilitating every

stage of the development of biotechnology .
Robert A. Bohrer, Forward: What is Biotechnology and Why Devote a Law Review Symposium
to Biotechnology Law?, 55 U. Pm. L. REV. 607, 608-09 (1994) (footnotes omitted) .
REV.

447. Warren E. Burger, Reflections on l.Aw and Experimental Medicine, 15 UCLA L.
436, 436 (1%7).
_448. See Ros:nberg, supra note 4 1 4 . With the absence of regulatory lines (whether drawn

by legislators or the industry itself), the industry is subject to broad-sided
attacks
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econom ic and health care contributions of the industry will be delayed, if not
lost.
This Article has described the genotech industry and the forthcoming
generation of products it is developing, highlighted critical legal issues which
bear upon the industry and its potential contributions to human health,
identified important choices which policymakers should addres s , and offered
suggestions to help maximize the human health and economic contributions of
the genotech industry. Hopefully, a reasoned debate of these proposals by
policymakers will translate into a thoughtful , not reactionary, legal response
to genotechnology, thus leading to greater market efficiency and, even more
important, alleviation of human suffering and preservation of human life. In
light of genotechnology's potential, policymakers must not ignore the choices
identified throughout this Article, for we all will bear the significant costs of
their silence.
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APPENDIX 1: 449

Biotech Drugs Approved by the FDA by March 1 995

Product

Company

Application (use)

Approval Date

Actimmune

Genentech

management of chronic

Dec.

Activase

1990

granulomatous disease

(gamma interferon)

Genentech

acute myocardial
infarction; acute

(recombinant alteplase)

1987
June 1 99
0
Nov.

pulmonary embolism

Adagen

Enzon

treatment of infants and

March

1990

children with severe

(adenosine deaminase)

immunodeficiency

Alferon N

Interferon Sciences

genital warts

Oct.

1989

Aug.

1993

Apr.

199 1

(Interferon Alfa-N3 , Human
Leukocyte Derived)

Betaseron (recombinant

Berlex Laboratories/

relapsing, remitting

interferon beta 1-B)

Chiron

Multiple Sclerosis

Ceredase/Cerezyme

Genzyme

Type l Gaucher'• disease

(alglucerase)

(Ceredase)

May

1994

(Cerezyme)
(alglucerase)

Epogen/Procrit

Amgen/Ortbo

(Epogen) treatment of

(erythropoietin)

Biotecb

anemia associated with

June

1989

chronic renal failure and
anemia in Retrovir-treated

Dec. 1990

IDV-infected patients/
(Procrit) chemotherapyassociated anemia

449. Compiled from data provided by Kendall Strategies Inc.
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Humatrope/Nutropin

Eli Lilly/

human growth hormone

March 1987

(somatropin)

Genentech, Inc.

deficiency in

Nov. 1993

children/(Nutropin)
growth hormone failure
due to chronic renal
insufficiency prior to
kidney transplantation
Humulin

Eli Lilly

diabetes

Oct. 1982

Schering/Plough

hairy cell leukemia;

June 1986

genital warts; AIDS-

June 1988

related Kaposi's sarcoma;

Nov. 1988

non-A, non-B hepatitis;

Feb. 1991

hepatitis B

July 1992

(recombinant human insulin)

IntronA
(alpha-interferon)

Leukine

Jmmunex

Neupogen

autologous bone

marrow

March 1991

transplantation

(yeast-derived GM-CSF)
Amgen

(Filgrastim)

chemotherapy-induced

Feb. 1991

neutropenia; bone

June 1994

marrow transplant;
accompanied neutropenia

Oncaspar

Enzon/Rbone-

acute lymphoblastic

(pegaspargase)

Poulenc Rorer

leukemia

Ortboclone OKT3

Ortbo Biotech

reversal of acute kidney

Chiron

treatment of kidney

May 1992

(renal) carcinoma

(Aldesleukin)
Protropin

June 1986

transplant rejection

(Muromonab-CD3)

Proleukio, IL-2

Feb. 1994

Genentech

growth hormone

Oct. 1985

inadequacy

(Somatrem, Human Growth
Hormone)
Genentech

Cystic Fibrosis

Dec. 1993

Recombinate

Baxter Healthcare/

blood clotting factor vm

Dec. 1992

rAHF/Kogenate

Miles

for the treatment of

Feb. 1993

Pulmozyme
(DNase)

(recombinant antihemopbilic

hemophilia A

factor)
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hepatitis B vaccine

Recombivax/

Merck/

Engerix-B

SmithKline Beecham

1986

July
Sept.

1989

(Hepatitis B
Vaccine
Recombinant)

ReoPro

Centocor,

Inc.

(Abciximab)

reduce acute blood clot

Dec. 1994

related complications for
high-risk angioplasty
patients

Roferon-A

Hoffmann-La

hairy cell leukemia;

June

1986

(recombinant

Roche

AIDS-related Kaposi's

Nov.

1988

alfa-interferon)
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Appendix 11:450
Significant Biotech Approvals From July 1994 Through June 1995

Company

Product

Indication

Date

ALZA

DynaCirc CR

controlled release

July

1994

formulation of
antihypenensive drug
Hybritech

Tandem PSA

detect prostate cancer

August

Molecular Biosystems

Albunex

ultrasound contrast agent,

August

heart disease

DNX

BIODIGM

LDL reduction

September

Quadra Logic

Photofrin

photosensitive drug for

September

Technologies

photodynamic therapy

SangStat Medical

PRA-STAT

HLA antibody detection

October

Amgen

Neupogen

severe chronic

December

neutropenia (3rd
indication)

Centocor

ReoPro

anti-platelet for

December

angioplasty

Epitope

OraSure

oral fluid collection for

December

HIV- I antibody testing

lmmunex

Thioplex

cancer (tumors)

December

Univax Bioloeics

WinRbo SD

blood clotting disorders;

March

1995

suppress Rh
isoimmun.ization in
pregnancy

Bio-Technology General

Bio-Tropin

recombinant growth

May

hormone

T Cell Sciences

CD4 cell enumeration

May

CQuentials

transplant donor tissue

June

DR DNA

analysis

TRAX
CD4 Test Kit

GeneTrak

Typing Kit

450. Reproduced from BIOTECH 96, supra note 2, at 20.
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NeXstar

DaunoXome

advanced, AIDS-related,

June

Kaposi's sarcoma

U.S. Bioscience

Ethyol

prevent kidney damage in
ovarian cancer patients
treated with cisplatin
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